

## THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF THE NATIONAL POLISH CITIZENS RECOVERY SYSTEM

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### Abstract:

*This article is devoted to the issue of personnel recovery. The author discussed, among others, the proposed process of the development of the National Polish Citizens Recovery System and the proposed database model ISOPREP (Eng. Isolated Personnel Report).*

### Keywords:

*recovering personnel, ISOPREP, Personnel Recovery*

### INTRODUCTION

Poland as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is obliged to create a national personnel recovery system, based on the guidelines of the NATO Military Committee. The National Military Personnel Recovery System functioning within the structures of the Armed Forces does not provide the possibility of its use in the case of unlawful isolation of both state officials and citizens of the Republic of Poland. It is appropriate to create a system that would be aimed at the recovery of Polish citizens and government officials dealing with the situations of broadly understood isolation. The development of the National Polish Citizens Recovery System has the following arguments in its favour:

- obtaining the possibility of an urgent response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and search and rescue actions undertaken immediately after the occurrence of Polish citizens' isolation, and possibly citizens of the EU and NATO;
- the possibility to effectively use the search and rescue unit under single Polish command in any region of the world;



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- the possible immediate use of the search and rescue unit in rescue operations within the country or abroad, immediately after the occurrence of a natural disaster.

The creation of such a system has been recognised reasonable which means that it is necessary to establish the scope of its operation and institutional location. In the author's opinion, *the National Polish Citizens Recovery System* should be defined as *a set of complementary military, political and civil - law undertakings which in organisational, planning and training terms are aimed at preparing staff, forces and measures to perform tasks related to the granting of aid or recovering personnel located in an unknown, inaccessible or hostile environments as a result of loss, interception or abduction.*

The defined system of recovering Polish citizens residing or directed to serve or work in dangerous regions of the world should be created by implementing the following projects of a structural (creating the organisational structure) and functional (implementing solutions) nature. In addition to the introduction of appropriate legal solutions, the primary task should be to create a central specialist search and rescue unit and provide it with the necessary equipment. Its task should be to conduct broadly understood operations of recovering isolated citizens of the Republic of Poland and possibly nationals of the EU and NATO Member States, as well as the participation in rescue operations within the country. Its organisational structure should include:

- a search unit, as members of which should be assigned officers and employees of AW – the Intelligence Agency, SWW – Military Intelligence Service and MSZ – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- a rescue unit, consisting of selected soldiers and officers of MON - the Ministry of National Defence and MSW - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, seconded from these services to that unit;
- aircrafts transferred to the needs of the units, which would allow to deploy forces and resources needed in the course of any search and rescue operation.

As part of activities of functional nature, the most important projects include:

- introduction of the single SERE (*Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape*) training program to the process of training of soldiers, officers and workers of MON, MSZ, AW, ABW – the Internal Security Agency, MSW and other institutions, organisations and companies deployed in dangerous areas of the world;
- setting up the central *ISOPREP* cards database in the organisational structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or in the structures of the search and rescue unit).

The introduction of mandatory *ISOPREP* cards for soldiers, officers and employees of MON, MSZ, AW, ABW, MSW and other institutions, organisations and companies leaving for high-risk countries, and ultimately for all the aforementioned travelling abroad on official duty. The process of development of the organisational structure of the System of Polish Citizens Recovery, providing for the implementation of three parts, should either spread out over time or consist of three stages.

Stage (Phase) I should be devoted to preparatory works that cover organisational and training activities. Among the organisational actions it is necessary to set up the Expert Group, consisting of both employees of MSZ as well as soldiers and officers from the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Intelligence Agency, experienced in running projects in the field of personnel recovery. The task of the Expert Group would be to develop uniform regulations, instructions and guidelines correlated with the solutions used in NATO and the Polish Armed Forces, that would allow for creating, processing and storing *ISOPREP* cards, and the establishment of the central search and rescue unit within the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or structured in the direct subordination of the Prime Minister). The second task in this area of activity must be the creation of hazard maps. Such a document should be formulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The development of hazard maps should be intended not so much to define hazardous areas as to contribute to undertaking diplomatic activities aimed at establishing cooperation with institutions of these countries in order to prevent the possibility of isolating and conducting operations of recovery of isolated Polish citizens. Ultimately, it must contain provision for the possibility of a bilateral agreement or an arrangement that would assume conducting activities by the Polish search and rescue unit within the countries' areas, and in particular that would determine the conditions of landing of planes and helicopters. In this context, it is also important to obtain information so as to develop plans for transport of forces and means by air and sea, and to conduct recovery operations including:

- the selection of airports, where landing would be most beneficial in operational and technical terms;
- the conditions of possible supply of propellants and lubricants for aircrafts;
- the conditions for amphibious operations in order to take isolated people.

The second group of projects of organisational nature are activities targeting the formation of the search and rescue unit. Soldiers, officers and employees posted from MON, AW, SWW, MSW and experts from MSZ should form its organisational structure. When developing this structure and selecting staff it would be reasonable to channel experience of NATO and the EU member states, having Personnel Recovery specialised groups in their structures. It will also allow for the proper selection of the equipment necessary for the unit. For this purpose it is indispensable to indicate types of aircrafts that should be at the disposal of the unit. This remains an open question whether they are to be made available or part of the organisational structure of the unit.

However, the purchase of these aircrafts should be included in plans the Air Force modernisation. It is also essential to obtain from the Ministry of National Defence equipment and technical capabilities to enable leading satellite communication. The approval for the use of the band held by the Military Unit 2305, i.e. GROM, should be considered the best solution during recovery operations.

Experiences of the Military Unit 2305 organisation process indicate that an important task carried out in the framework of organisational preparations is to establish coop-

eration at the international level. It is crucial to cooperate with the EU countries and NATO on the grounds of both interoperability in the event of unlawful isolation and the reciprocal use of resources and information during the operation of recovering isolated nationals of the Republic of Poland, the EU and NATO. This is especially significant in areas in which Poland does not have its diplomatic representation. It is justified to use political means to work closely together with representatives of the US Navy, the US Air Force, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the Israeli Unit 669, with regard to training, interoperability and the usage of aircrafts, surface ships and submarines targeting the transport of the equipment and evacuees.

In the group of training projects conducting specialised training should be particularly indicated. It should focus on two thematic groups. The first of them should be directed at improving skills of search, negotiation and appropriate cooperation with special services of different countries in order to recover nationals of the Republic of Poland, the EU and NATO. Soldiers, officers and employees of AW, SWW and MSZ should be subject to it. The second type of specialised training is a classic tactical and technical training addressed to soldiers / officers performing broadly understood operations of recovery of isolated citizens of the Republic of Poland. Both types of training should be conducted in their own or foreign training centres.

Stage (Phase) II of the system development process should be brought to prepare personnel and equipment to carry out rescue missions and operations aimed at recovery of isolated people. It should be noted that it is possible to start this before Stage I has been finished, as activities performed in the course of the project come down to:

- conducting a full cycle of the training process of specialist search-and-rescue groups;
- technical preparation of aircrafts and the personnel to carry out activities as part of recovery missions, which can be successfully conducted on the territory of our country and NATO or the EU member states;
- development of executive documents, including instructions, guidelines and orders to conduct rescue and isolated people recovery operations;
- possible test flights in regions considered potential areas for isolation of Polish citizens, also in order to verify the possibilities of cooperation with the forces of the EU and NATO states.

Whereas Stage (Phase) III of the system organisation process should be in practice reduced to exercise execution, as an attempt to carry out an action of recovery of the unlawfully isolated and on this basis determine the scope of improvement courses and necessary equipment investments.

## **1. THE MODEL OF THE SEARCH AND RESCUE UNIT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL POLISH CITIZENS RECOVERY SYSTEM**

The presented above range of actions undertaken at various stages leads to the conclusion that the development of the National Polish Citizens Recovery System is an achievable task. According to the author of this publication, the greatest challenge that is possible to meet in the two-year time since its inception, it is to pursue its objectives

and stages. Nevertheless, it should be considered real that within the period of minimum three years the operational capability by the search and rescue unit of the National System Recovery Citizens can be reached. In order to ensure its effective use in the case of an act of the unlawful isolation it would be separated into four cells focusing on individual elements of the system. Thus, the search and rescue unit should consist of:

- the cell responsible for searching;
- the cell responsible for rescue;
- the cell responsible for personal and training matters;
- the cell responsible for logistic support.

The cell involved in searching should include soldiers, officers and employees of MSZ, the Intelligence Agency and the Military Intelligence Service with experience gained while staying in regions within their competence. It should be divided into sections dealing with the assessment of the situation in different regions of the world. Generally it can be assumed that the division may reflect the continental one or any other justified by the organisational structure. Employees forming the section should have practical knowledge in the field of social, economic, political and cultural conditions in a given region. Moreover, they should possess knowledge about geographical, climatic and topographical conditions and at least, be acquainted with safety issues. This concerns in particular the role played by local extremist organisations and possible links between extremist organisations and special services of the country concerned. It is also reasonable for them to have good contacts with representatives of the country or countries. They should be trained in the field of negotiations and complete the course SERE at the "C" level.

The cell with responsibility for rescue should include soldiers and officers seconded to the unit, having outstanding physical fitness, mental resilience and shooting, tactical, parachuting and medical training. Each of them should be qualified as a SERE instructor, or at least hold a certificate for completing the training at the "C" level. The introduction of rules regarding deploying soldiers or officers to cells would enable their covert displacement into the area of activities, for example as a member of the military contingent posted in the framework of stabilisation forces, humanitarian or observation missions. In addition, it solves a practical problem of possessing firearms by them and thus also by MSZ (or another designated institution). This cell should be composed of eight rescue sections of six people each. This structure stems from the construction of helicopters and the number of seats, including seats for those taken during the operation.

The cell responsible for training and personnel issues should consist of two sections. The first section should deal with the organisation of the unit training, as well as carry out the SERE courses for officers and employees of MSZ, MSW, AW, ABW, BBN – the National Security Office, Chancelleries of the Sejm and the Senate and other institutions, organisations and companies. It should be assumed optimal when in the initial period of the unit existence the matters concerning training would remain in the hands

of soldiers / officers of the rescue section. Whilst the personnel section should be dealing with HR issues and documentation associated with generating, processing and storing ISOPREP cards of non-soldiers, officers and civilian employees of MON, SWW, SKW – the Military Counterintelligence Service. Also it would handle personal matters of the entire unit. Thus, it is reasonable that it is composed of soldiers, officers and employees of the Ministry of National Defence and the Internal Security Agency.

In contrast, the logistic cell's task should be to provide the unit with, among others, specialist equipment and satellite and air communications in accordance with its needs. The detailed tasks analysis that should be performed by individual organisational cells also allows the unit to determine the number of full-time employees, which must be estimated at a minimum of about 125 - 135 people, including about 30 people in the first and third cells, 55 officers or soldiers in the second cell and 15 in the fourth one.

Moreover, an important element is equipment attributed to the organisational structure. Not only does it determine the mode of action, but also the organisational model. As it was stated above, a reasonable solution is to provide aircrafts for the needs of the system, which are necessary to transport forces and equipment. The following means of transport should be put at the unit's disposal:

- one transport C-17 Globemaster III aircraft (heavy), the capacity (134 people and approx. 77 tons of freight) of which fully guarantees the possibility to deploy forces;
- two transport MC-130E / H Combat Talon I / II planes, which as a variety of the classic C-130 Hercules aircraft were used for conducting search and rescue operations;
- eight specialised HH-60H Rescue Hawk helicopters - a version of the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter designed for the conduct of search and rescue operations.

The choice of aircrafts presented by the author stems from both their intended purpose and also a consequence of the analysis of the number of this type of aircrafts held by the Polish Armed Forces. As far as the aircraft C-17 is concerned, Poland as a NATO member state has the right to use such a plane based in Papa Air Base in Hungary. The granted amount of 150 flight-hours is enough to allow the execution of the possible transport of the search and rescue unit. Thus, it must be assumed that a possible solution is to bring to the potential increase in the number of flight-hours in the situation when it is necessary to use the citizens recovery system or then the purchase of such aircrafts is not required. The Polish Air Force have already had the C-130E Herkules aircrafts. Currently they have not been prepared to conduct search and rescue actions but for transportation purposes. However, the Air Force development programme provides for the purchase of new aircrafts. It must therefore be concluded that at least one of them should be adapted to the MC-130E / H Combat Talon I and / or II standard, which would apply to both the needs of the National Military Personnel Recovery System and the National Polish Citizens Recovery System. A similar solution should be used in reference to HH-60H Rescue Hawk helicopters. In order to reduce the financial

consequences of these projects they ought to be carried out simultaneously to the modernisation of the equipment of the Air Force and Land Forces through the partial change in the action nature by adding tasks of recovery of MON and MSZ personnel.




Fig. 1. The proposal of the SAR unit organisation structure

Source: own elaboration

The purchase of other communication equipment, weapons, ammunition, means of transport and other items necessary to the functioning of the unit should be held within the Intelligence Agency's special expenditure, and then made available for the exclusive use of personnel of the search and rescue unit, and it should not be officially registered.

## 2. COMPETENCES OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OVER CITIZENS RECOVERY

The author of this article pointed out several times on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' leading role in the system. In his opinion, the position of *the National Polish Citizens Recovery System* in the organisational structure - or the direct subordination - of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or possibly the Prime Minister) is not only legitimate, but in fact indispensable. This is due to either the statutory duty of this department, which is representing the Republic of Poland and its citizens on the international arena<sup>1</sup>, the

<sup>1</sup> Article 13 and 32 of the Act of 4<sup>th</sup> September 1997 on government administration departments (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 141, item 943 with amendments) and §1 of the Ordinance of the Prime Minister of 18<sup>th</sup> November 2011 on the specific responsibilities of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

possibility to ensure diplomatic protection for them, or the necessity to carry out actions aimed at the personnel recovery with diplomatic means, which often occurs in the case of unlawful isolation. The solution proves reasonable when taking into account that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a significant role in creating activities – it is mandated to negotiate, cooperate with NATO and the EU in acquiring diplomatic authorisation for overflight and movement of forces participating in operations of isolated non-military personnel recovery through territories of third countries. In addition, such subordination allows assigning personnel conducting operations of diplomatic status and unlimited access to information owned by the Polish diplomatic missions.

In this context it is equally important to shorten the decision-making process, since the assignment of the system to the Ministry of National Defence would require proceedings to send a military contingent outside the country. In addition, practical issues also dictate this solution. First of all, the creation of such a structure will allow securing issues related to the combat rescue in places where, for various reasons, units subordinated to the Ministry of National Defence cannot be used. In addition, it is quite important to solve the issue, which is a problem of the personnel inclusion of a specific employee in the *ISOPREP* card system<sup>2</sup>. It must be therefore assumed that the creation of a system which arranges matters related to procedures in case of isolation, defines and standardises the manner the *ISOPREP* cards and possibly other documents necessary to direct soldiers, officers or employees to perform tasks outside Poland are prepared, stored and shared

At the same time it must be considered that the scale of organisational undertakings and the scope of activities carried out within the system means that it should be developed in consultation with the concerned ministries, especially the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as largely correlated with the National Military Personnel Recovery System. Moreover, it is reasonable to draw on the experience of the Ministry of National Defence. The experiences of the functioning of the National Military Personnel Recovery System lead to the conclusion that the efficiency of operations conducted by the National Polish Citizens Recovery System depends on the professionalism of employees of MSZ and the search and rescue unit as an integral part of the system.

Officers and soldiers deployed to the unit are to constitute its core. It should be ready for use during operations of isolated Polish citizens recovery and rescue operations carried out in the country with the use of aircrafts, e.g. when floods and other natural disasters occur. In addition, it could be used to provide assistance to citizens of the EU and NATO if a given country did not possess appropriate forces and resources for this purpose, having asked to the Polish side for such assistance.

It would also seem reasonable to make the search and rescue unit responsible for the creation of the SERE system conducting trainings for employees and officers of non-military structures, and the procedure of creating, processing and storing *ISOPREP*

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<sup>2</sup> In the course of legislative works on the introduction of *ISOPREP* cards a problem arose with determining the procedure to specify who and upon what rules the cards should be available to.



cards of Polish citizens who are not soldiers, officers and employees of the Polish Armed Forces, the participation of whom would be necessary in the course of the isolated people recovery operation. This solution allows for the implementation of uniform procedures during isolated Polish citizens recovery operations.

Thus, the central element of the National Polish Citizens Recovery System should be the search and rescue unit prepared to carry out actions aimed at releasing the wrongfully isolated. Recognising the rules of functioning of such units in military structures of various countries reasonable, it is appropriate to make both the unit's peacetime establishment as well as the types of its operations confidential<sup>3</sup>. It may therefore be a priority to implement the rule *Operations Security - OPSEC*<sup>4</sup> in the information state policy applicable to such units functioning in the military structures.

When performing activities by a civilian entity it is not always possible and sometimes justified to fully apply the *OPSEC* principle reduced to the confidence that the safety of an isolated entity / staff is always treated as superior to the right to information. However, a civilian operation should also apply *OPSEC* measures as the derogation from the principle of confidentiality may contribute to the failure of the operation. The example of a German citizen killed in Nigeria after the kidnappers had obtained information on the being arranged recovery operation may evidence the need to apply this principle.

Apart from the aforementioned arguments of organisational and competence character, such solution is supported by purely operational issues. First and foremost the matter of taking and carrying out - in case of isolation - diplomatic activity aimed at the recovery of isolated personnel or property falls within the competence of a diplomatic mission. What is more, diplomatic missions held the responsibility for preparing evacuation plans for national citizens abroad, identification of those appointed to evacuation and ensuring safety of evacuees. This principle is also incorporated into NATO AJP - 3.4.2 doctrine, which clearly states that *Evacuations of endangered non-military personnel are diplomatic initiatives*<sup>5</sup>. Thus, this solution should be considered reasonable and rational in relation to activities aimed at isolated non-military personnel recovery. This solution provides the opportunity for immediate and effective action taken by state bodies and enables to retain their high flexibility in rapidly changing conditions.

The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to take urgent steps aimed at the recovery of isolated persons or property, including the usage of funds available to other ministries. This is feasible using regulations set out in Article 5 of the Law on the Council of

<sup>3</sup> It should be considered necessary to remain the organisational structure, possessed equipment, officers' personal data and information on the run of the conducted operation confidential.

<sup>4</sup> Operations Security OPSEC is a process when non-classified information which may be used against us is protected. OPSEC calls us to see ourselves through the eyes of an enemy (persons, groups, states, organisations). Basically everyone who may harm people, assets or mission is considered an enemy. OPSEC should be used to protect information, thus prevent the enemy's ability to counteract, <http://www.dodea.edu/Offices/Safety/OPSEC.cfm> (01.01.2014r.).

<sup>5</sup> AJP – 3.4.2 Allied joint doctrine of conducting operations of NATO non-military personnel evacuation. 2007, p. 23.

Ministers<sup>6</sup> of 8<sup>th</sup> August 1996. They must be carried out from the very moment of the occurrence of an event and take into account diplomatic undertakings in the state of isolation and on the international scene. In the state of isolation the primary task is to take action with a view to releasing detainees, followed by receiving the consent to strengthen the diplomatic mission personally, enhance its protection and obtain visas for personnel deployed to the state of isolation<sup>7</sup>. However, as far as the international system is concerned, diplomatic efforts should aim to achieve a minimum approval for pursued activities, in particular - to get direct assistance. Whereas, in the case of search and rescue actions, documents authorising the flight and movement of the forces participating in a personnel recovery operation through the territories of states.

The effectiveness of the conducted projects requires a short decision-making process. Guided by this conviction and taking into account experiences of the evaluation of procedures regarding the use of force in rescue operations following natural disasters, operations of SAR (Search and Rescue Actions), DSAR (Deployable Search and Rescue Actions), CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue Actions) and CR (Combat Recovery), NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operation), the author recognises that the right to take decisions on the form of operations should be held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This requires the introduction of the rule of him/her being fully informed on a given matter by the Intelligence Agency and the Military Intelligence Service. At the same time it should be noted the minister's powers ought to be limited in the case of NAR (Non-conventional Assisted Recovery) and HR (Hostage Rescue) operations. In such a situation, a decision must be taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but after prior approval of the Prime Minister. Applying this solution would allow the reduction of decision-making duration and faster action taking.

Indisputably, the leading role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in carrying out activities directed at realising unlawfully isolated Polish citizens results from the conditions of an operational nature. Personnel recovery operations come down to hasty movement of forces into the area of activities, which would lead actions with the military target limited to a minimum. The essence of any such operation is to rescue and evacuate detainees, carried out with minimum forces through their quick organisation and withdrawal. It is obvious, therefore, that action of the element executing the operation of recovering and evacuating the unlawfully detained should be preceded by activities aiming at the location of the detainees, acquiring information on the environment and conditions in which they are held and possibly their psychophysical condition. The information will be obtained just by structures of diplomatic missions. People who are familiarised with the environment of the operation are employees of diplomatic missions, their personal contacts, employees of friendly to Poland governmental non-governmental or international organisations.

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<sup>6</sup> "In order to fulfil tasks and competences specified in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Acts of Law, the Prime Minister may in particular: set out to the minister the scope of responsibilities within which he/she acts under the authority of the Prime Minister". See: Article 5, Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 24, item 199, with amendments

<sup>7</sup> The scope of activity is also recommended by AJP – 3.4.2 See: *Połączona doktryna sojusznicza...*, op. cit., p. 26.

Another factor of an operational nature that emphasises the role of MSZ and diplomatic missions is the matter of political consequences of the operation being conducted. Reference is to be made to the problem of preparations to undertake operations in the territory of a foreign country. They will therefore be run accompanied by the media interest, even if the consent of the state's authorities is obtained. Thus, it is essential not only to ensure secrecy of action, but also eliminate consequences that may result from the fact of deploying an armed component in the territory of a foreign state. The publicity given to the fact by the media can influence the social attitudes and indirectly decisions of political authorities. Diplomatic missions' task will therefore be leading measures for limiting negative effects of the preparatory actions.

Pointing to the importance of diplomacy in preparations to carry out a recovery operation possible restrictions arising from the operation being directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be emphasised as well. The most serious issue appears to be the very essence of conducting diplomatic activities. The goal is to lead them as long as possible without prejudice to proper diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of a recovery operation needs to carry it in a timely manner, which must be preceded by development of forces, including exploratory and liaison ones, and taking preventive measures. This can lead to differences between diplomatic and military requirements. Whereas the effect - the recognition by diplomats recovery operations as a final solution would make the decision be taken too late.

Potentially too long period of time spent on designing guidelines on how to carry out the operation must be regarded as further limitation. Assuming that the greatest probability of the abducted personnel successful recovery takes place in the abduction or transport phases, preparations to a recovery operation should be taken immediately after the occurrence of an event and conducted only upon the political decision has been made. And their essence cannot hinder both planning and performing the operation.

### 3. THE DATABASE MODEL (*ISOPREP*) OF CITIZENS EXPOSED TO ISOLATION

An important thing in the isolated personnel recovery process is the need to set up the *ISOPREP* database. All those who may be subjected to isolation should complete declarations every five years, or whenever their personal data change, and must be renewed in order to update the information contained in them.

*ISOPREP* documents should be completed and collected in the country in an electronic form in the period of preparations to go abroad. Electronic *ISOPREP* files should be stored in the *ISOPREP* database and updated each time the data change. Immediately after the occurrence of isolation the data of the personnel should be transferred to the cells involved in recovery actions. The transfer of the data should take place with the use of a secured network or through designated persons (depending on availability).

With this in mind the question arises how to specify persons whose data should be included in the *ISOPREP* database? The author of this article proposes the following criteria of their division: classification to the *ISOPREP* database people with regard to positions they held and classification to the *ISOPREP* database people regarding their job.

This would be to allow, in the case of the need to start rapidly a personnel recovery operation, relatively quick identification of victims' bodies of accidents and disasters, without unnecessary feverish and exposing to additional suffering treatments, in order to obtain from family members samples needed to achieve DNA codes<sup>8</sup>.

Classification to the ISOPREP database people with regard to positions they held

Classification to the *ISOPREP* database people with regard to positions they held should be compulsory for such posts as:

- The President of the Republic of Poland;
- Ministers of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland;
- The Head of the National Security Bureau;
- The Prime Minister;
- Ministers of the Republic of Poland;
- Senators and Members of the Polish Parliament;
- The Chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff;
- Commanders of the Polish Armed Forces' Services;
- Chiefs of Special Services;
- The General Prosecutor;
- Other persons who do not occupy positions mentioned above, and who because of duty-related reasons would be assigned to areas of the world considered to be particularly dangerous, and should fill in the *ISOPREP* form.

According to the author, the aforementioned people due to their positions, and consequently, the information they possess on issues of importance to safety and defence of the state, when travelling abroad may become objects of desire of various extremist and terrorist groups. It should be noted that the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Commanders of the Polish Armed Forces' Services arrive in areas such as Afghanistan, Pakistan where, for instance, they can be abducted or may fall into isolation because of the breakdown of the means of transport which they are moving. It is hard to imagine how disastrous could the consequences of these people's abduction for the Polish international situation be.

Classification to the *ISOPREP* database people with regard to their job

Classification to the *ISOPREP* database people regarding their job should be compulsory for such posts as:

- the personnel (eg. Government Security Bureau officers) usually accompanying people discussed in the previous section during their travels abroad;

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<sup>8</sup> This was the case during the Smolensk air crash of 10<sup>th</sup> April 2010, when officers of the Internal Security Agency entered homes of victims' families asking for samples necessary to obtain DNA. As is known, it lasts a few days to obtain a DNA code, and according to media reports this could be the reason for mistakes in bodies' identification.

- soldiers, officers and civilian employees of the Polish Military Contingents;
- pilots and cabin crew, both uniformed and civilian, operating aircrafts registered in the Republic of Poland;
- sailors and the personnel embarked on ships, both uniformed and civilian, who are citizens of Poland;
- employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs performing duties beyond Polish borders;
- officers and employees of special services performing official duties beyond Polish borders;
- officers and employees of other uniformed services performing duties outside the country;
- photographers and war correspondents residing in regions of the world considered to be particularly dangerous;
- the poles - employees of international organisations (e.g. the UN, the OSCE, the EU) posted in regions of the world considered to be particularly dangerous;
- the poles - employees of humanitarian organisations (e.g. Doctors Without Borders, the Polish Humanitarian Action) carrying assistance in regions of the world considered to be particularly dangerous;
- priests, monks and nuns attached to missions in regions of the world considered to be particularly dangerous;
- employees of polish companies (e.g. PGNiG, PKN ORLEN) running their businesses and having their employees in the countries considered to be particularly dangerous;
- polish adventurers and explorers traveling to the most distant and the most dangerous regions of the world;
- other persons who do not fall into the above categories and who for duty-related or personal reasons have been seconded to parts of the world considered to be particularly dangerous, and should fill in the *ISOPREP* form.

According to the author, this outlined division of people with regard to their job is the most optimal. It includes people who performing their job, vocation or passion stay in areas of the world considered to be particularly dangerous, or as soldiers / officers of the uniformed services may possess information constituting the secrecy important for safety and defence of Poland.

At the same time these people staying in areas considered to be particularly dangerous as a rule, in contrast to e.g. the President of the Republic of Poland guarded by the officers of the Government Protection Bureau (BOR), do not have any weapons and are an easy target for terrorists, extremists and special services of a given state.

Considering that in Poland there are no procedures on how to operate in case of a Polish citizen isolation not for terrorists reasons, such situations may last long, even for months and years, as was the case of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit who was trans-

ported from one place to another virtually every day.<sup>9</sup> Over time, an isolated person can significantly change the appearance and only after distinguishing characteristics or "passwords" previously established when completing *ISOPREP* it is possible to confirm the identity of a person sought.

## CONCLUSION

To summarise the above considerations, it should be noted that Poland joining NATO in 1999 was obliged to establish the National Citizens Recovery System. It is not known why for 15 years no steps have been taken to design such a system. Recent events, for example the abduction of a Polish citizen in Afghanistan, the plane crash of 10<sup>th</sup> April 2010 and the abduction of a Polish journalist in Syria, revealed the powerlessness and incompetence of the Polish state in this regard. It was not necessary to expose families of people who had died during the Smolensk disaster to severe emotional experiences while identifying bodies, urgent DNA testing, etc. If *ISOPREP* cards had been prepared earlier, the remains' identification would have been quick and without unnecessary action. If there had already been a specially appointed and trained search and rescue unit, the operation of a Polish citizen recovery in Afghanistan could have been directed smoothly.

The use of the Armed Forces, and the Military Unit 2305 "GROM" is part of the Polish Armed Forces, in any country which we are not at war with, certainly will be strongly opposed in the international arena - at least by some states - since it violates the sovereignty and independence of the country concerned<sup>10</sup>. It has been done, in the case of Piotr Stańczak detained probably in the territory of Pakistan.

The matters looks different when using the forces subordinate to the Ministry responsible for internal affairs, as was the case in Somalia where the German Federal Republic sent GSG – 9 to rescue its citizens abducted by terrorists. This unit had been a part of the German Border Guard before that. Currently, it constitutes a part of the Police structures. Another example may be the state of Israel which sent the unit "669" when in 2011 an Israeli helicopter crashed in the territory of Romania. The unit secured the crash site and immediately transported bodies and the most important elements of

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<sup>9</sup> This method effectively prevented for five years to trace him by Israeli special forces and forced the government to negotiate, thus breaking the maxim that one should not negotiate with terrorists. However, the authorities were aware of how great negative impact on the morale of other Israeli soldiers had the fact of leaving this soldier in the hands of terrorists, and agreed to exchange 1027 Palestinian prisoners for him. It shows that the matter of isolated personnel recovery is very important for the government and the public in Israel. See: <http://www.jewish.org.pl/index.php/ru/izrael-mainmenu-61/4480-gilad-szalit-wolny-jest-ju-w-izraelu.html> (02.01.2014).

<sup>10</sup> It is worth mentioning a similar problem during the attempt to rescue the freight vessel *Hans Stange* by German Services. There were also reported difficulties in the organisation of cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the German Navy on the one hand, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the GSG 9 on the other. See. K. Kubiak, *Przemoc na oceanach. Współczesne piractwo i terroryzm morski*, Warsaw 2009, p. 144. With this in mind, it is likely to conclude that a similar situation can also take place in Poland, which would greatly hinder the personnel recovery operation, even make it impossible.

the helicopter equipment to Israel, having prevented any bystanders from access to the crash site.

The Polish presence in Afghanistan - or in other failed states - can make Polish citizens more vulnerable to the abduction targeted at forcing a particular behaviour. It should also be noted that transportation crashes happen on a daily basis, not necessarily via third parties.

Every human being, a soldier, a president, a minister, an MP or "an ordinary" citizen, should be provided with a sense of security. The Polish state is obliged to ensure all available means and forces to save lives or health of its citizens.

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