Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

• Autorzy: Chen H.-P. , Mohammad M. , Kish L. B.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/mms-2016-0025

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

KLJN; current injection attack; secure key exchange; unconditional security; privacy amplification

• Wydawca: Komitet Metrologii i Aparatury Naukowej PAN
• Czasopismo: Metrology and Measurement Systems
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 23, nr 2
• Strony: 173--181
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 44 poz., rys., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Chen H.-P.

• Texas A&M University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College Station, TX 77843-3128, USA

autor

Mohammad M.

• Texas A&M University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College Station, TX 77843-3128, USA

autor

Kish L. B.

• Texas A&M University, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, College Station, TX 77843-3128, USA

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.