Spoofing detection for underwater acoustic GNSS-like positioning systems

Ochin, Evgeny

doi:10.17402/324

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Tytuł artykułu

Spoofing detection for underwater acoustic GNSS-like positioning systems

Autorzy

Ochin Evgeny

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DOI

10.17402/324

Warianty tytułu

Języki publikacji

Abstrakty

The need for accuracy, precision, and data registration in underwater positioning and navigation should be viewed as no less stringent than that which exists on the sea surface. In the same way in which GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receivers rely on the signals from multiple satellites to calculate a precise position, undersea vehicles discern their location by ranging to the acoustic signals originating from several fixed underwater acoustic sources using the Time-of-Arrival algorithm (ToA) through the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). In this article, the scope has been limited to only considering underwater positioning systems in which the navigation receiver is acoustically passive. The receiver “listens” to the buoys, receives their messages and solves the problem of finding its own position based on the geographical coordinates of the buoys. Often, such systems are called GNSS-like Underwater Positioning Systems (GNSS-like UPS). It is important to note the distinction between general purpose GNSS-like UPS (mainly civil systems) and special purpose GNSS-like UPS (mainly military systems). In this article, only general purpose GNSS-like UPS systems have been considered. Depending on the scale of system’s service areas, GNSS-like UPS are divided into global, regional, zonal and local systems. Only local GNSS-like UPS systems have been considered in this article. The spoofing of acoustic GNSS-like UPS works as follows: the acoustic GNSS signal generator transmits a simulated signal of several satellites. If the level of the simulated signal exceeds the signal strength of the real satellites, the acoustic receiver of an underwater object will “capture” the fake signal and calculate a false position based on it. All receivers that fall into the spoofing zone will calculate the same coordinates, while the receivers located in different places will have a mismatch in the XYZ coordinates.

Słowa kluczowe

antiterrorism GNSS spoofer antispoofing spoofing detection algorithm underwater vehicle underwater transport safety acoustic communication

Wydawca

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie

Czasopismo

Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie

Rocznik

2019

Tom

nr 57 (129)

Strony

38--46

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 21 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Ochin Evgeny

ochin@am.szczecin.pl

Maritime University of Szczecin, Faculty of Navigation 1–2 Wały Chrobrego St., 70-500 Szczecin, Poland

Bibliografia

1. BAE Systems (2016) Undersea navigation and positioning system development to begin for U.S. Navy. [Online] May 16. Available from: https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/article /undersea-navigation-and-positioning-system-development -to-begin-for-u-s—navy [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
2. Caparrini, M., Egido, A., Soulat, F., Germain, O., Farres, E., Dunne, S. & Ruffini, G. (2007) Oceanpal®: monitoring sea state with a GNSS-R coastal instrument. Paper presented at the International Geoscience and Remote Sensing Symposium. IEEE, Barcelona, Spain, 23–28 July 2007, doi:10.1109/IGARSS.2007.4424004
3. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2012) Antiterrorism – design and analysis of GNSS antispoofing algorithms. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 30(102), pp. 93–101.
4. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2013) The analysis of the detecting algorithms of GNSS-spoofing. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 36(108) z. 2, pp. 30–36.
5. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł. & Ochin, E. (2014) Design and Analysis of Spoofing Detection Algorithms for GNSS Signals. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 40 (112), pp. 47–52.
6. Dobryakova, L., Lemieszewski, Ł., Lusznikov, E. & Ochin, E. (2013) The study of the spoofer’s some properties with help of GNSS signal repeater. Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie 36 (108) z. 2, pp. 159–165.
7. Ehrgott, M., Ide, J. & Schöbel, A. (2014) Minmax robustness for multi-objective optimization. European Journal of Operational Research 239, 1, pp. 17–31.
8. EvoLogics (2018) Underwater Acoustic LBL Positioning Systems. [Online]. Available from: https://www.evologics.de /en/products/LBL/index.html [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
9. Hubert, T. (1966) Method and device for the monitoring and remote control of unmanned, mobile underwater vehicles. United States Patent 5,579.285 https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/d2/73/89/6cd7173d154977/ US5579285.pdf
10. Humphreys, T.E., Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M.L., O’Hanlon, B.W. & Kintner, P.M. Jr. (2008) Assessing the Spoofng Threat: Development of a Portable GNSS Civilian Spoofer. Preprint of the 2008 IONGNSS Conference Savanna, GA, September 16–19.
11. iXblue (2018) High performance USBL positioning system. [Online]. Available from: https://www.ixblue.com/products/ gaps [Accessed: January 20, 2018]
12. Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandan, A., Nielsen, J. & Lachapelle, G. (2012) GNSS Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and a Review of Antispoofing Techniques. Hindawi Publishing Corporation International Journal of Navigation and Observation 2012, Article ID127072, doi: 10.1155/2012/127072.
13. Kaushal, H. & Kaddoum, G. (2016) Underwater Optical Wireless Communication. IEEE Access 4, pp. 1518–1547.
14. Kongsberg Maritime (2016) High Precision Acoustic Positioning. [Online]. Available from: https://www.km.kongsberg. com/ks/web/nokbg0397.nsf/AllWeb/D3F9B693E19302BBC12571B6003DD0AE/$file/HiPAP_Family_brochure_ v3_lowres.pdf [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
15. Lavars, N. (2016) DARPA program plunges into underwater positioning system. [Online] 23 May. Available from: https://newatlas.com/darpa-underwater-navigation/43472/ [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
16. Mortimer, C. (2016) Russia testing new underwater nuclear drone amid growing tensions with the West. [Online] 10 December. Available from https://www.independent.co. uk/news/world/europe/russia-nuclear-test-submarine-drone -us-intelligence-trump-a7467301.html/ [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
17. ROV (2018) Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) Manufacturers (includes Manufacturers who are also Operators). [Online]. Available from: http://www.rov.org/industry_ manufacturers.cfm [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
18. Scuba Diving Chicago (2013) Underwater Vehicles. Underwater GPS navigation. [Online] 18 Apr. Available from: https://www.scubadivingchicago.us/underwater-vehicles/ underwater-gps-navigation.html [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
19. Sonardyne (2018) Subsea technology for energy, science and security. [Online] Available from: https://www.sonardyne.com [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
20. Thomas, H.G. (1998) GIB buoys: an interface between space and depths of the oceans. Proceedings of the 1998 Workshop on Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, 21 Aug. 1998, pp. 181–184. Available from: https://ieeexplore. ieee.org/abstract/document/744453 [Accessed: January 20, 2018].
21. Youngberg, J.W. (1991) A Novel Method for Extending GPS to Underwater Applications. Navigation 38, pp. 263– 271.

Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2019).

Typ dokumentu

Bibliografia

Identyfikator YADDA

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