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Fundamental limit and trade-off between security and secure key generation rate in quantum key distribution

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Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Many researchers have contributed to creating Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) since the first protocol BB84 was proposed in 1984. One of the crucial problems in QKD is to guarantee its security with finite-key lengths by Privacy Amplification (PA). However, finite-key analyses show a trade-off between the security of BB84 and the secure key rates. This study analyses two examples to show concrete trade-offs. Furthermore, even though the QKD keys have been perceived to be arbitrarily secure, this study shows a fundamental limitation in the security of the keys by connecting Leftover Hash Lemma and Guessing Secrecy on the QKD keys.
Rocznik
Strony
125--137
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 15 poz., wykr., wzory
Twórcy
  • Quantum ICT Research Institute of Tamagawa University, 6-1-1 Tamagawa-Gakuen, Machida, Tokyo 194-8610, Japan
Bibliografia
  • [1] Bennett, Ch.H., Brassard, G. (1984). Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, 175-179.
  • [2] Scarani, V., Renner, R. (2008). Quantum cryptography with finite resources: Unconditional security bound for discrete-variable protocols with one-way postprocessing. Physical review letters, 100(20), 200501.
  • [3] Tomamichel, M., Lim, C.C. W., Gisin, N., Renner, R. (2012). Tight finite-key analysis for quantum cryptography. Nature communications, 3, 634.
  • [4] Yuen, H.P. (2012). Problems of security proofs and fundamental limit on key generation rate in quantum key distribution. arXiv preprint arXiv:1205.3820.https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.3820.
  • [5] Yuen, H.P. (2016). Security of quantum key distribution. IEEE Access, 4, 724-749.
  • [6] Iwakoshi, T. (2017). On problems in security of quantum key distribution raised by Yuen. In Quantum Information Science and Technology III International Society for Optics and Photonics, 10442, 1044203.
  • [7] Renner, R. (2008). Security of quantum key distribution. International Journal of Quantum Information, 6(01), 1-127.
  • [8] Portmann, C., Renner, R. (2014). Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution. arXiv preprintarXiv:1409.3525.https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3525.
  • [9] Tomamichel, M., Lim, C.C. W., Gisin, N., Renner, R. (2011). Tight Finite-Key Analysis for Quantum Cryptography. arXiv preprint arXiv:1103.4130v2.https://arxiv.org/abs/1103.4130.
  • [10] Tomamichel, M. Lim, C.C.W., private e-mail to Iwakoshi, T., 7th Jan.-25th May, (2015).
  • [11] Hayashi, M., Tsurumaru, T. (2012). Concise and tight security analysis of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol with finite key lengths. New Journal of Physics, 14(9), 093014.
  • [12] Renner, R., Wolf, S. (2005). Simple and tight bounds for information reconciliation and privacy amplification. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 199-216.
  • [13] Barak, B., Dodis, Y., Krawczyk, H., Pereira, O., Pietrzak, K., Standaert, F.X., Yu, Y. (2011). Leftover hash lemma, revisited. In Annual Cryptology Conference Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1-20.
  • [14] Iwakoshi, T. (2018). Bit-error-rate guarantee for quantum key distribution and its characteristics compared to leftover hash lemma. Quantum Information Science and Technology IV, International Society for Optics and Photonics, 10803, 1080309.
  • [15] Tomamichel, M., Schaffner, C., Smith, A., Renner, R. (2011). Leftover hashing against quantum side information. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 57(8), 5524-5535.
Uwagi
PL
Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2019).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-39dd4859-b499-4698-95f3-2fec86217a09
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