Rational taxation in an open access fishery model

• Autorzy: Rokhlin D. B. , Usov A.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/acsc-2017-0001

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We consider a model of fishery management, where n agents exploit a single population with strictly concave continuously differentiable growth function of Verhulst type. If the agent actions are coordinated and directed towards the maximization of the discounted cooperative revenue, then the biomass stabilizes at the level, defined by the well known “golden rule”. We show that for independent myopic harvesting agents such optimal (or ε-optimal) cooperative behavior can be stimulated by the proportional tax, depending on the resource stock, and equal to the marginal value function of the cooperative problem. To implement this taxation scheme we prove that the mentioned value function is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, although the instantaneous individual revenues may be neither concave nor differentiable.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

marginal value function; stimulating taxes; myopic agents; optimal control

• Wydawca: Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee of Automatic Control and Robotics
• Czasopismo: Archives of Control Sciences
• Rocznik: 2017
• Tom: Vol. 27, no. 1
• Strony: 5--27
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 29 poz., wzory

Twórcy

autor

Rokhlin D. B.

• Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Southern Federal University, Mil’chakova str., 8a, 344090, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation

autor

Usov A.

• Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Southern Federal University, Mil’chakova str., 8a, 344090, Rostov-on-Don, Russian

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Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (zadania 2017).