Bidding languages for auctions of divisible goods

• Autorzy: Kaleta M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Bidding languages are well-defined for combinatorial auctions. However, the auctions of divisible goods are quite common in practice. In contrast to combinatorial auctions, the feasible volumes of the offers are continuous in the case of divisible commodities. Such auctions are called continuous auctions. In the paper we introduce three families of bidding languages for continuous auctions. They are based on the concepts derived from the combinatorial auctions. We generalize the language families based on goods, bids, and some mixture of both of them, to the continuous case. We also analyze fundamental properties of the new languages. Simple examples, reflecting the complementarity and substitutability, are provided with exemplary representations in different languages.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

bidding languages; auctions; market mechanism design

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: Vol. 41, no. 4
• Strony: 799--816
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 9 poz., il., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Kaleta M.

• Warsaw University of Technology Institute of Control and Computation Engineering

Bibliografia

• 1. Benyoucef, M. and Pringadi, R. (2006) A BPEL Based Implementation of Online Auctions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4652, Springer.
• 2. Boutilier, C. and Hoos, H.H. (2001) Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. Proc. 17th Intl. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, 1211—1217.
• 3. Fujishima, Y., Leyton-Brown, K. and Shoham, Y. (1999) Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. Proc. 16th International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 548—553.
• 4. Hoos, H.H. and Boutilier, C. (2000) Solving Combinatorial Auctions using Stochastic Local Search. Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, 22–29.
• 5. Kaleta, M. (2012) Security constrained network winner determination problem. Automatyzacja Procesów Dyskretnych, Teoria i zastosowania. Silesian University of Technology.
• 6. Kaleta, M. and Traczyk, T. (eds.) (2012) Modeling Multi-commodity Trade: Information Exchange Methods. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing 121. Springer.
• 7. Lehmann, D., Müller, R. and Sandholm, T. (2006) The winner determination problem. Chap. 12 in: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham and R. Steinberg, eds., Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press.
• 8. Nisan, N. (2000) Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM Press New York, 1–12.
• 9. Rolli, D. and Eberhart, A. (2005) An Auction Reference Model for Describing and Running Auctions. Proc. of the Wirtschaftsinformatik. Physica –Verlag HD, 289—308.