Threats for GNSS - present status & counteractions

• Autorzy: Felski Andrzej

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.36163/aon-2024-0002

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Nowadays, most of the society, especially young people, treat GPS as an obvious source of information, just like television, radio or the Internet. In fact, we are dealing not only with the American system, but also several others that make up Global Navigation Satellite Systems. This is the primary source of situational awareness for many activities: professional, military and business as for everyday use. From crisis actions, by timing and synchronization in critical infrastructures such as financial, communications, power grid and industrial systems, and more. In fact, we can talk about the critically reliant of human life upon GNSS. Like any radio system, GNSS is also susceptible to interference and changes in the ionosphere, however on the turn of the centuries appeared the new, not expected threat in the form of more and more frequent cases of interferences, especially intendent one. If so, appears the question how to recognize this threat and how to proceed in such case? In the paper, some current information about the question, as well as some suggestions how to act on board in such cases will be presented.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

GNSS; jamming; spoofing; countermeasures to GNSS threats

• Wydawca: Polskie Forum Nawigacyjne
• Czasopismo: Annual of Navigation
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: No. 29
• Strony: 16--24
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 18 poz., rys., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Felski Andrzej

• Navigation and Marine Hydrography Chair Polish Naval Academy Gdynia, Poland

Bibliografia

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