Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank

• Autorzy: Sosnowska H.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

voting; European Central Bank; Shapley value

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: Vol. 23, No. 1
• Strony: 75--86
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 13 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Sosnowska H.

• Warsaw School of Economics, al. Niepodleglości 162, 02-554 Warsaw, Poland

Bibliografia

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