The (Il)legitimacy of Cybersecurity. An Application of Just Securitization Theory to Cybersecurity based on the Principle of Subsidiarity

• Autorzy: Thumfart Johannes

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0016.1093

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The application of securitization theory to cybersecurity is useful since it subjects the emotive rhetoric of threat construction to critical scrutiny. Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) constitutes a mixture of securitization theory and just war theory. Unlike traditional securitization theory, it also addresses the normative question of when securitization is legitimate. In this contribution, I critically apply Floyd’s JST to cybersecurity and develop my own version of JST based on subsidiarity. Floyd’s JST follows a minimalistic and subsidiary approach by emphasizing that securitization is only legitimate if it has a reasonable chance of success in averting threats to the satisfaction of basic human needs. From this restrictive perspective, cyber-securitization is only legitimate if it serves to protect critical infrastructure. Whilst Floyd’s JST focuses exclusively on permissibility and needs instead of rights, I argue that there are cases in which states’ compliance with human rights obligations requires the guarantee of cybersecurity, most importantly regarding the human right to privacy. My version of JST is also based on the principle of subsidiarity, in the sense that securitization should always include stakeholders directly affected by a threat. To strengthen this kind of subsidiarity, focused on the private sector, I argue for the legitimacy of private active self-defence in cyberspace and emphasize the importance of a ‘whole-of-society approach’ involving digital literacy and everyday security practices. Moreover, I argue that far-reaching securitization on the nation-state-level should be avoided, particularly the hyper-securitization of the digital public sphere, following unclear notions of ‘digital sovereignty’.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cybersecurity; desecuritization; digital sovereignty; securitization; societal security

PL

cyberbezpieczeństwo; desekurytyzacja; cyfrowa suwerenność; sekurytyzacja; bezpieczeństwo społeczne

• Wydawca: NASK – National Research Institute
• Czasopismo: Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: Vol. 1, No. 1
• Strony: 1--24
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 105 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Thumfart Johannes

• Research Group Law, Science, Technology and Society (LSTS), Department of Metajuridica, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Vrije Universiteit Brussels, Belgium
• International security management at the Faculty of Police and Security, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Germany

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4337-2990

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).