Effective learning from safety events reporting takes two: getting to the root & just culture

• Autorzy: Carrera-Arce M.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12716/1001.15.04.08

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

SAFEMODE is an EU-funded project under the Horizon 2020 programme. The project brings together experience from the whole safety value chain including manufacturers, service providers, regulators, academia, and small-medium enterprises. This paper focuses on two core aspects the project is addressing: 1) the systematic collection, analysis, and categorization of Human Factors (HF) data from maritime and aviation safety events, and 2) the development of a Just Culture framework for maritime to encourage reporting of safety events and learning from them, and at which respondents feel they are treated in a fair and just manner when reporting. Learning from safety events is only possible if root causes of accidents and incidents are properly and systematically identified, analysed, and categorized, and reporters know that reporting is a “safe” and beneficial practice. The implementation of these two outcomes as part of the institutionalization strategy of the project includes recommendations to industry guidance and practice and proposals to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Słowa kluczowe

EN

human factors; Horizon 2020 programme; effective learning; safety events reporting; just culture; International Maritime Organization; maritime safety culture; safety at sea

• Wydawca: Faculty of Navigation, Gdynia Maritime University
• Czasopismo: TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: Vol. 15 No. 4
• Strony: 775--780
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 27 poz., rys,

Twórcy

autor

Carrera-Arce M.

• World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2021).