

INTERINSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION CONCERNING PLANNING, TRAINING AND FORCE ENGAGEMENT AS RESPONSE TO THE HYBRID WAR

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Summary:

The proliferation of risks and unconventional threats, especially the hybrid ones, requires the finding of integrated security solutions, both nationally and internationally. The beginning of the millennium reveals new ideas for conducting military conflicts. Thus, within the future confrontations characterized by a high degree of complexity, awareness of the need and development of some mechanisms necessary for the inter-institutional integration and the effects of the actions of all power tools, military and civilian, is a priority of major significance.

In this regard, the present article presents some mechanisms, guidelines and methods that could lead to inter-institutional integration.

Keywords:

hybrid warfare, inter-institutional integration, planning and force engagement

INTRODUCTION

In the past, the military conflicts were characterized by the emphasis on the destruction of the most important military and economic capabilities of the enemy, as well as its means of responsiveness, thus paralyzing its retaliation potential.

In the current security environment, the state actors and the non-state actors that have *weaker* capabilities than the modern/allied armies will become innovative, avoiding direct confrontation and creating atypical threats, of a hybrid type.

Thus, the prospect of future confrontations show that the classical threats, which require a military and distinct fundamental approach, will be replaced by forces that will engage in simultaneous use of conventional battlefield tactics and criminal activities (smuggling, illegal drug and weapon trafficking and narco-terrorism) aiming to destabilize the governmental authorities or to achieve personal and group interests.

1. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

The regular combat defined nowadays, initially, as asymmetrical conflict and later, as hybrid, becomes a relevant product of the same permanent concerns, of the combatants, of identification, improvement and use of the combat engagement forms that would tip the scales in favor of the maximum effects with minimal resources.

The history of the circulated concept, used for the first time in 1995[1], brings in the limelight contradictory studies and analysis influenced even by features defined as futuristic, but conservative and pragmatic.

The hybrid warfare is a situation in which a state adopts the outright use of armed forces against another state or a non-state actor, plus a mixture of other means (economic, political, diplomatic and information).

The concept of "hybrid war", as it was outlined by Frank G. Hoffman[2], defines the totality of activities arising from *"...any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battle space to obtain their political objectives"*[3],

According to Frank G. Hoffman, the definition of hybrid war requires five distinct elements[4]:

- course action versus structure: should the definition focus on the fighting methods (irregular actions) of the opponent, or on its structure (combination of non-state actors, states, individuals, groups);
- simultaneity: should the force adopting hybrid warfare operate simultaneously the four different courses of action, or to demonstrate the ability to engage all four during a campaign;
- the merger: should the force which adopted the hybrid war merge various forces, regular and irregular, in the same theatre of operations or should it combine different types of conflict? How much should be integrated, and at what level of the military art;

- complexity: should the actor combine all four modes, or are three enough to define a hybrid war;
- criminal behavior: is criminality a deliberate way of conflict, or simply a source of income/support for insurgents or terrorists;

Likewise, Paul Latawski (Professor at the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, and Senior Researcher in Modern War Studies), in his article *The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine* stipulates that, "fashionable 'big ideas' may be nothing new in the history of war and neither is their impact so profound as to change its nature or character"[5]. Moreover Latawski, highlighted the fact that, "there is really nothing particularly new about the hybrid nature of war and (...) indeed, all wars are hybrid and it is only the characteristics of hybridity that change over time"[6].

The precipitating and accelerating of the latest security events at the global level demonstrates that these hybrid methods, apparently uncoordinated, is not just a trend, being actually a practice used by the states.

In the context of these minimum but relevant considerations, a great challenge is represented by the identification of the "antidote", of the solutions to counterattack this type of confrontation.

A very generous topic from this perspective is the *comprehensive approach*, both at the level of national security system and the international level such as the North-Atlantic Alliance.

2. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION - SOLUTION IN THE HYBRID WAR

Hybrid conflicts hold elements which when appropriate are mainly directed to political decisions in the diplomatic, military, economic or informational field. Most of the times, their nature is unclear or involves factors and actions from several domains.

It is considered that future military operations, particularly those in hybrid conflicts will be more complex and multidimensional. a holistic[7] inter-institutional approach involving political, military diplomatic, economic, and civilian means is a real success.

Thus, the wide spectrum of hybrid conflicts calls for national and international institutions, coordinated and competent answers as well as civilian-military capabilities able to undertake coherent and effective actions within the framework of inter-institutional operations to solve conflicts.

In the field we refer to, an important aspect is represented by the integration of actions of the military and civilian government institutions, of the effects of non-governmental organizations, as well as the military operations.

Thus, the inter-institutional integration would imply a process by which the capabilities a joint force (military), together with those of other civilian institutions and government agencies, are combined in achieving consistent effects[8].

In a conventional design, the military policies of some departments/governmental institutions are generally limited to engage and destroy terrorist/ insurgent networks so

as the opponent should not be able to organize and execute attacks against national territory or national interests, to create the conditions that allow the partner nations to govern their own territories effectively and to maintain an inhospitable climate for violent extremists and their supporters.

Instead, the policies and strategies needed to achieve the specific objectives of the hybrid conflict that must take into consideration the inter-institutional actions which by holistic analysis, through exhaustive planning and concerted execution would lead to the elimination of the military, logistical and ideological support of the groups within the hybrid conflict.

The military structures and the civilian agencies, traditionally perceive their roles distinctly, as being separate and different.

The military leaders tended to regard the civil agencies as undisciplined and their actions uncoordinated and inefficient. However, the staff of the civilian organizations which operate during conflicts, particularly complex situations, often request support from the army for protection, logistics and evacuation. In time, the attitude of both sides has changed. The civilian agencies have earned respect of the army for their initiative and innovative elements, and the army has gained confidence for its unsurpassed logistics capacity.

However numerous deficiencies still persist in coordination of the operations of these elements. Therefore, in order to identify some essential issues, helpful to our study to suggest remedies, solutions, ideas of promotion and optimization of the inter-institutional actions, we bring into the debate a few differentiating directions in terms of planning and engaging the participants in these operations, such as[9]: definition of the final status; setting initial goals; preparation of plans; communication.

3. RULES OF CONDUCT IN THE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

In recent conflicts, it has been demonstrated that modern operations are joint actions of the ground, naval and air forces, integrating also the effects of the other instruments of the civilian power (political, diplomatic, economic, information), derived from various international actors (states, governmental and non-governmental organizations).

This fact actually involves the modern principles of structuring, training, projecting of inter-agency groups of forces and especially of employing them in order to achieve the desired effects. These particular elements are to be found in any institution belonging to the defense, public order and national security system.

From the perspective of interoperability, of the unity of effort and command, the need for interdependence, both conceptual but mainly actional, is obvious.

Thus, we consider as necessary the identification of a set of fundamental, theses and norms -principles which should represent standards, important landmarks in the decision-making process at the interinstitutional level:

- unity of effort is carried out by analyzing the following factors: the purpose and objectives, agreements and procedures, language and command and control relationships. a manual of Operating Procedures can also be prepared to provide unique planning and cooperation directives;
- priority of employment in operations must be the joint mission. Based on this principle, each undertaken military action or of another type, must contribute directly, quickly and economically to accomplish the mission. The materialization of the principle means both the joint action of forces and capabilities towards well-defined and realistic objectives as well as skillfully merging of political, economic, diplomatic and military means and mechanisms in achieving the desired effects;
- the understanding and mutual understanding of the peculiarities and partners' availability ensures the foundation of cooperation, teamwork, mutual respect, trust and achievement of long-life collaborative relationships;
- command integration presupposes that the command structure can ensure concerted action of the military, civilian, diplomatic, information capabilities, etc., of one or more organizations, so as to achieve, decisively and effectively, both the partial goals, as well as the ultimate goal;
- periodic determination of the effectiveness of operation consists in determining the specific assessment parameters of the effects of the undertaken measures and actions. These parameters are focused on the status and activity of the supported institutions over which the effects were concentrated and must be measurable, to connect the cause to the effect in order to allow the decision-makers to understand and appreciate the progress or regress;
- adaptability is the ability to quickly change functional structures and to use effective methods so as the forces could switch from one activity to another, having no need for outside assistance. In order to do it the Inter-institutional Force must be flexible and have the necessary capabilities and integrated logistics, which would confer a status of independence.

As we stated above, one of the fundamental activities, essential to the operational integration, is the need for anticipated planning of the engagement consequences.

Therefore, especially for national and international security structures, the development of a process to ensure inter-institutional integrated planning that anticipates the decision of force engagement must be a priority[10].

Thus, the specific advantages of the integrated approach to the military and civilian capabilities during the planning phase could include:

- the comprehensive analysis of the situation, clarifying and understanding of the causes of the problems, therefore a risk assessment at a higher level and alternative choices with regard to the use of power tools;

- large participation and better co-ordination between departments, agencies and other bodies, in terms of conduct and evaluation phases of the mission, which would lead to greater efficiency in achieving the effects and the achievement of the objectives/goals;
- more efficient use of resources;
- the ability to generate and maintain authority over the structures and actions.

4. THE NEED FOR A STRATEGY OF INTEGRATING INTER-INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITIES

In the future military operations, the focus will be on "the enhancement of the integrated use of both military and non-military instruments of power, in order to create the planned effects [and] the forces and capabilities must be suitable to pursue a coordinated and concerted action from a political, military, civilian, economic and scientific point of view, among the governmental and non-governmental organizations"[11].

In this context, we appreciate that it would take an integrator document (strategy) to cover the concept of establishing, training and engagement of capabilities designed to participate in the full range of operations.

The Strategy of the Integration of Inter-institutional Capabilities must be based on the constitutional provisions, on the national defense strategies as well as NATO and EU documents in this field.

The construction of the strategy must be comprehensive/integrated and multinational based on a scientific basis, capable to generate the implementation of a new system of regulations, procedures and standards derived from experience and actions undertaken by NATO and the allies. The strategy of integration interinstitutional capabilities must refer to all structures involved in the planning process of the national security in an allied context.

In this regard, from our point of view, The strategy of integration of inter-institutional capabilities would have the following attributes:

- establishes principles governing the status and role of each power tool;
- defines the situations and conditions in which they will be used;
- outlines the organizational integrated structures needed to the conduct of capabilities and coordination of effects;
- directs the elaboration of the Plan of the joint strategic capabilities stipulated within the strategic planning;
- regulates, in a uniform conception, the process of generating capabilities, the establishment of groups of forces, the planning of operations, succession of the engagement tools (forces), command and control;
- directs the preparation in peacetime of the capabilities intended to participate in the integrated operations (comprehensive approach) etc.

- highlights the nature of modern warfare and response needs to new types of threats;
- implements new operating concepts;
- treats the concept of integrated use of capabilities.

Likewise, the main characteristics of this strategy could be the following [12]:

- complex construction in an integrative vision, consistent with that of the Euro-Atlantic political and military structures;
- permanently open through capitalizing the conclusions resulting from the analysis of the contemporary military phenomenon and the accumulated experience in the preparation and conduct of joint multinational operations, lessons learned.

The elaboration of this strategy will result in the use of the same operating concepts and models of reasoning at a political-military and strategic level. In this regard, both the theory and military practice will be compatible with those of other governmental institutions involved in security (defense) and in the management of the hybrid conflicts.

Thus, the strategy of integration inter-institutional capabilities presupposes the approach in a uniform conception of the process of elaboration of the specific normative acts, of the doctrinal framework, of the concerted way of using all the power tools, both military and non-military as well as the identification of those success factors, principles which can contribute to a favorable outcome of a hybrid conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

Regardless the typology of the actors involved in the dynamics of conflicts, whether military structures, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations or agencies, all of them have specific goals and interests within the theater of operations specific to the hybrid war. These objectives will entail different policies and behaviors, which very often are incompatible. The problem to be solved is not a simple one, as it relates to the capacity of these actors to find the correct procedures needed to manifest their interests, in a spirit of complementarity, cooperation and mutual respect, both conceptually and in action.

We consider that the common perception of reality, the vision unity, the permanent exchange of information and dispense of stereotypical behaviors are the way by which one can reach the unity of effort. There are no recipes for a complete inter-institutional integration but communication and behavioral adaptation of the organizations must be reached and the possible disagreements be reduced and common objectives achieved with acceptable efforts.

The lack of a coordinated response, the refusal to share resources and unwillingness to subordinate certain common goals characterized many missions that managed conflicts. Although, there may be reasonable explanations for this lack of coordination, it is

obvious that the lack of a common vision and a unity of action, weakens and the efforts to control conflicts. The solution could be the strengthening of the cooperation relations which should be a priority for all the parties involved in a hybrid war.

You can also emphasize the need for a culture of integration and co-ordination of the civilian and military instruments, to ensure a functional synergy of all the mechanisms and structures, regardless of interests and subordinations.

A culture of inter-institutional integration plays the role of an "ideology" designed to eliminate the conceptual and actional barriers between the two vectors of the two domains. Civilian and military tools can become coherent capabilities when the coordinating culture will create an actional mobility, which could lead, eventually, to the diminishing of differences between civilian and military. Such an approach is necessary both at the level of implementation, especially at the level of design (political and military).

Thus, integrated (multilateral) inter-institutional approach in the hybrid conflicts still reveals a number of challenges, which the analysts and theorists and policy makers should have in view: the existence of parallel structures for planning and control, the lack of specialists with expertise and authority, different organizational cultures or even antagonistic as well as different funding mechanisms for the civilian and military instruments.

The force planning is a comprehensive topic with multiple facets which within the national framework will be treated starting with the political and political-military level which by the provisions of the national Defense Law imposes the force-planning domain and continues with the strategic military level aimed at planning the operations namely, "nomination, deployment and engagement" of the forces. At the same time, we appreciate that within this process we can also approach the issue of the capabilities development.

The topic of the hybrid war is more and more discussed being an up to date subject of debates which manifests itself as a cliché in the public space but what is more important is the fact that these realities ask for an increase of the pace that should be taken in implementing countermeasures.

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Dorin IONIȚĂ - BG., *Commander of the Operational Land Forces Component and Deputy Chief of the Romanian Land Forces Staff*. He is deeply involved in the elaboration of doctrines, military standards and procedures. In his field of expertise, being aware of the global security challenges and threats, he is informed with the latest research findings and based on my personal professional experience as active participant in missions in the international theatres of operations. He wrote scientific studies and articles for national and international conferences, presenting the best solutions for training and engaging of the forces against various threats.

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