The safety of modern and traditional communication protocols in vehicles

• Autorzy: Sumorek A.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Communication infrastructure of vehicles sub-assemblies has undergone three phases of development. The first phase was initiated by the need to reduce emission levels. The function of vehicle sub-assemblies health monitoring was introduced simultaneously. This phase took place in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century. The second phase was focused on the elimination of redundant sensors and implementation of new functions of the vehicle. This phase has been particularly noticeable since the beginning of the 21st century. At the moment, there are 2 directions of development. On the one hand, the works are being continued in the scope of autonomous movement of vehicle and, on the otherhand multimedia solutions are being introduced in order to make the time spent in a vehicle more attractive (multimedia, the Internet, …). The present study is focused on the mechanisms of protection applied in communication protocols used in vehicles. Furthermore, it contains the classification of communication methods, characteristics of the basic methods of protection incorporated in the described protocols and the practical cases of security breach. Therefore, it is possible to answer the question why it is possible for third persons to interfere into the communication network of a vehicle and to indicate potential methods of protection against the functioning disturbance in such communication networks.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Vehicle Communication Protocol; Protocol Safety

• Wydawca: Polish Academy of Sciences, Branch in Lublin
• Czasopismo: ECONTECHMOD : An International Quarterly Journal on Economics of Technology and Modelling Processes
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 5, No 3
• Strony: 19--26
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 38 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Sumorek A.

• Lublin University of Technology, Department of Structural Mechanics, Poland, 20-618 Lublin, Nadbystrzycka 40

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (zadania 2017).