Implications of the arithmetic ratio of prime numbers for RSA security

• Autorzy: Ivanov Andrey , Stoianov Nikolai

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.34768/amcs-2023-0005

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The most commonly used public key cryptographic algorithms are based on the difficulty in solving mathematical problems such as the integer factorization problem (IFP), the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). In practice, one of the most often used cryptographic algorithms continues to be the RSA. The security of RSA is based on IFP and DLP. To achieve good data security for RSA-protected encryption, it is important to follow strict rules related to key generation domains. It is essential to use sufficiently large lengths of the key, reliable generation of prime numbers and others. In this paper the importance of the arithmetic ratio of the prime numbers which create the modular number of the RSA key is presented as a new point of view. The question whether all requirements for key generation rules applied up to now are enough in order to have good levels of cybersecurity for RSA based cryptographic systems is clarified.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

public key cryptography; RSA encryption; public key generation rules; kleptography; fusion of number balance

PL

kryptografia klucza publicznego; szyfrowanie RSA; kleptografia; bilans liczbowy

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego
• Czasopismo: International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
• Rocznik: 2023
• Tom: Vol. 33, no. 1
• Strony: 57--70
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 26 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Ivanov Andrey

• C4I Systems, Professor Tsvetan Lazarov Bulgarian Defence Institute, 2 Prof. T. Lazarov Blvd., 1592 Sofia, Bulgaria

autor

Stoianov Nikolai

• C4I Systems, Professor Tsvetan Lazarov Bulgarian Defence Institute, 2 Prof. T. Lazarov Blvd., 1592 Sofia, Bulgaria

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023)