

Original article

Conditions for the process of ensuring the Republic of Poland's security – selected problems

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ABSTRACT

The processes of ensuring Poland's security require the constant analysis of many factors that significantly affect the possibility of the emergence of threats to external and internal security. From the point of view of this criterion of understanding security, the political, military, economic, and social factors are crucial. Along with Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, membership in these organizations has become the basis for building the national security system and is positively perceived by most of the society. However, it should be remembered that the volatility of the security environment and the immediate environment of Poland brings about new challenges (migration processes, energy supply issues, the power policy of the Russian Federation) that may give rise to anxiety and a sense of threat. The article aims to present selected conditions of the process of ensuring the security of Poland.

KEYWORDS

national security, NATO, the European Union, migration, international relations



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Introduction

The factors and mechanisms influencing the external and internal security environment as well as the possibility of the destructive influence of potentials, not only military ones, of individual countries in the process of dynamic changes, mean that none of the spheres of subjective and objective perception of our country's security has acquired unequivocally permanent and unchanging features. Since Poland acceded to the North Atlantic Alliance¹ and the European Union², we have been trying to build our relations on strong alliance and community foundations and values that guide these two subjects of international relationships.

¹ On March 12, 1999, in the town of Independence in the USA, together with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted to the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance.

² On May 1, 2004, the following countries were admitted to the European Union along with Poland: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary. Poland's accession to the European Union took place pursuant to the Accession Treaty signed on April 16, 2003, in Athens.

It takes place in all spheres of state functioning, with every state that is peaceful towards our country, both in the closer and more distant surroundings.

By participating in the mechanisms of the functioning of the European Union, we somehow automatically become a country that benefits from the EU membership, but we also face factors that may pose threats to the societies of individual Member States. The phenomenon of migration is a significant problem in maintaining cultural identity and the sense of security of citizens, in the face of the need to maintain shared values of the European area. The term refugee is frequently given a pejorative meaning due to committing crimes and lack of respect for the communities' values in the countries where the migrants go and their claims about the conditions of their stay. From a person who needs help, they become an undesirable person in a given area and community.

At the same time, the globalization of international relationships and the increasing role of entities, including non-state ones in the process of ensuring security, mean that, on the one hand, states will direct their actions towards multilateral cooperation in the field of eliminating threats and ensuring security. On the other hand, they will build their systems, especially in the process of ensuring internal security [Cf. 1, p. 41].

In the process of the state functioning and fulfilling its internal and external functions, the political, military, economic, and social factors and mutual influence are essential determinants. Not only do they condition the processes of ensuring security, but force the entities responsible for them to monitor and analyze them continually. At the same time, each of these factors is subjectively assessed and perceived by society; on the one hand, as strengthening security and contributing to the creation of conditions for the elimination of threats adequate to its sphere of influence, and on the other hand, as being able to contribute to the emergence of threats that the state structures and society will have to face.

Therefore, the cognitive objective of this article is to present selected conditions and factors that significantly affect the processes of ensuring the Republic of Poland's security.

For this purpose, the main research problem was formulated in the form of multiple questions: To what extent has Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union strengthened Poland's security, why does the Russian Federation remain a destabilizer of the international situation, and what impact does the phenomenon of migration have on social security conditions?

Considering that solving the main research problem will require an analysis of various conditions and factors affecting security, the main aim of the research is to present:

- membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union as a determinant of Polish and European security,
- public opinion polls on the perception of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union and Poland's membership in these organizations,
- the Russian Federation with which Poland maintains contacts in all areas of foreign and international cooperation as a destabilizer of the international situation in its immediate and more distant surroundings,
- the phenomenon of migration as a problem having a significant impact on the internal situation as well as social security and negative perception of refugees in Poland and in some European Union countries.

Considering the scope of the objective and the main research problem, the following main working hypothesis was formulated: Poland's membership in Euro-Atlantic and European

structures is the main guarantor of our security and is supported by the society. The Russian Federation remains a destabilizer of the international situation, and intensifying migratory movements are becoming an important factor of social security. Understanding these conditions will contribute to a more complete awareness of the processes of ensuring security.

In the work on the article, mainly theoretical research methods were used, including analysis of statistical data, literature, and phenomena occurring in the communities of European Union countries, synthesis, which allowed to combine the areas identified during the analysis, as well as the inference as a cognitive factor of the analyzed subject. Interviews with experts were also vital in the process, which allowed for a more detailed discussion and a broader view of the analyzed factors that significantly affects the processes of ensuring security.

1. Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance

Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance undoubtedly increased the scope of security in the military and political area, and less in the economic sphere of our state. The accession to the European Union complemented the political dimension of security and clearly strengthened and expanded the possibilities of providing it in economic and social matters. At the same time, Poland's membership in both these structures significantly impacted the perception and sense of security by the society of our country. The estimated increases in political, economic, military and social factors after Poland's accession to NATO and the EU are presented in Figure 1³.

These two milestones, so important in terms of the external and internal security of our country and the entire former bloc of Eastern European countries, were positively assessed by Polish society. Poland's admission to NATO has given not only the state but also the society an increased sense of security. With the accession to the Alliance, both the position of the state in the European balance of power and Poland's subjectivity in the area of security changed.

In the opinion of the public, the consent of the United States in 1997 and the other Alliance countries on the expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary⁴, made Poland, a vassal of Russia, a real partner of the superpower.

As Bronisław Geremek, the then Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, said on July 9, 1997, in Washington: "The historical dimension of Poland's accession to NATO stems from the fact that our country joins the Alliance that corresponds to Polish national interests and built its defense and political tasks on community of Western values and traditions" [2].

We can also say that this view is shared by the vast majority of society. A comparison of the responses in 1998-2019 to the CBOS (Center for Public Opinion Research) question on the validity of Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance is shown in Figure 2.

In public opinion polls conducted by CBOS, when the first NATO Member States ratified Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this fact is recognized by the society as a milestone in Polish security policy invariably since 1989.

Both before Poland's accession to the Alliance and the 20th anniversary of this fact, most Poles see NATO accession as an important event – 44% in 1998, and as ground-breaking

³ The number 100 in Figure 1 does not mean absolute security, it is just a form of display scale.

⁴ On December 16, 1997, NATO foreign ministers signed in Brussels the accession protocols for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.




Fig. 1. Estimated strengthening of Poland's security after joining NATO and the EU in the political, military, economic and social spheres

Source: Own study.

with a historic meaning – 42% in 2019, and 41% and 44% respectively as important but not primary.

At the same time, over the 20 years of Poland's presence in the North Atlantic Alliance, the public's view of the permanent stationing of foreign troops in our country has changed. While after Poland joined NATO, more than half of the society (55%) was against the stationing of foreign troops in our country (this was mainly due to the experience of the stationing of the Soviet Army in Poland for over 50 years). Nevertheless, in September 2014, after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the number of supporters of the stationing of troops from other NATO countries in Poland exceeded the number of opponents by 27 percentage points (pp) and amounted to 57% and 30% respectively.

Since June 2016, we have been recording the highest support in the history of CBOS surveys for the stationing of troops from other NATO countries in Poland, and the research results are extremely stable. In February 2019, 65% of the respondents believed that troops from




Fig. 2. Comparison of the answers in the years 1998-2019 to the CBOS question on the validity of Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance
Source: [3, p. 3].

NATO member states should be stationed in Poland, 22% of whom supported the stationing strongly and 43% moderately.

At the same time, 25% of the respondents were against the permanent presence of allied troops in our country. Compared to February 1999, this percentage decreased by 31 pp. [3, p. 16-17].

2. Poland's membership in the European Union

Just like joining NATO, the Poles positively evaluate our country's membership in the European Union. In the opinion of those surveyed by CBOS and Eurobarometer, the economic foundations of Poland's security are strengthening. A public opinion poll conducted by CBOS in March 2019 showed that 91% of the respondents supported Poland's membership in the EU, including: 59% answered that they strongly supported, and 32% that rather supported.

Only 5% of the respondents were against the membership. Compared to the May 2004 survey, the number of supporters of the presence in the EU has increased by 19 pp. In 2009 it was 85% and in March 2014 – 89% [4].

At the same time, 85% of the respondents (9 pp more than in 2014) express the conviction that the presence in the EU has a positive impact on the Polish economy. Positive results are recorded in every sector of the economy. 78% of the surveyed (i.e., 12 percentage points more than in the 2014 survey) positively assess the EU membership for enterprises and farms. Only 6% negatively assess the impact of the EU membership on the condition of Polish enterprises. Compared to 2014, it is a decrease by 9 pp. [5].

In terms of personal benefit, the results are not so clear-cut. However, they are also positive. From the perspective of their benefits, 57% of the respondents positively assess the effects of Poland's membership in the EU. 24% equates personal gains and losses from membership, and 5% believe that our presence in the EU brings them losses [6].

Not only CBOS research proves that Polish society sees much more benefits from membership for the country and the economy than the average of ratings from other Member States. Eurobarometer surveys show that 60% of citizens of 28 Member States positively assess their country's membership of the European Union. Over two-thirds of the respondents (i.e., the highest number since 1983) are convinced that their country has benefited from membership. According to the same research, support for the EU in Poland is higher than the EU average. 70% of the respondents consider the membership as good for Poland [7].

Each of these integration processes, both in Poland and in many European countries, finds opponents who use their Euro- or NATO-skepticism to create a populist atmosphere of threat. Insofar as they fit into the formula of social debate and substantive discourse, they are a natural phenomenon. They become dangerous when their unjustified populism takes precedence over their objective understanding of security and they become a tool for increasing support for radical right-wing groupings.

3. Migration problem

We can talk about the threat and problems related to the migration process in terms of the scale and causes of this phenomenon, which cannot be limited and eliminated by the contemporary world and international security institutions. Problems are also visible in the European Union, especially in the implementation of the shared immigration policy, when the Member States do not find an understanding of the problem that is satisfactory for all Member States. The total number of immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants in individual Member States of the European Union is presented in Figure 3.

Poland is in the group of countries in which the percentage of people who are not Polish citizens is one of the lowest and amounted to 5.5 people per 1000 inhabitants. Thus, they constituted about 0.6% of the entire population of Poland⁵.

⁵ According to Eurostat data, "in absolute terms, the largest number of foreigners residing in the EU Member States on January 1, 2018, lived in Germany (9.7 million people), Great Britain (6.3 million), Italy (5.1 million), France (4.7 million), and Spain (4.6 million). Altogether, 76% of the total number of non-nationals residing in all EU Member States were foreigners living in these five Member States, while the population of the five Member States represents 63% of the total EU-28 population" – based on the material: *Statystyki*




Fig. 3. Immigrants per 1000 inhabitants in the EU countries in 2017

Source: [8].

dotyczące migracji i populacji migrantów, [online]. Eurostat. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics/explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/pl [Accessed: 11 November 2019].

According to Eurostat data⁶, in 2017 a total of 4.4 million people immigrated to one of the EU-28 Member States, while at least 3.1 million emigrants left an EU Member State. The data do not illustrate migration flows to/from the entire EU, as they also cover flows between individual EU Member States.

In 2017, the 4.4 million immigrants accounted for approximately 2.0 million non-EU nationals, 1.3 million citizens of another EU Member State than the one to which they emigrated, about 1.0 million migrants to a Member State EU the citizenship of which they already held (for example, returning citizens or citizens born abroad), and about 11,000 stateless persons. In total, 2.4 million immigrants from third countries arrived in the EU in 2017, and at the same time 1.9 million people previously residing in one of the EU Member States moved to another Member State, with the result that on January 1, 2018, 22.3 million (4.4%) of the 512.4 million people living in the EU were not EU citizens. In 2017, the largest number of total immigrants was received by Germany (917.1 thousand), followed by the United Kingdom (644.2 thousand), Spain (532.1 thousand), France (370.0 thousand), and Italy (343.4 thousand).

Unfortunately, Poland and Hungary, which deny solutions to the shared migration policy of the European Union, are a negative example in terms of admitting non-EU citizens without considering that the scale of migration is mainly influenced by pushing factors: armed conflicts within individual countries (or even civil wars – e.g., in Syria), religious fundamentalism, maintaining and supporting regimes. The claims that migration problems should only be solved where they occur are also not fully acceptable. Apart from economic migration, some people who decide to leave their country do it for fear of repression for political or religious reasons, as well as for the life and health of their loved ones.

On the other hand, the Poles are citizens who willingly migrate to other EU countries. The largest number of emigrants in 2017 was reported by Germany (560.7 thousand), Spain (368.9 thousand), Great Britain (359.7 thousand), France (312.6 thousand), and by countries admitted to EU after 2004, namely Romania (242.2 thousand) and Poland (218.5 thousand).

From Poland's point of view, it is disturbing that while in 2017 in total in 22 EU Member States there was a higher level of immigration than emigration, in many countries of the former Eastern bloc, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the opposite was true. Therefore, it cannot be clearly stated whether the government's announcements that they will create conditions encouraging the return of Polish citizens from abroad are reasonable in Poland.

According to CSO data, in 2018, 2.45 million Poles stayed outside our country. The result is lower of 85 thousand than in 2017, but the uncertain situation in the British Isles due to the protracted Brexit was identified as the reason for the decrease in the number of the Poles living abroad. 98 thousand Poles left Great Britain during that year. The largest increase in the number of the Poles settling in was indicated in the Netherlands and Germany – approximately 3 thousand people [9]. Although, Poland is not an attractive destination country for citizens of other EU Member States, it can become not only a transit country, but also a destination country for economic emigrants from the former USSR states.

In November 2018, the Work Service Agency published the report "Labor migrations of the Poles IX – November 2018", which shows that 8.6% of the economically active people

⁶ All cited migration data are derived and quoted from the material: *Statystyki dotyczące migracji i populacji migrantów*, [online]. Eurostat. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics/explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/pl [Accessed: 11 November 2019].

considered economic emigration. In numbers, it is over 1.6 million people. 45% of potential emigrants are young and professionally active people between 18 and 36 years of age. Most of them were not unemployed, as 82% declared that they had a job and had higher education (69%). The main reasons for migration (7 out of 10 Poles) were better social conditions and higher earnings in Western Europe [10, p. 6-7].

The CSO report also confirms the persistent cause of our compatriots leaving Poland – it is mainly economic emigration. The tendency basically alters with the economic changes in the country to which Poles migrate rather than with the decreasing unemployment in Poland.

Such emigration trends may not serve the Polish system of public finances and social security, especially if we consider the very low Polish fertility rate and the aging of the society, which is below the generation renewal.

Moreover, Eurostat data shows that people who immigrated from third countries to the EU Member States in 2017 were on average much younger than the population already residing in the destination country. As of January 1, 2018, the median age of the EU-28 population was 43.1 years, while the median age of people migrating to the EU-28 in 2017 was 28.3 years, so they are mainly of working age. In many destination countries international migration can be used as a tool to fill specific shortages in the labor market. Unfortunately, it is not so evident, not only because of the language barrier, but also for reasons resulting from education, lack of demand for low-skilled workers, reluctance to take up any work by immigrants to more developed countries of the European Union, and focusing only on state aid benefits.

A dangerous phenomenon that can cause aversion to any newcomers is creating a sense of threat, xenophobia, and racial hatred towards strangers. The growing hostility and divisions in society does not serve social security.

With respect for human and civil rights and freedoms, it should be remembered that migration is not only a threat and, due to cultural differences and problems with assimilation and integration in the societies of many European countries, including Poland, will certainly not reverse neither the bad demographic trends and the replacement rate, nor the aging population in many EU countries. It is a specific challenge, which may bring some benefits but it is necessary to strengthen all kinds of projects aimed at promoting integration activities of third-country nationals migrating to the EU.

These issues are highlighted in the “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Progress report on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration”. Based on the October 2017 Eurobarometer survey, the authors of the Communication stress that “most Europeans (69%) regard integration as “a necessary long-term investment for their country”. Four out of five respondents (and a majority in all Member States) see the EU’s important role for in the integration of immigrants with particular added value of sharing best practices among Member States and promoting cooperation between all parties involved and providing them with financial support” [11, p. 21].

4. The Russian Federation as a destabilizing factor in its close and distant surroundings

When it comes to the close environment of Poland and the European security environment, the behavior of the Russian Federation does not inspire optimism. Russia’s method of accomplished facts in generating threats and destabilizing the situation or supporting authoritarian

regimes in various regions of the world shows that it is justified to indicate it as a state that cannot be ignored in the process of identifying real threats to the security of not only our country but also former states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Russia's attitude in relations with countries, which have chosen the path of democratic changes, and showing the former Warsaw Pact states and the current members of the North Atlantic Alliance that it will accept none of the changes in military potential in Europe and each of them will face retaliation on its part do not positively affect the perception of neighborhood and relations with Russia as contributing to the peaceful coexistence of states.

In the context of the security dilemma⁷ [12], the Russian Federation is becoming a typical example of a state which unilaterally negatively evaluates any, even the most peaceful, actions and intentions in its vicinity. The actions undertaken by the former Eastern Bloc countries neighboring Russia for the integration with European and NATO structures are interpreted by Russia as hostile, thus giving rise to restrictive actions. The rhetoric of Russia's conduct makes this country perceived as more and more clearly entering the path of return to the arms race. An open but tragic question arises what will such the Russian Federation's attitude lead to? Russia's practical actions may be the answer.

Russia's aggressive policy in a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Georgia – supporting separatist activities in Ossetia, Ukraine – military involvement and supporting separatists in Donbas and Lugansk, annexation of Crimea), declarations towards Russian interests in Transnistria (Moldova), supporting and joining military operations in Syria, "internationalist" aid to the communist President of Venezuela, and vetoing the UN Security Council on all resolutions condemning totalitarian regimes confirm the thesis that Russia can be recognized as a state which, through its foreign policy, contributes to the emergence and maintenance of tensions and outbreaks of inflammation not only in their immediate, especially Western surroundings, but throughout Europe and the world.

Therefore, we can say, based on the ideological causes of conflicts, including armed ones, that Russia will seek and maintain all opportunities to create trouble spots, especially in regions that it will consider useful, both as creating a sphere of influence and giving it the ability to decide on political solutions in various regions of the world. Contemporary Russia will not renounce the possibility of creating the so-called "sovereign governments" or "sovereign democracies". Russia will create them in a clear violation of international law, as the Russian authorities put it, at the "request" of some undefined representatives of a given nation. Such financially, politically, and militarily backed pro-Russian governments give the Kremlin the ability to fully control them.

The impact of Russia's economic policy, mainly the policy based on energy resources, on the security environment, both on a global and local scale, remains unchanged. The countries of the former Eastern bloc, which for decades have been mostly dependent on crude oil and natural gas supplies, also today, especially when they implement investments aimed at independence from Russian supplies and diversify the directions of obtaining energy resources, are subjected to pressure and a kind of energy blackmail from Russia. At the same time, as some countries are trying to limit Russian oil and gas supplies, Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on Russia as a resource for raw materials.

⁷ A security dilemma – "expresses the existential condition of uncertainty, which characterizes interpersonal relationships. States that want to ensure their security strive to obtain the greatest possible power, which in turn makes other states feel threatened and forced to act in a similar way [...] there are two levels of its interpretation and response". J. Czaputowicz. *Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN; 2012, p. 109-10.

We see it very clearly in Germany's attitude to energy investments jointly with Russia. Germany treats energy cooperation with Russia as a necessary source and direction of diversification⁸ [13]. Further Russia and Germany's investments, which bypass Poland and Ukraine as transit countries for energy carriers, are becoming increasingly problematic for our country. Poland may lose the attributes of its geographical location in the East-West relations. At the same time, we observe an emerging conflict between the US and some European countries over North Stream 2⁹ [14].

Summary and conclusions

Each of the areas presented (political, military, economic, social) can generate causes and premises for the occurrence of security threats, and simultaneously play an important role in the process of counteracting threats and influencing the mechanisms of ensuring security in Poland. The decisions made after 1989 to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union have brought positive effects. They strengthen the possibilities and means with which Poland can influence and participate in the process of ensuring European security as well as create a stable basis for the implementation of projects and build the national external and internal security system structures on solid pillars. Not only is Poland's membership in both these organizations supported by public opinion but also their positive impact on individual sectors of the economy and the feeling of internal and external security felt by Polish society.

Poland's membership in NATO and the EU structures does not mean that the national interests formulated in strategic documents have changed dramatically. Challenges and threats last and with varying intensity affect the security policy and are important from the point of view of geographical location, external and internal political conditions, the changing international environment, further and closer environment, economic and social development, industrialization, and digitization.

Thus, the assumptions of the key role of NATO in Polish security policy remain valid – expressed both in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2014. It is “significantly determined by the fear of a threat from Russia dominating among Polish political elites. This implies the priorities of Polish involvement in NATO, which “mainly refers to maintaining

⁸ This position was expressed by the German Minister of Defense and CDU Chairman Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer on October 19, 2019, during a conversation in Riga with the Latvian Minister of Defense Artis Pabriks. Kramp-Karrenbauer stated that “in Germany's energy policy, Nord Stream 2 plays an important role for the country's energy security and the diversification of gas supplies”. The position of the German Minister of Defense was not understood by the Latvian side. The Latvian Minister of Defense stated that “five gas pipelines can be built but when the supplier remains the same, it does not constitute any additional security” – information based on: *Stanowcza deklaracja szefowej niemieckiego MON ws. Nord Stream 2*, [online]. Wirtualna Polska. 12.10.2019. Available at: <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/stanowcza-deklaracja-szefowej-niemieckiego-mon-ws-nord-stream-2-6434415518066817a> [Accessed: 24 November 2019].

⁹ For example, on November 22, 2019, Jim Risch – Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Senate – informed during the talks as part of the International Security Forum held in Halifax, Canada that the draft of the US defense budget for the financial year 2020 included sanctions against companies participating in the Nord Stream 2 construction. The draft budget act is to be compliant with the Act “Protecting Europe's Energy Security” passed in July 2019 by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US Senate – information based on: *USA szykują sankcje wobec Nord Stream 2. „Rosjanie będą musieli szukać innej drogi”*, [online]. Wirtualna Polska. 24.11.2019. Available at: <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/usa-szykuj%C5%82a-sankcje-wobec-nord-stream-2-rosjanie-beda-musieli-szukac-innej-drogi-6449678657701505a> [Accessed: 24 November 2019].

and strengthening the Alliance's original function – collective defense, expanding NATO to the East under the so-called open-door policy" [15, p. 191]. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 2020 confirms that when reads: "The basic factor shaping Poland's security is its strong embedding in the transatlantic and European structures [...] Poland is also striving to strengthen external pillars of security, including through membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union" [16, p. 6, 10].

Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by Poland's membership in NATO is to maintain the maximum possible transatlantic ties, strengthen the equipment capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces, and cooperate for the development of NATO-EU partnership and Member States' political cohesion. At the same time, the growing political, military, economic, and social interdependencies of states mean that the economic factor and membership in the European Union is and will be the main pillar of Poland's security.

Social conditions, crucial from the point of view of the security of individuals, communities, and countries, as well as local, regional, and even global security, make it impossible to ignore the factors important for the processes of ensuring security, demographic issues, and migration.

The migration process is, in a way, an inevitable social phenomenon that will affect especially developed countries with a high standard of living. Apart from the apparent situation in which a given person may lose his/her life or unjustly other criminal sanctions for political and social roots, the reasons for migration are evident: improving material well-being and the need for cheap labor.

As far as Poland is concerned, the influx of emigrants will certainly not have any significance in terms of demographics, but may have an impact on economic and social issues. The demand for cheap labor means that we are becoming a country where people, especially from Ukraine, stay and will stay. In 2017-2019, they effectively fueled the development of investments in Poland. Suffice it to mention that the Central Statistical Office data shows that in April 2019, investments increased by 22.8% compared to April 2018.

In general, it should be emphasized that the European Union Member States and other developed countries generate, to a greater or lesser extent, many tempting factors (economic, environmental, political, and social) for a potential emigrant. Therefore, they are and will be attractive target countries for migration. The pull factors far outweigh the pull factors of migrants' countries of origin. These factors, strengthened by pushing factors in the immigrant's country of origin, in combination with the attracting factors, make the European Union countries ultimately appealing places to stay [Cf. 8].

The phenomenon of migration is not only a positive contribution to the economy, but also brings many challenges and threats, especially related to crimes caused by dishonesty of employers, when there are not only violations of employee rights, but even human rights – especially when the form of their use and dependence on the employer becomes economic slavery or even labor camps.

The problem of uncontrolled migration is illegal transfers of people across borders and trafficking in human beings. Organized crime groups see in it, also in Poland, a source of illegal income.

We can emphasize that the overlapping of external and internal factors in the security policy and the typically social factors of racism, nationalism, xenophobia, chauvinism, intolerance [17, p. 372], and all kinds of nationalisms will very strongly affect the will to preserve national

identities, and at the same time influence social moods and a subjective and objective understanding of security. An increasingly pressing problem to be solved not only in Europe will be the need to change the common migration policy, which is not respected by some European countries (including Poland), in a manner acceptable to all EU Member States. However, it should be remembered that it cannot be a policy of absolute tolerance nor “absolute restraint but a definite “no” for immigrants” [18, p. 29].

Therefore, building it in close correlation not only with economic policy and the needs of the labor market, but also with the policy of security and public order will be very important in the process of ensuring the internal security of our country, as well as observing and developing the common EU migration policy. Such an approach to the issue of emigrants will facilitate their integration with the local community with mutual respect for cultural differences. At the same time, it will enable the maintenance of social cohesion and, most importantly, it will facilitate more effective counteracting possible threats to public order and security related to the migration processes [16, p. 32].

The factor of fundamental importance as for the threat to Poland’s security is the neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation. Some of the countries of Western Europe, which in the past were not under the dominance of the former USSR, differently than some countries of the former Eastern bloc, perceive contemporary Russia, its foreign, economic and military policy. For some Western European countries, market mechanisms are essential. They are not as sensitive to Russia’s superpower actions as Poland is.

The military actions taken by the Russian Federation (the attack on Georgia and support for separatist actions in Ossetia, annexation of Crimea, inspiring and supporting separatists in Donbas and Lugansk, supporting and conducting military operations in Syria) and the continuing tensions in Transnistria show that Russia is breaking international law. It aims to change the security system not only in its former sphere of influence, but also in European security. Any pro-democratic and pro-European changes in countries where Russia has its interests will be treated by the Russian authorities as a threat, and at the same time will become a pretext for hostile actions taken by the Russian side in the political, economic, and military spheres.

It should be borne in mind that the Russian Federation will treat all these actions not only as a bargaining element in relations with other states and powers but stating that without Russia’s consent it is impossible to solve any of the security problems, regardless of which country or region of the world it concerns.

Also, in economic matters, especially in terms of raw materials, it seems difficult to expect the European Union Member States’ shared position on Russia. For the countries of Central and Western Europe, the possibility of increasing oil and gas supplies from Russia is the diversification of supplies and economic freedom based on the laws of the market, for Poland it is a kind of resource dependence of Europe and incomplete understanding of the former Eastern Bloc countries’ point of view on the emerging threat of Russian domination in the raw materials economy.

Considering the above, and taking account of the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union as the fundamental pillars of Poland’s security, it is necessary to be aware that every even the smallest action weakening the coherence of the organizations’ activity negatively affects the understanding of the problems of individual Member States in all areas of the security understanding in question. In the case of Poland, leaving the mainstream of Community and alliance policy would be an irreparable mistake not only politically and economically, but also militarily.

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Conflict of interests

The author declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions

The author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

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Biographical note

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Uwarunkowania procesu zapewniania bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – wybrane problemy

STRESZCZENIE

Procesy zapewniania bezpieczeństwa Polski wymagają ciągłego analizowania wielu czynników, które w zasadniczy sposób wpływają na możliwość pojawiania się zagrożeń zewnętrznego i wewnętrznego bezpieczeństwa. Z punktu widzenia przedmiotowego kryterium pojmowania bezpieczeństwa niezmiernie istotnym są czynniki polityczne, militarne, ekonomiczne i społeczne. Wraz z wstąpieniem Polski do Organizacji Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego oraz Unii Europejskiej, członkostwo w tych organizacjach stało się podstawą budowania naszego systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego i jest pozytywnie postrzegane przez większość społeczeństwa. Pamiętać jednak należy, że zmienność środowiska bezpieczeństwa i najbliższego otoczenia Polski rodzi wciąż nowe wyzwania (procesy migracji, kwestie dostaw surowców energetycznych,

mocarstwowa polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej) mogą wzbudzać niepokój i poczucie zagrożenia. Celem tego artykułu, jest przedstawienie wybranych uwarunkowań procesu zapewniania bezpieczeństwa Polski.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE bezpieczeństwo państwa, NATO, Unia Europejska, migracja, stosunki międzynarodowe

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