Rozmowa z Andrzejem Nowakiem – Laureatem Nagrody im. Rufusa Isaacsa

• Autorzy: Jaśkiewicz Anna

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14708/ma.v47i1.6491

Warianty tytułu

EN

Interview with Andrzej Nowak - Laureate of the Rufus Isaacs Award

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

PL

Nagroda Rufusa Isaacsa jest przyznawana co dwa lata za wybitne wyniki w dziedzinie gier dynamicznych na Sympozjach Międzynarodowego Towarzystwa Gier Dynamicznych począwszy od 2004 roku. W 2018 r. nagroda ta została przyznana prof. dr hab. Andrzejowi S. Nowakowi z Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego oraz prof. Georges Zaccourowi z HEC w Montrealu. Artykuł prezentuje wywiad z prof. dr hab. Andrzejem Nowakiem, w którym Laureat wspomina swoją drogę naukową, opowiada o uzyskanych wynikach w tej dziedzinie i ludziach, których spotkał podczas swojej kariery naukowej. Lista wszystkich laureatów znajduje się w dodatku zamieszczonym na końcu wywiadu.

EN

The Isaacs Award, named after Rufus Isaacs, is given every two years for the outstanding achievements in dynamic games by the International Society of Dynamic Games since 2004. In 2018, Professors Andrzej Nowak (University of Zielona Góra) and Georges Zaccour (HEC, Montreal) were awarded. The article presents an interview with Professor Andrzej Nowak, in which the Laureate tells about his research career, the significant results obtained in this field and mentions scholars he met as a scientist. The list of all winners can be found in the appendix at the end of the interview.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Nagroda Isaacsa; gra stochastyczna; gra dynamiczna; równowaga Nasha

EN

Isaacs Award; stochastic game; dynamic game; Nash equilibrium

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
• Czasopismo: Mathematica Applicanda
• Rocznik: 2019
• Tom: Vol. 47, no. 1
• Strony: 61--80
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 54 poz., fot.

Twórcy

autor

Jaśkiewicz Anna

• Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, Wrocław 50-370

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2019).