Military and civilian integrated logistics : caveat emptor (let the buyer beware)! considerations for the NATO Article V battlefield

• Autorzy: Ti R.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0013.2801

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The past 25 years has seen the increasing use of commercially contracted firms to provide logistic support to Western armies, especially in the British, US, and Australian militaries. The resulting integration of civilian and military logistic personnel and systems to form a joint military-civilian/ public-private integrated logistic system has required a number of adjustments and changes in order for the product to be efficient, effective, and functional and remains a dynamic and ongoing process. In 2018, commercial logistic support is now at the point where certain militaries are deploying non-military logistic contractors forward into 1st and 2nd line logistic support roles. This article will briefly describe the western military trend to commercial logistic contracting, highlighting key points and considerations of which any military will require awareness, if contemplating a similar expansion. It will also emphasise that this growth of civilian contracting has been predicated on low intensity, counterinsurgency conflicts such as deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1st and 2nd line commercial logistic support hence remains completely untested in the event of a potential peer or near-peer conflict. The untested nature of commercial contracting in a forward support role is the greatest potential critical vulnerability of militarycivilian integrated logistic systems, especially in the context of a potential NATO Article V -type conflict. The lessons for the Polish military as it considers greater integration of military and civilian logistics as part of a modernised force structure are clear.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

1st and 2nd line logistic support; military-civilian integrated logistics; high; intensity-high lethality conflict; asymmetrical information/unlimited liability contract

• Wydawca: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Sztuki Wojennej
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: nr 4(113)
• Strony: 19--33
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 23 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Ti R.

• Integrated Soldier Systems Branch, Land Systems Division, Capability, Acquisition, and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, Australia

Bibliografia

• [1] See: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50107.htm. “SALIS” (Strategic Air Lift International Solution), is the NATO acronym for this arrangement.
• [2] However as at April 2018, the current NATO SALIS RUEC is ending, see: https://thedefensepost.com/2018/04/18/russia-airline-end-nato-contract/.
• [3] NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP 4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, Edition B, Version 1 and NATO Standard Land Forces Logistic Doctrine ALP-4.2, Edition B, version 1, Dec 2015. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics provides a common perspective for planning and conducting multinational joint logistic support for Allied operations to support NATO commanders.
• [4] UK Ministry for Defence Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations, 2015. This UK MOD publication considers in more detail than NATO doctrine, the roles of contractors on deployed operations. (Termed “CONDO’s” by the UK).
• [5] Hambler, R., Team leader LDOC strategy, UK MOD. Presentation at Combat Logistics 2018, 17 April 2018, Warsaw. Included description of the UK Logistic Commodities and Services Transformation program.
• [6] Mc Grath, J.J., The other end of the spear: the Tooth to Tail ratio (T3R) in modern military operations, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas , 2007,Chapter 3, p. 73. This is an excellent and particularly detailed discussion on T3R focussed on the US Army. The T3R quoted in this article is at p. 73.
• [7] Chang, E., Prior, D. and Gottwald, F., Towards an integrated system for army logistics management, from Australian Army Journal (AAJ), Spring 2016 Vol XIII, no 2, pp. 105-121. Despite these advances, simplifying information systems to enable SCM continues to be a challenge. For an ADF perspective, the reader is directed to this article.
• [8] Mileham, P. (2010). “Unlimited liability and the military covenant.” Journal of Military Ethics 9(1): 23-40. This reference discusses the unlimited liability contract, focusing on a commander’s power of coercion as a factor in its enforcement.
• [9] Definition downloaded from: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asymmetricinfor mation.asp Not all blogs are evil: at some risk of affecting the credibility of this article, this particular blog has an excellent definition of asymmetry/information failure that complies with definitions produced in standard university undergraduate textbooks of economics and verified by the author.
• [10] Pan, J., Silent Kingmaker-the need for a unified wartime contracting strategy, Joint Forces Quarterly, National Defence University, 1st Quarter 2011, 60, pp. 38-41, is recent comment on the various asymmetries occurring at every level of the Afghan contracting system.
• [11] For 2 examples reported on by mainstream US media see for example two articles describing the findings of official enquiries regarding the scope of the problem: https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/international/middleeast/pentagon-finds-halliburtonovercharged-on-iraq.html and https://www.ft.com/content/7f435f04-8c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0.
• [12] The Australian Defence Force Warfare Training Centre (ADFWTC) based in Newcastle, Australia, offers an Operational Contract Management Course (PM keys code 208759). This course is aimed at a target audience of military rank OF2-3 as well as appropriate civilians within the Department of Defence working in the operational logistics field. The course is conducted via a combination of four online learning modules via the Defence CAMPUS online learning system plus a 3-day intensive residential block held in Canberra. Topics include the following: Operational Contracting, Development and trends in the use of contractors in support of operations, Current operations and contracts, Understanding the importance of profitability, Evaluation of contract performance, Consideration of risk, Relationship management and communication, Finance, and the rights and obligations of all parties.
• [13] Report summary, Commission on wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan CWCNR- 49, 31 Aug 2011. This report is particularly critical of the behaviour of US prime contractors.
• [14] See: https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html This provides a single source point for tables of US contractor numbers.
• [15] Peters, H.M., et al: Department of Defence contractor and troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017, Congressional Research Service, 28 April 2017. Report downloaded from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf . This publication documents several metrics, the principal one of interest being US military versus contractor numbers in both theatres of operation, trending over the past decade. Of note is the differentiation between contractors and private military contractors undoubtedly originating in past controversies associated with PMC’s.
• [16] Karber, P., Lessons learnt from the Russo-Ukrainian war-personal observations, The Potomac Foundation, Washington DC 6 July 2015. Amongst many articles on Russian “new generation warfare” this contains an excellent summary of “new Generational Warfare”. Downloaded from: https://www.scribd.com/doc/274009061/Lessons-Learned-From-the-Russo-Ukraine-War#.
• [17] Thomson, M., Drury, A. and Rothwell, D.R., War and Profit: doing business on the battlefield, Australian Security Policy Institute publication, ASPI Canberra, March 2005. This monograph contains an excellent discussion and summary of IHL considerations in relation to commercial contractors at Ch3, pp. 41-50.
• [18] Galeotti, M., I’m sorry for creating the Gerasimov doctrine, 5 March 2018, downloaded from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. This online article from a leading commentator on Eastern geopolitical affairs who is senior research fellow at the Institute of International Affairs in Prague and a visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. It was Galeotti who first coined the term “the Gerasimov doctrine” in 2013. As the title implies, this short piece describes his disappointment at the widespread and faulty appropriation of this phrase as official Russian doctrine originating from the Russian Chief of the General Staff, without foundation.
• [19] Gansler, J.S., et al, Prime vendor contracting: lessons learnt, School of Public Policy, Centre for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, University of Maryland, March 2011. This publication contains some excellent definitions, and discussion on the benefits of prime vendor contracting at p. 6, and pp. 26-28.
• [20] Barber, E., Incentive options for performance-based logistic contracts, AAJ, Autumn 2008, volume V, number 1, pp. 115-130. This article contains an excellent discussion on the dynamics of performance-based outcomes as part of the commercial transactional process.
• [21] Spence, C., Air-Vice Marshal, Logistic support to operations; an Australian perspective, RUSI Defence systems, Spring 2007. This is a particularly good summary of the ADF’s logistic intent (which remains current in 2018) presented by a NATO equivalent OF 7-ranked senior Air Force officer who was a previous Chief of Joint Logistics (CJLOG), the ADF’s integrated tri-service national logistic command.
• [22] Readers who are interested in the current Australian OF7 CJLOG’s strategic intent are referred to: Defence Logistics Enterprise Strategy 2016-2021, JLOG publication, Canberra December 2016.
• [23] Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 4-0 Logistics, 2018, this is the capstone Australian Army logistic doctrine governing logistics at formation level and below. It is an open access document available via the Australian Department of Defence internet site for free download.

Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2019).