Principles and dilemmas of disinformation (deception) on selected historical examples

Adrian Czesław Napora

Operational Department G-3,
Command of the 11th Armored Cavalry Division in Żagań, Poland,
e-mail: acnapora@gmail.com

INFORMATION	ABSTRACT

The study presented here attempts to draw a synoptical comparison of the modern principles of operational camouflage through military deception. The research problem adopted encompasses the practical employment of disinformation and deception in an appropriate and inappropriate manner. The first part of the article contains an attempt to briefly present the current theoretical assumptions related to operational deception, including disinformation. The second part is dedicated to an arbitrarily selected examples from the history of the 20th-century warfare. The third part comprises conclusions and references of the theoretical assumptions to selected examples of armed struggle. The article contains two fundamental conclusions. The first one is the possibility of gaining an advantage at every operational level, especially at the tactical level, through employment of deception. The second one states that success is determined by a concept of operation which is recognizable by the opposing side, using the so-called Magruder's principle and Jones's dilemma.

KEYWORDS

Introduction

This study presents an outline of the issue of applying contemporary theoretical principles to the deployment of one form of operational deception, namely, disinformation. Due to the formally limited length of this article, the author does not aim at an exhaustive exploration of the topic. The fundamental research problem involves an attempt to identify the reasons for success or failure, and hence the directions for optimization and development of conducting disinformation and deception. The whole discussion takes into account the current state of knowledge. Based on the examples from the history of warfare, it is hypothetically possible to determine which components of disinformation and deception were applied correctly and which were not. As a result, it is possible to optimize the utilization of the existing knowledge and identify directions for its further development [1].

This article is of signalling and confrontational nature. The current state of theoretical knowledge has been verified by the author in relation to historical aspects of warfare. As far as theoretical assumptions are concerned, the document setting out the national doctrine was deemed to be the matter of primary importance. The documentation used by the Armed Forces of the US and selected views currently existing in the broader academic discourse complement the issues in question. Additionally, historical examples are analysed, which – despite being limited to the 20th century and compiled by arbitrary selection – in the author's opinion, will assist in gaining an understanding of the content signalled herein and deepen the theoretical foundation, as well as – more importantly – expand the planning staff's imagination.

The research methods applied include theoretical methods such as logical analysis, comparison, generalization abstraction, and deduction, as well as the historical method, which belongs to practical methods. The latter method allowed for presenting subjectively selected facts characterizing similar events. Logical analysis allowed for indicating the consequences of applying specific features of disinformation and deception, while their comparison allowed for identifying appropriate and inappropriate applications. On the other hand, generalizing abstraction allowed for determining the most significant aspects of practical knowledge application, ultimately facilitating inference in the scope of its optimal use and directions for its development [1].

The first part describes the issues presented in the Polish publications of operational standardisation and extended by the content of American documents related to deception. Selected elements of the scientific discussion on the nature of military operations in the future were also presented. These

operations will undoubtedly be supported by information tools, including disinformation. The whole discussion creates a kind of tool base which allows for efficient analysis of the historical examples cited in terms of the conditions for conducting effective deception[1].

The above-mentioned examples are presented in the second part of the article. Their choice is selective and dictated by the transparency of the content in the available historical sources regarding the use of disinformation. The first of the examples deals with the failure of disinformation operations suffered by the Allies in 1943. The second example illustrates how military deception may occur spontaneously and how it can be directed and exploited. This example is related to the Falklands War of 1982. The final example furnished refers to the Gulf War and demonstrates how the optimized use of military deception can be used in order to obtain and exploit tactical advantages.

The whole article is summarized with an attempt to make concise reference to the theoretical conditions described above.

1. A brief outline of disinformation

Presently, in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, operational deception is a term whose content boils down to directing the available potential in such a way that one ensures freedom of action for themselves and misleads the opponent [1]. Its intended effect is to prevent the opponent from identifying the actual positions of troops, interpreting their formations, and discerning the intentions behind the actions. Such state of the matters is meant to lead the opponent to make erroneous planning assumptions, ultimately resulting in choosing an ineffective way of action. As a result, in the best-case scenario, the opponent will carry out the actions while adjusting the initially adopted plan. In the event of a highly successful application of operational deception, the opponent will operate in a disorganized manner, without a plan or coordination, improvising, and potentially introducing a new planning process in a hurry. Their combat will switch from an organised form organized to an ad hoc one, and combat systems, although properly prepared, will be poorly directed[2].

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[1] The term "deception" is the American equivalent of the Polish term "maskowanie operacyjne (operational camouflage)" which originated from the so-called previous era – a period when there was a strong influence from the Soviet Army. A more thorough discussion on modifying the terminology in this specific field could be beneficial.

[2] According to the current operational standardization documents, operational camouflage is implemented at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Operational camouflage is defined as: "(...) a set of activities conducted to hinder the opponent from making correct

Conducting operational deception effectively boils down to the implementation of its two fundamental endeavours: *operations security (OPSEC)* and *Military Deception (MILDEC)*. The first of these aspects involves guarding information on the available potential and intentions of actions. This endeavour is accomplished by identifying weak elements in the information system of one's own military forces and implementing appropriate remedial measures. Military deception, commonly called deception, is a set of actions leading to the creation of a false or multi-variant image of available potential and the possibilities of conducting military operations. The latter term directly overlaps with the concept of operations security. The more possible interpretations of potential actions exist, the greater the number of potential threat assessments, and the more challenging it becomes to assess the actions of the deceiving side accurately[3].

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decisions and effectively influencing them by affecting their decision-making process. It includes concealing troops and defensive infrastructure from enemy reconnaissance, deceiving the opponent regarding the actual location of troops, and the intent behind the operations conducted." For a more comprehensive understanding of the theoretical principles of operational camouflage, please refer to DD-3.31(A) [2]. Operational standardization document DD-3.20 [3] states that operational camouflage: "(...) Includes concealing forces and assets from enemy reconnaissance, as well as deceiving the opponent about intentions, actual troop positions, and their ongoing actions." The combat manual defines operational camouflage as follows: "(...) it involves operations aimed at deceiving the opponent by concealing subdivisions, fortification structures, logistics equipment, and the adopted method of operation." Zdzisław Galewski indicates that "passive operational camouflage involves avoiding the detection of available potential, while active operational camouflage is about concealing the intent of action." [2, p. 14-15; cf. 3, p. 9-10; 4, p. 228-234; 5, p. 11-13, 36-37, 45-47; 6, p. 14-15; 7, p. 12-16, 43-44; 8, p. 328-329].

[3] DD-3.20 [3] indicates that operational camouflage takes on the following forms: military deception, feigning, and concealment. DD.3.31(A) [2] defines operations security as follows: "(...) it is a fundamental element of camouflage at the operational level of command. This applies to the protection of the necessary elements of information related to one's potential and intentions." On the other hand, military deception is defined as: "(...) a planned and intentional action aimed at influencing the decision-making process of a potential opponent." However, AAP-6 [9] defines disinformation as: "any deliberate actions intended to deceive the opponent using manipulation, feigned activities, and the preparation of evidence that cause actions that are harmful to the opponent's interests." Conversely, *the Lexicon of Military Knowledge* [10] provides the following definition for this category: "1) disseminating false information and documents to deceive the enemy regarding the actual intent, organization, and conduct of operations (combat, battle), as well as the composition of own troops and the nature of their actions. Disinformation is one of the fundamental methods for implementing operational camouflage tasks. It includes: 2) unintentionally misleading superiors or commanders of troops performing joint tasks (collaborating) by misinterpreting orders, directives, or other tactical-operational information or omitting crucial executive instructions (guidelines), sometimes failing to provide the necessary information on time." [2, pp. 15-16; cf. 3, p. 9-10; 11, p. 4-6; 10, p. 128; 12,

As is clear from the above-mentioned factors, operational deception is a complex set of activities calling for good organization, clear and precise planning, but above all, a creative approach supported by knowledge of one's own intentions. Hence, operational deception is built upon specific principles, the implementation of which aims to achieve the general objective in alignment with the principles of warfare. These principles include seizing the initiative and gaining an advantage over the opponent. The Polish doctrinal document distinguishes the following principles of operational deception:

1) surprise and initiative,
2) effectiveness of the action,
3) centralized planning and coordination,
4) temporary freedom of action,
5) continuity of action,
6) comprehensiveness of impact,
7) actual viability,
8) credibility,
9) confirmability,
10) flexibility,
11) non-conventional conduct of action
12) security,
13) coordination of deceptive measures,
14) alignment of deceptive measures with the operations of other types of troops,
15) feasibility of implementation and,
16) periodical inspections[4].

The first principle listed consists in the continuous creation and maintenance of a false perception of one's own intentions in the opponent's mind. This is intended to cause the enemy to waste planning efforts, target combat mechanics in an inappropriate manner and make errors leading to their failure. By creating such a situation, the deceiving side surprises the opponent, maintains the initiative, and increases the chances of victory[5].

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p. 1-1–1-3; 13, p. 7-9; 14, p. 346; 10, p. 87; 15, p. 187; 5, p. 11-13, 34-35; 6, p. 15-16; 16, p. 207-208; 17, p. 51-52; 18, p. 301 et seq.; 19, p. 77-80; 20, p. 57-60].

[4] The Polish document DD-3.31(A) [2], in comparison to DD-3.20 [3], introduces two new principles of operational camouflage: coordinating camouflage activities with the operations of other types of troops and the possibility of implementation. More information about the principles of warfare, including military superiority, can be found in sources such as: [2; 21; 22; 23; cf. 3; 5; 8; 11; 12; 13; 19; 20].

[5] For more in-depth information on topics related to the element of surprise, please refer to [2; cf. 3; 4].

The second one involves directing operational deception at the opponent's command centres. This is intensified through understanding the opponent's staff procedures, the calculation of the capacity and means for executing the deception task. The human being, as the weakest element of the entire system, is to be presented with a false image of the troops of the deceiving side, which will ultimately lead to a wrong configuration of the available combat potential[6].

Centralization of planning and coordination consists in creating a system for effectively conducting feinted and deceiving operations alongside the actual plan in a way that the enemy's surveillance sensors can read. False information should be distributed in a way that enables task execution while also reducing the chance of being exposed [2; cf. 3; 11].

The next three principles refer to time. The first of them boils down to the idea that it is sometimes necessary to establish timeframes within the scope of time management so that one can react freely to situations that arise as a result of the deception being conducted. In addition, this deception is supposed to mislead the opponent to a sufficient degree, so as not to give them time to correct the position. The other one is intended to deepen the confusion of the opponent through sequential and logical actions, as a result of which the opponent will not be able to escape an inconvenient situation and regain the initiative. In turn, the comprehensiveness of impact is supposed to encourage the opponent to perceive feinted actions as genuine ones, which is achieved through the complementary use of all forms of operational deception [2; cf. 3; 4; 11].

Actual viability, in turn, is a requirement determining the plans of deception in such a way that they do not deviate from actually possible actions. In other words, operational deception must not be used in a manner which would not be normally scheduled. This principle is directly correlated with credibility which forces planners to develop feinted actions, for which justification can be found in the entire false image. Credibility is enhanced by the principle of coordinated deceptive activities which dictates the implementation of other activities resulting from combat security operations such as engineering support, defence against weapons of mass destruction, countermeasures and universal anti-aircraft defence. The same applies to the alignment of deception operations with other military branches, e.g. reconnaissance or artillery. The entire deception strategy must be based on the use of the combat capabilities of the

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[6] For example, the command process of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation that was presented in a study by L. Grau and Ch. Bartles [25]. Cf. [2; 3; 11; 16].

available military capability. It seems important to use reconnaissance strategies to determine the opponent's operations counteracting the deception. Confirmability, in turn, is supposed to assure the opponent that the actions of the deceiving side are "as genuine and justified as possible". This is achieved through the use of specially crafted and mutually congruent materials planted with the sole purpose of being detected by the enemy's reconnaissance units [2; cf. 3; 4; 11; 16; 25].

It should be noted that there might appear a situation in which feinted actions reveal the main undertaking. In such situations the principle of flexibility is supposed to be a protective element, forcing the development of such an operational deception plan that will allow its correction, thus preventing it from being uncovered. In order to avoid the latter, deception must be different each time, so it must display unconventionality. The deception may be exposed also by releasing true information. Security is a condition stipulating that only the necessary data be distributed in a way which minimises the likelihood of such an interpretation of a given situation that will reveal the true objectives of the operation [2; cf. 3; 11].

The last rules refer to the feasibility of implementation and periodic control. They are intended to ensure that the deceptive actions undertaken are feasible and that their executors have available forces, means and skills. As in any plan, it is necessary to control the implementation and maintain the capability of reacting, in addition to maintain the superficial picture of the operation[7].

As part of operational deception and in addition to endeavours and principles, other forms can be distinguished: protection of critical information, disinformation, ruses and concealment. The doctrinal document distinguishes disinformation conducted by agents, electronic disinformation, disinformation through the mass media and disinformation by inspiring the environment. The former consists in deliberately providing the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance groups with deceptive or untrue information. Electronic disinformation works analogously, but it is directed at the opponent's reconnaissance assets. It is achieved by emitting radiation in the electromagnetic spectrum of false organisational structures, e.g., a radio network. Deception in the mass media is carried out by posting false information in the public space,

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[7] The author would like to emphasize that the military term "control" is defined as: "The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate structures or structures that are not typically under their direct command. This authority includes responsibility for carrying out orders or directives." In the discussion on command and control, it is essential not to confuse it with the oppressive controlling actions of superiors over subordinates (exercising their command authority), which typically involve comparing the subordinate's documentation against the assigned task [2, pp. 24-25; 3, pp. 11-13; 11, pp. 4-5, 9-10; 27, p. 316].

in the form of reports, photos, articles and others. Disinformation through inspiring the environment involves dissemination of false information among the population, which can subsequently feed it to the sensors of the enemy's reconnaissance system[8].

In the scientific discussion on disinformation, a broad range of the possible ways of misleading electronic sensors is indicated. These, in turn, in the absence of information on technical malfunctions usually inspire the trust of their users. Electronic sensors, such as battlefield radars, radiolocation stations and others, are disrupted or confused by three possible techniques which include: imitation, manipulation and simulation [16; cf. 18].

Imitation is a disinformation technique which consists in entering the communication network of the enemy's own equipment. This can be done by using radio stations or computers connected to the network of a command centre. Then the station under the control of the deceiving side provides false information as a legitimate user [18; cf. 11].

Manipulation is a deliberate introduction of one's own electronic equipment into special operating modes, application of a specific use of them and their organisation in a system other than a model one, so that the opponent themselves interprets the whole as being different from the actual state [18; cf. 11].

Simulation, in turn, is about creating a false or multiplied electromagnetic spectrum, the purpose of which is to mislead about the true location. Then, on the basis of radiation, electronic sensors indicate the possible location of forces and assets, in particular command posts. Manipulation is intended to create an image of several apparent or false spectra [18; cf. 11].

In the field of disinformation, the United States Armed Forces distinguish assets, tactics, techniques and procedures. Such a classification creates a range of support tools for creating a deceptive picture of military operations [12; cf. 13].

As for the disinformation assets one can distinguish the physical, technical and administrative ones. The essence of the former is to conduct deceptive activities leading to confirmation or denial of selected information by the opponent. These include relocation of forces, manoeuvres, use of spurious devices, mock-ups and dummies, conducting operations, relocating and deploying elements and logistic devices, as well as conducting reconnaissance activities. National economy assets are also used to confirm or exclude information by the opponent; however, they must absolutely correspond to

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[8] The author of this paper believes that when the population unknowingly and indirectly contributes to transmitting false information to the enemy's sensors, it can be interpreted as joining one of the sides in the conflict, which entails the risk of retaliation and shelling. For more information about forms of operational camouflage, see in: [2], cf. [4; 5; 16; 18; 20].

the apparent image which is being built. These include: release, absorption or reflection of energy, release of chemical or biological odours, use of mass media. Administrative measures are intended to provide the opponent with the right photographic and written documentation for the interpretation of the intention to act accordingly to the expectations of the deceiving party [13].

The employment of tactics in each operation is conditioned by time, environment, enemy action, inventory stockpiles, equipment and the task. They are assessed each time with regard to the feasibility of executing operational deception tasks.

Tactical tasks include: camouflaging changes in the military capability detected by the enemy, shaping the enemy's awareness in the scope of introducing new types of equipment into combat, strengthening the opponent's current assumption as to the manner of one's own troops' operations, diverting the opponent's attention from other essential activities, information overload of the enemy's reconnaissance system, creating the impression of focusing the potential in a location where it is weak, desensitising the attention and vigilance of the opposite side, confusing the opponent as for the size, location and activities of one's own army and finally reducing the possibility of generating a clear image of the battlefield [12; cf. 2; 11; 13; 20][9].

Four techniques of conducting military deception are distinguished in the United States Armed Forces: confusing manoeuvre, demonstration, ruse and exposure. The first one is about misleading as to the choice of the location, military capability and time of the assault and focus of the main effort. It consists in maintaining contact, but the concentration of military capability takes place in a different location. The second one is based on the action of one's own troops, so that the opponent confirms the assumed variant of action, as well as the belief in the legitimacy of the plan which, as a result of the actions taken by the deceiving party, will ultimately fail. A ruse is understood as an apparent action preventing the achievement of advantage over one's own troops. It boils down to using false or deceptive information and making the opponent act accordingly. Exposure involves one's own troops acting in a manner that aligns with the assumptions of the operational deception plan. Procedures, in turn, correspond to the provisions and organisation of the Army Battle Command System and determine ways to develop deception [12; cf. 13].

While considering deception assets, it is impossible to avoid dilemmas related to compliance with the law of the state in which the operations are carried

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[9] The American tactical tasks for disinformation correspond with the operational camouflage tasks of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.

out, compliance with the International Humanitarian Law, moral dilemmas related to the involvement of the population or lying. These include selected categories such as: faithlessness in capitulation, in the use of the white flag and in the use of special signs, involvement of non-combatants in military actions or the use of equipment intended to save life and health for combat purposes [12; cf. 13].

Shaping the battlefield requires commanders and planners to have meticulous organisation, give subordinates appropriate freedom of action, often as part of search for unconventional solutions, as well as exhibit imagination and resourcefulness. Thus, creating a false image along with the preparation and implementation of real operations requires officers to develop a comprehensive understanding of the situation, plans and control them properly. In order to learn how to perform that, numerous army leaders and commanders studied military actions thoroughly as part of the history of warfare. Following their example, in order to build a creative apparatus, it is worth considering selected historical examples in which the search for advantage resulted in the use of disinformation operations. In the further part of this study, the conclusions from the reflections on misleading the opponent and obtaining the initiative will be presented. Generalizing the problem in question, it can be understood as spreading false information about one's own strength. Fabricated data is to be aimed at its reception and interpretation by the personnel and sensors of the enemy. In order to accomplish this effectively, it should be performed by implementing the principles determining the creation of a false image of one's own actions[10].

2. Operation *Starkey* – the failure of ineffective commitment

During World War II in the summer of 1943, the dispersal of the Wehrmacht was a strategic problem for the Germans. German commanders feared the possible opening of a new front in north-western France, Italy and the Balkans. Having noticed that, the Allies began to prepare for the implementation of Operation *Cockade.* The conditions supporting the operation included concentration of forces allowing for the intended amphibious operation in northern France, the victories of the Allies in North Africa and the gradual collapse of the German forces on the eastern front. The objective of Operation *Cockade* was

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[10] Historical figures who examined military operations and achieved military success include individuals such as Napoleon Bonaparte, Helmuth von Moltke, and Józef Piłsudski [5; 15]. More about the victories of outstanding commanders can be found in [21; 28].

to create the conditions for landing in southern Italy, specifically in Sicily. This landing was defined to be a strategic objective for the alliance in 1943. The idea for the operations was to create an impression of carrying out an amphibious operation in the Pas de Calais in France and drawing part of the German forces away from the south. The region in question is the northernmost French department on the coast with its capital in Calais, about 40 km west of Dunkirk[11].

It was decided that this endeavour requires proper command. Therefore, in April 1943, a special command was created – Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), where Major General Frederick E. Morgan held the position of Chief of Staff. Interestingly, it was a staff that did not officially have any commander. Morgan quickly realised that the organisation commanded by him could only issue recommendations to subordinate units. Therefore, he contacted the British headquarters that was developing appropriate orders. He set up a special disinformation planning department called Ops (B) that was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Read. Read, in turn, had contacts in the structures of British secret intelligence, thanks to which he established cooperation with Colonel John Bevan. This collaboration elicited greater engagement of the intelligence service, which used a controlled network of double agents. The operation consisted in providing supposedly true and well-authenticated information to spies who passed it on to the German command – Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) [17; cf. 29; 31].

Cockade was a framework plan of a disinformation operation and consisted of three sub-operations codenamed: *Starkey*, *Wadham* and *Tindall.* The first one was crucial for the success of the entire endeavour and the achievement of the strategic objective, i.e., deceiving OKW with regard to the landing location, in order to tie up some of its forces in France and to reduce the German forces involved on the Eastern Front. The command of the entire operation was entrusted to COSSAC [17; cf. 29].

Starkey assumed that the Luftwaffe forces would be tied up for 14 days. A misleading image of a potential amphibious operation triggered the commitment of the German air force which had to prepare sufficient strength and resources to prevent the Allies from landing in Pas de Calais, as part of the countermeasures. Ultimately, as part of the deceptive image being created, it was assumed that the German forces would be so large that an amphibious operation would end in defeat. The climax of the entire operation was to be the week between September 8 and 14, 1943. The command of this task was

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[11] This operation was decided on at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 [17; cf. 19; 29; 30; 31].

entrusted to Marshal Trafford Mallory who cooperated with the American General Major Ira C. Eaker. The forces to be involved in the fictional landing were fourteen British and Canadian divisions which were also fictional.

Fewer than two divisions were actually involved in this task. Therefore, it was decided to involve two army corps, namely 8 and 12. In total, these were forces numbering around 60,000 soldiers. These units were to be deployed in southern England starting from August 1, 1943. It should be noted that it was only for Operation *Starkey* that real forces were allotted for its execution, namely forty-five British and fifteen American fighter squadrons. In addition, an actual bombardment of the fortifications on the French coast was assumed. A feint concentration of amphibious assault landing craft in the number of approx. 450 vessels was allegedly created in the southern British seaports. Two R-class battleships, 12 destroyers, 29 minesweepers and 59 other vessels were planned for the marine component. In addition, part of the British commando force, who planned 14 raids to the coast in Pas de Calais, was assigned. The whole picture was to have been intensified by an intelligence bait operation prepared against OKW. False data on the plans of the landing was to be provided to the Germans by people using the pseudonyms *Garbo* and *Tricycle*[12].

Fig. 1. Theatre of war for Operation *Starkey*
Source: [32].

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[12] According to Jon Latimer, *Garbo* was actually named Juan Pujol. *Operation Starkey* was synchronized with the actual landing in southern Italy, i.e., *Operation Avalanche* [17; cf. 29; 31].

Operation *Wadham* was supposed to create the impression that immediately after *Starkey*, the Americans and the British would carry out a powerful landing operation from the territory of Great Britain. The execution date was supposed to be sometime in the second half of August. Subsequently, this operation was postponed to November and eventually cancelled. The command of this operation was given to a command centre consisting of representatives of COSSAC, representing every type of armed forces at that time. The forces which were to be involved in these operations were five fictional American divisions [17].

Operation *Tindall* had an analogous role to *Wadham*, but it was supposed to create a threat of a landing in Stavenger, Norway. It was also commanded by an element of the staff seconded from COSSAC. The role of this operation came down to binding German forces deployed in occupied Norway. Just like *Wadham*, it was supposed to be postponed and eventually abandoned. The units involved in this task were five imaginary Scottish divisions [17; cf. 31].

In April 1943, a conflict of interest occurred. At the same time, the UK was carrying out tasks resulting from the *Starkey* plan, preparations and exercises related to the landing operation planned for 1944 and the bombing of German cities by the air force. Unfortunately, this state of affairs did not entirely correspond with building the image of striving for the real execution of the Operation *Starkey*. Thanks to General Morgan, there was a meeting at the top level of the Allied command, but operational masking in the scope of military operations in the United Kingdom was not considered a priority[13].

In May 1943, a disinformation operation was launched to prepare the implementation of the *Cockade* plan. These activities consisted in planting a clandestine suggestion by the spy network. The intelligence service reported on troop movements, air and naval preparations for seaborn assault. The matter was intensified by adequate statements of the government about the preparations which had been undertaken. Shortly after the commencement of the operation, it was noticed that the actions of the air force did not bring an expected result in the German intelligence circles. The abandonment of misleading fleet operations was considered, but ultimately 175 mock-ups were allocated [17].

On June 7, 1943, the commander of the 8th U.S. Air Force, Brigadier General Eaker, proposed that the support of Operation *Starkey* by the bomber wing be withdrawn. The issue was argued for by pointing to an unjustified use of bombers for 14 days – that is, for the period of the operation – which would not

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[13] Despite conducting intelligence activities, the Germans, influenced by Hitler's interpretation, concluded on May 19, 1943, that the preparations for the Western European landing were not credible [17].

have accomplished real tasks against industrial targets. Deceptive operations were supposed to burden the aviation excessively. In turn, the real support carried out along the lines of the operation might turn out to be insufficient. As a result, a decision was made by the Americans to use training aircraft for Operation *Starkey*, and the bombers' tasks could only be carried out as training, which in turn depended on weather conditions. Conceptually, this prevented supporting the credibility of the operations which were to be "sealed" by the bombing of Pas de Calais. Thanks to Dudley Pound and his analogous request to withdraw the use of real battleships in a sham operation, their use was also cancelled. One of the Dudley Pound's arguments was a possible loss of ships and, as a result, the lowering of the morale in British soldiers[14].

At the same time, the Germans concluded that the Allies had the conditions to carry out a seaborn assault operation from the direction of the Mediterranean Sea and transferred forces from Western Europe accordingly. Decisions in this regard were made mainly by the staff of the "West" area commanded by General Gerd von Rundstedt, and then in OKW. The intelligence network provided the Germans with information about the launch of the seaborn assault operation on September 8, 1943. The next day, it was assessed that the landing was imminent [17; cf. 29].

On August 25, 1943, aerial bombing began as part of preparations for *Starkey*. However, weather conditions prevented the completion of almost half of the tasks. The decision to discontinue Operation *Tindall* was made on the grounds of focusing the attention of the German OKW on *Starkey*. Bad weather also affected the operations of the Royal Navy. Only three fleets of minesweepers carried out their tasks. The German reaction was perfunctory. Despite the doubts, *Starkey* was continued. On September 8, as part of an exercise codenamed *Harlequin,* British and Canadian forces performed the task of loading the amphibious assault landing craft. This fact was observed by the Germans [17].

Operation *Starkey* finally began on September 9, 1943. In the first place, landing craft in a total number of 30 vessels were used. However, after approaching the French coast to a point 10 nautical miles away from it, a decision was made to withdraw the convoy under the cover of smokescreen. The other group sailed east, simulating landing forces, and turned back after three hours. The media reported that Operation *Starkey* was an exercise. In turn, German intelligence was informed that the landing operation had been abandoned.

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[14] Ultimately, the bombers had very little application in the described operations [17].

The feint assault, which had been prepared for more than half a year, was completed in such a manner [17; cf. 29].

Operation *Starkey* is an example of British operational deception through disinformation, which took the form of a comprehensive and calculated impact on the decision-maker. The latter was supposed to have made the wrong decision on its part, which was ultimately to bring advantage and victory to the deceiving side. After its completion, Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory reported that the operation had not brought about any real effects. The German army did not carry out any serious task aimed at counteracting the potential landing. It is also worth noting that the number of German divisions deployed in France between May and September 1943 was reduced from forty-five to thirty-five[15].

The failure of Operation *Starkey* was determined by the division of the forces subordinate to COSSAC and the low involvement of the forces not involved in creating the deceptive image. Ultimately, despite the disinformation and planting a bait for the OKW and Hitler by the spy network, no credible threat to Heer and the Luftwaffe was created and their forces were not absorbed. No effect was achieved in southern Italy either. Direct conclusions from this fiasco were implemented a year later during the preparation of the operation codenamed *Fortitude* [17; cf. 19].

3. Falklands War

The Falkland Islands are islands located in the Atlantic Ocean, east of the Argentine coast. Interestingly, they are about 16,000 kilometres away from the British Isles.

At the beginning of the ninth decade of the twentieth century, there was a fierce ongoing political discussion about whether the islands belonged to Argentina or to the United Kingdom. Officially, it was a royal overseas territory. In international discussions there was a tendency to hand over the territory to Argentina. However, private British consortia blocked this decision. Finally, on April 2, 1982, impatient Argentina carried out a seaborn assault operation in the Falklands[16].

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[15] Due to the unsuccessful outcome of *Operation Starkey, Operation Wadham* also ultimately ended in failure [17; cf. 29].

[16] Considering the Falklands War example, it is worth noting Jones's Dilemma, which involves supplying misleading information to the deceived side from various sources of different origins, to gradually reinforce the constructed battlefield image. Another interesting thread is the issue of which country the Falkland Islands belong to. The dispute continued from the moment Spain relinquished its rights to the archipelago in the first half of the 19th century.

Admiral John Fieldhouse was appointed commander of Naval Task Force 317 as a part of British rapid response. From the very beginning, he adopted the position of even-sized seaborn assault operations which were intended to confuse the opponent as to the real landing site. He envisaged San Carlos as the target assault direction, and Port Stanley as a feint assault site. The distance between these settlements is around 100 kilometres. It was also assumed that British operations would as a rule resemble American seaborn landing operations. In addition, a blurry image of the time of landing was to be implemented as a part of the deceptive scheme, and the party to be deceived was supposed to interpret the target action as one consisting in an assault and disengagement. The royal side also assessed that only the towns mentioned were feasible landing sites with regard to their decisive potential. Therefore, it was deemed justified to inspire the belief that the operations would be carried out exactly in the second of the possible locations, especially since the Argentinians assumed the attack on Port Stanley *as imminent*. It is worth noting that they also assumed the use of special forces for diversionary operations with the task of preparing the battlefield. The British responded with a seaborn landing operation on May 21, 1982[17].

When considering the planning of the operation, the British took into account several beaches close to San Carlos settlement. Due to the fact that the island was located near the mainland Argentina, aviation support was to be expected. In the assessments, there was a view that the island would be a convenient place for landing. It had three beaches, with possibility of a protective cover for them, and after their occupation a beachhead might be strengthened. In addition, the terrain of the island created the possibility of protection against weather inconveniences, such as strong ocean winds. The poor density of population of the island was supposed to promote low losses among the inhabitants, as well as minor damage to infrastructure [33; 35].

Argentina declared its annexation in 1832, and a year later, Great Britain did the same. The dispute escalated and turned into an armed conflict in the second half of the 20th century. Most of the people on the islands considered themselves British. A small group of working-class population opted for Argentinian citizenship. There was a provocation coordinated with the Argentinian government, during which workers living in Leith raised an Argentinian flag, leading to British protests on the international stage. It is puzzling why the Argentinians aimed for a military resolution of the conflict. At that time, Argentina was under military rule and experiencing economic problems. The authorities were in need of success. It was estimated that the United Kingdom would not be able to maintain a military defence of the islands. This led to the decision to resolve the issue using military forces. [12; cf. 30; 33; 34].

[17] Argentinians considered the possibility of a British landing on West Falkland Island and the Lafonia Peninsula [33; cf. 35; 36].

Disinformation was spread by the British media. Initially, it was spontaneous. Both the news television and the socio-political press speculated about the capacities of the assigned component, its composition, time and place of assault. Many experts were invited. Divergent opinions did not form a cohesive picture, on the contrary – they built numerous, possible and justified variants of operations [33; cf. 36].

The British Ministry of Defence initially demanded cessation of all speculation regarding the landing operation. It was feared that they would cause an Argentine pre-emptive strike from the air. At the same time, it was believed that the image of operations presented in the media should be controlled and shaped. A number of information security restrictions were introduced on the ships, including correspondents moving along with the task force, who had to submit prepared reports for approval. For balance, some information which could be considered harmful was released. Information on the weaknesses of the amphibious assault ships was part of this scheme, which resulted in a wide public discussion. It was believed that this would ultimately allow the bold plan to be carried out [33].

Speculations were also aroused after the speech of one of the officials of the British Ministry of Defence, Frank Cooper. He suggested that the landing operation would not resemble the landing in Normandy in 1944. Moreover, he declared that his understanding of future actions comes down to local strikes and sorties [33].

The deception aimed at the Argentine side began with the departure of the Royal Navy convoy from the British Isles. One of the first tasks for the aviation

Fig. 2. Magazine covers regarding the Falklands War
Source: the author's own collections.

Fig. 3. The course of operations during the conflict in the Falklands
Source: [37].

was to create the trash traces of the fleet larger than the actual ones. From the very beginning, this built the image that the forces were greater than those actually involved. In addition, the British began an operation codenamed *Tornado* intended to give credibility to the approach to Port Stanley. These actions involved performing a series of air strikes and their aim was to weaken the Argentine potential and create convenient conditions for landing by drawing away Argentine forces. Additionally, a false image was created through controlled leaks of information in the radio network regarding the organization and conduct of activities[18].

On May 1, 1982, an air strike was launched from the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes*, which prevented Argentine planes from taking off. In addition, the barrage from the sea was fired by the ships HMS Alacrity, HMS Arrow and HMS Glamorgan.

These attacks did not cause fatalities among the population which was meticulously used by the British media. The reconnaissance of the targets was conducted by the special forces of the United Kingdom. The opinion that D-day would take place on May 1 or 2 was reinforced among the Argentine command. The English deliberately postponed the moment of starting the

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[18] To carry out the operation, they planned to utilize Sea Harrier and Vulcan aircraft, along with naval artillery. Furthermore, the British fleet secured the islands against the Argentine navy, leading to the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano by the British submarine HMS Conqueror [33; cf. 35; 36].

operations. Subsequent strikes against the airfields were carried out on May 3-4, 1982. This action was codenamed *Black Buck* [33; 35].

Preparation for landing on the island lasted until May 20, 1982. Thanks to reconnaissance activities, the British hit Argentine targets with precision. Between May 20 and 21,1982, artillery and rocket preparation was carried out, suggesting an upcoming amphibious assault. In fact, it was shelling, which in fact brought losses for the Argentines, but only simulated a landing site. The task assigned was specified as: *one-man amphibious landing*. The main executor was HMS Glamorgan. These actions eventually confirmed the Argentinians' belief in the landing at Port Stanley and bound most of their forces in the Falklands in a position being inconvenient for them[19].

On May 21, 1982, British forces landed in the San Carlos area without much resistance. The defenders asked for air support, but the Argentinian air force was already overpowered. The Argentinian forces had been dispersed, as a result of which there were no losses on the part of the landing forces. The surprise was so great that the landing reached all the main objectives before dawn, and it was four hours before the scheduled H-Hour. Interestingly, the landing craft, which were considered disposable, withdrew without losses [33; cf. 35].

On the basis of Argentinian reports, the BBC reported on a series of raids carried out by British forces. Information about such a course of action was practically repeated by the Argentine media, e.g., following the interview with Frank Cooper. One of the places where the actions took place was San Carlos. As it turned out, even direct recounts from the Argentinian side were imprecise. It was not intentional. This was repeated only in the British media which, in turn, had a masking and disinforming effect [33].

The British maintained their surprise until the very end and did not betray their real intentions. Disinformation was exacerbated by the involvement of the media, including the BBC which is a government-controlled entity. The choice of the site for the seaborn assault was conditioned by the possibility of conducting it in several convenient locations and the inability of the Argentinian forces to maintain a powerful presence everywhere. Additionally, the threat assessment and reconnaissance in the generated information noise turned out to be too difficult for unambiguous interpretation. The fighting for the Falklands continued, with varying results, until June 20, 1982. Ultimately, the most severe losses on the British side were inflicted on the navy.

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[19] HMS Arrow and HMS Glamorgan came under fire from the Argentine Air Force and suffered minor damage [33].

The Argentine forces sank HMS Ardent, HMS Penelope and HMS Coventry. However, these losses did not stop the air force strikes and the operations of the land component fighting directly on the islands in any way [33; cf. 35].

4. The first Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces took over Kuwait. The aim of this aggression was to control the infrastructure for the extraction of strategic raw materials and the production of petroleum reserves. A small state was conquered in two days. The annexation was to be a compensation for the losses suffered by Iraq in the past war with Iran. It is worth paying attention to the historical context – Kuwait was part of the Basra province in the Ottoman period. After the annexation, a military coalition with the pre-dominance of American forces was relatively quickly formed under the United Nations (UN) resolution. It was to carry out the operation of liberating Kuwait. The American General Norman H. Schwarzkopf was at the head of the forces gathered for this task. The operation *Desert Sword* began on February 24, 1991; however, this event was preceded by a series of air force strikes as well as comprehensive disinformation and deception of the enemy regarding the site of the assault made by the land component[20].

Many officers of the former Iraqi command had experience from the 1980-1988 Iraqi Iranian War. However, the knowledge and skills coming from conducting military operations in that conflict were not useful in counteracting the upcoming invasion. Several wrong assumptions were made as part of the armed forces' preparation for the defence. The presumption that the potential of the air force is of little use on the battlefield should be listed among the worst. Another serious mistake was the assumption that after the deployment of the main land forces in Kuwait other directions, e.g., the Iraqi-Saudi border, would remain passive. It was assumed that because of difficult terrain conditions (sandy and rocky desert), military operations would not take place there. Eventually, an assumption was made that the area was impassable. In addition, Iraq's road infrastructure indicated an axial, latitudinal vector of

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[20] The city of Kuwait was occupied by twenty Iraqi divisions. In October 1990, there were 430,000 Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait. The following countries joined the military coalition: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Syria, and Egypt. It was initially formed after the possibility of Iraq attacking Saudi Arabia emerged. The operation involving the deployment of pre-emptive military forces on Saudi Arabian territory was codenamed *Desert Shield* [11; cf. 22; 29; 38; 39; 40].

Fig. 4. A leaflet suggesting an American seaborn assault
Source: [41].

Fig. 5. Iraqi war game – visible assessment of the threat of a seaborn assault
Source: [41].

operations. The defence of Basra and Kuwait cities was assessed as key to retaining Kuwait. It was also the location from which the main Iraqi road connecting the abovementioned cities with Wadi al-Batin ran [29; cf. 39].

The gravest type of an erroneous assumption turned out to be the limitation in the acquisition of strategic information to the public media, in particular the English-speaking ones. Gen. Schwarzkopf, being aware of this, ordered high information security during the preparation for the operation. At the same time, he launched psychological impact operations targeting Iraqi soldiers through a leaflet campaign. The materials contained content encouraging surrender, discontinuance of fighting, disclosure of the Iraqi troops' position and suggestions of a seaborn assault. Photos of American soldiers sailing to Iraq appeared. Operations of the coalition troops intended to break the strong positions of the Kuwaiti coast defenders were suggested in the leaflets. The American press picked up this content and began to multiply it. At the same time, the Newsweek magazine published a plan to strike the flank of the Iraqi forces. The convergence of the "Newsweek" analysts' assessment with the concept of the American planners was a complete coincidence [38; cf. 29].

The Iraqi analysts considered the coalition's land component to hold the decisive potential. It was also assessed that the only functional variant of conducting military operations was a landing operation from the direction of the Persian Gulf. Combat groups were gradually formed under such assessment. Iraq armed forces have consistently focused on repelling the threat from the sea, leaving the rest of the country exposed. The application of the principle of force economy led to the conclusion stipulating the deployment of subordinate units in a cumulative order in terms of training and elitism. Possible sections of the coastline suitable for landing were gradually eliminated, and finally the assumption of the landing of the coalition forces in the northeast of the city of Kuwait was made. A total of seven mechanised divisions and four armoured divisions were assigned to combat the seaborn assault[21].

The credibility of the potential threat of a landing operation was reinforced long before the actual operations began. In August 1990, 2500 Marines carried out a demonstration onboard the USS Inchon landing crafts on the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, the Americans were transporting troops from the bases on the Pacific and Indian Ocean towards the Persian Gulf by sea. By the middle of that month 15,000 soldiers were involved in the expedition. After the landing in Saudi Arabia in January 1991, the 18th and 7th Corps moved along the border with Iraq, 570 km to the west. The first operational formation

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[21] In those days, the primary field manual for planning military operations was *Field Manual 100-5 Operations*. It emphasized that employing military deception would yield an advantage when assessing the threat perception of the opposing side. In other words, when the opponent assesses the threat, this assessment should be utilized to deceive him. In Western terminology, such an action is called the Magruder's Principle [11; cf. 12; 29; 38; 39; 42].

left a group of about one hundred soldiers in eastern Saudi Arabia. Their goal was to prepare mock-ups and cause confusion regarding the location of the coalition forces. This displacement was preceded by the evacuation of the indigenous people, i.e., the Berber tribes who could betray the location of the allied forces. The Iraqi forces were outflanked even before the start of hostilities. At the same time, the Marine Corps conducted an exercise consisting in the execution of a seaborn assault. Moreover, the British established the *Rhino* team, *whose* task was to broadcast radio communication through the use of transmitters of communication services [38; cf. 29].

In the morning of January 17, the allied air force began operations aimed at weakening the Iraqi defence. This part of the operation was codenamed the *Desert Storm*. Eight days later, information was fed to the public media whereby the landing in Kuwait would be the largest one after the Korean War. Three days later, a strike was carried out on the Iraqi ships deployed in the waters of Kuwait. This action was intended to clear the sea lane for the arrival of the landing groups. The media – the main source of the Iraqi information – added hype to the situation in which the landing was supposed to take place

Fig. 6. The course of operations aimed at deception
Source: [11].

on 1 February. On 17 February the coalition force of 100,000 troops and 1,200 tanks was amassed along the Saudi territory[22].

The start of the land operations was delayed, which was intended to have a negative impact on the spirit of the Iraqi troops. On February 24, two divisions of the allied forces launched an attack in the southeastern part of the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. It was meant to match the Iraqi assessments. These activities were codenamed the *Desert Sword*. However, these divisions were successful and broke through two echelons of the Iraqi defence. At the same time, the 18th Corps, which together with the 6th French Armoured Division took over the airport in Salmon – virtually without resistance – and, together with the 10th American Airborne Brigade, Motorway 8, began operations. In turn, the 7th Corps was to wait 24 hours, but Schwarzkopf decided to take advantage of the success and put this operational formation into action the same day. On February 25, the coalition helicopters carried out strikes on the Kuwaiti coast. The Americans made a mock landing on the coast with one of the Marines brigades. In Kuwait, radio reported that the coalition forces had landed on the island of Faylakah. Three days later, the operation was finally successful – in total it lasted one hundred hours. The losses on the coalition side amounted to about 250 casualties [38; cf. 29; 39].

The example cited presents how important different components of deception are in armed conflicts. One of them is the disastrous and uncritical acquisition of information from the English-language media by the Iraqis. After identifying this state of affairs, the Americans used the so-called hunger for knowledge among journalists for this purpose. The vast majority of information reaching the media was reflected in the aggregation of the forces, their movement and training. Building a false image and misinforming the Iraqis was made credible to such an extent that the analysis of these activities did not allow the Iraqi command to categorically exclude the likelihood of a seaborn assault. In other words, the real probability of a seaborn assault was maintained for a very long time, even after reconnaissance discovered the forces cantered on the Saudi territory [38; cf. 29].

[22] D.P. Wright states that as of the autumn of 1990, 200,000 soldiers from coalition nations had been deployed on Saudi territory, with as many as 130,000 belonging to the United States. The 7th Corps left a gap between its formation and the 18th Corps, causing it to move about 225 km west of its intended operational area [38; cf. 29; 39].

Conclusion

In the above-mentioned examples of various war operations, above all, the principle of surprise and initiative is noticeable. In all three examples, false intentions to take action were constantly created. However, in the Falklands example a certain bottom-up spirit and spontaneousness, which appeared in the public space, was visible. It was later targeted and used. However, in the example of the Operation *Starkey*, the initiative was lost due to the finally low involvement of the coalition forces.

Each of the examples referred directly to the second principle and aimed at inspiring the opponent's decision-making centres with an apparent picture of future actions. Particularly visible was the focus on the procedures in the First Gulf War, when Iraqi analysts largely based the system of obtaining information about the possible operations of the coalition forces on the English-language media.

An attempt at espionage disinformation, undertaken by the British through a network of double intelligence agents, also seems interesting. It was aimed at inspiring Adolf Hitler himself. However, due to a low activity of forces in the United Kingdom, which were to pretend to prepare for a landing operation, the attempt at disinformation had almost the opposite effect. Magruder's principle has also proved useful for considerations. Both the British during the Falklands conflict and the Americans used it to mislead the enemy. This took place owing to the exploitation of the threat assessment made by the opponent. It is worth noting that both the Magruder's Principle and the Jones's Dilemma can be applied at any level to refine and detail the currently known disinformation processes.

In terms of the centralisation of planning and coordination, this principle was utilised in an exemplary fashion by the Americans. It is worth noting that in the case of the Falklands War, the initially spontaneous disinformation in the media was gradually taken over by the British command. In turn, the example of *Starkey* indicates that the described principle can be applied unsuccessfully.

Temporary freedom of action corresponds to all the historical examples described. Each time, flexible reaction to the situation was allowed for. The decisions were not always accurate, e.g., the decision to abandon *Wadham* and *Tindall.*

The success derived from deception, magnified by disinformation, was effectively used in the case of the conflict in Iraq and the Falklands. Practically until the start of operations, the opponent was not allowed to significantly improve their position. General Schwarzkopf's actions were part of the

comprehensive nature of the operation, and he made them credible through a real military manoeuvre creating the threat of a seaborn assault on the coast of Kuwait. The situation was similar in the described Second World War case.

The principle of operational deception which seems to have been decisive in the American case and during *Starkey*, is actual viability. The possibility of acting elsewhere, created by the coalition against Hussein until the start of the operation, practically bound his forces in Kuwait. In turn, there was a lack of proper support for the credibility of Operation *Cockade*, which was a direct reason for its failure. The abovementioned principle corresponds directly to credibility. The use of the latter is commensurate to the implementation of reality. However, the credibility of the multitude of operational variants created by specialists in the British public space needs to be emphasised. It goes without saying that the change of a landing site in the Falkland Islands was limited by the availability of convenient field conditions, which in turn multiplied operational options. This is an indication for the development of deception based on *branching* plans [27].

Confirmability, as a principle determining the creation of a false image susceptible to interpretation by the deceived party as true, has been applied in all examples. The Americans introduced imitations in the electromagnetic spectrum. The British in the Falklands intentionally broadcasted false communications on the radio network. In France, on the other hand, attempts were made to convince the Germans through the actions of the air force and the navy.

The principle of flexibility was visible in the American operation. Initially, after the publication of a plan similar to Schwarzkopf's real concept, the officer imposed restrictions on information security. However, then, using the media to disinform about the alleged landing on the coast, he developed a bypass in the concept of the operation. Only the necessary information regarding the potential landing operation was distributed in the public space. The author holds the position that such action may be considered unconventional. Naturally, other types of troops, and even armed forces, took a major part in this action. Reference can be made here to the exercises of the marines, and then to the alleged seizure of the Faylakah island off the coast of Kuwait. The Falklands example also corresponds to the abovementioned principles. The security principle, which directed spontaneous disinformation by the media, seems to be particularly visible.

The probability of a threat to individual deception activities is the result of the implementation of the principles of feasibility and cyclical control. The former was used in each example. Each time, both the Americans and the British deceived with a potential threat or in the alternative direction, or in the numer-

ous directions of the seaborn assault itself. Periodic control allowed for react to the situation, but in the case of *Cockade* it did not bring the desired effect.

One of the dilemmas of using disinformation is maintaining credibility. It is widely seen as a component of humanism. There is no doubt that building trust is outright dependent on this category. However, based on the analysis of the literature describing armed conflicts, it seems reasonable to believe that disinformation and even deception is the right action in the fight against the enemy. It has been deployed through the deliberate usage of the media in building a false image and in the use of double intelligence agents. The first aspect may raise doubts in terms of the journalistic reliability and the trust of its recipients. On the other hand, there are loyalty problems with double agents. They usually work for the side that currently offers higher remuneration[23].

The widespread use of military deception in operational planning has been examined by Sherwin and Waley's agenda. The samples covered the period from 1914 to 1973. The conclusions suggest that military deception was employed in 82% of the examined conflicts, with 41% of all identified cases involving both American and Russian forces. The effectiveness of military deception is substantiated by data showing that its use led to achieving the element of surprise and securing victory in 93% of operations. Military operations that failed to achieve the element of surprise secured victory in 50% of cases. In addition, a strategic advantage can be achieved through the use of military deception. There is no need to convince anyone that strategic advantage is the foremost principle of warfare[24].

It is hard to argue with the statement that the purpose of military deception is to bring about a situation in which the opponent makes a fatal error in planning operations. The result of such an error is the enemy's inability to impact the weak points of our troops. Simultaneously, the chance of hitting the opponent's weak points increases. This is one of the direct ways to influence the central point of the strategy. Overcoming this allows for the effective defeat of the opponent. Among the fundamental elements that have been identified as properly utilized components of disinformation and deception are: a consistently planned image presented to the opponent, its authentication by forces ultimately tasked with conducting operations, connecting (at least part of) the area of deceiving activities with an actual place, and the disclosure of fragments of truthful information. The low effectiveness of this operation can be attributed to several factors, including: the insufficient dedication of the forces

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[23] One proponent of this view is, for instance, Nicholas Rankin [17].

[24] This is confirmed by research on the same historical examples conducted by William R. Harris [17].

assigned to deceptive actions, an inconsistently and imprecisely prepared deception scenario that lacks authentication with real information, and a lack of convincing activities confirming the extensive scale of the military operation. Two interesting principles, albeit rarely applied, are the Magruder's Principle and the Jones's Dilemma. These elements enable the creation of an image which is much more easily comprehended by the opponent, making it much simpler to deceive and surprise them. The same applies to situations where the battlefield environment allows for the development of many operational variants. In such cases, the preparation and conduct of hostilities by common elements of each operational variant can form the basis for deception.

It seems, therefore, reasonable, and somewhat in a Western fashion, to establish tactical-level procedures finely tailored to the planning process. These procedures may be based on the Magruder's Principle and Jones's Dilemma, as well as *branches*. When appropriately supported by military deception, they may result in achieving surprise and gaining an advantage over the opponent. Due to their form, these procedures may obligate command authorities to seek effective military operations. The author of this study raises the open question of whether it is acceptable to potentially violate moral and "chivalrous" principles to gain an advantage over the opponent, leaving this matter for the Reader's reflection.

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**Stosowanie zasad i dylematów obowiązujących
w postrzeganiu dezinformacji (mylenia)
na wybranych przykładach historycznych**

STRESZCZENIE   Prezentowane opracowanie jest próbą synoptycznego zestawienia współczesnych zasad maskowania operacyjnego z wykorzystaniem dezinformacji. Podjęty problem badawczy stanowią zagadnienia praktycznego zastosowania dezinformacji i mylenia w sposób właściwy i niewłaściwy. Pierwsza część artykułu zawiera próbę zwięzłego przedstawienia obecnych uwarunkowań teoretycznych związanych z maskowaniem operacyjnym, w tym z dezinformacją. Druga część poświęcona jest subiektywnie wybranym przykładom z historii sztuki wojennej XX wieku. Trzecia część zawiera konkluzje i odniesienia założeń teoretycznych do wybranych przykładów walki zbrojnej. Artykuł zawiera dwie zasadnicze konkluzje. Pierwszą z nich jest możliwość uzyskania przewagi na każdym poziomie działań, w szczególności taktycznym, poprzez mylenie. Drugą jest uwarunkowanie powodzenia koncepcją działania możliwą do rozpoznania przez stronę przeciwną z zastosowaniem tzw. zasady Magrudera oraz dylematu Jonesa.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE   maskowanie operacyjne, dezinformacja, zasada Magrudera, dylemat Jonesa, operacja Cockade, wojna o Falklandy, I wojna w Zatoce Perskiej

Biographical note

Adrian Czesław Napora – a qualified officer of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and PhD in humanities. In 2014, he graduated with a degree in National Security, specializing in Armoured Forces, from The General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces in Wroclaw. In 2019, he successfully defended his doctoral thesis at the Faculty of History of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, which was devoted to the National Armed Forces. In 2021-2022, he was enrolled in Postgraduate Operational-Tactical Studies at the Faculty of Military of the War Studies University in Warsaw, where he completed his studies as the top student. In the years 2014-2015, he served in the 12th Bolesław Krzywousty Szczecin Mechanised Division, and from 2015 to 2021, in the 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigade in Żagań. He has served in the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade in Świętoszów since 2022. Throughout his career in various units, he has taken on successive command and staff positions related to commanding motorized infantry subunits and tanks, as well as planning and conducting tactical operations. His research interests include, among other things, art of warfare, history of the 20th century, military history, and geopolitics.

ORCID

Adrian Czesław Napora https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0462-156X

Conflict of interests

The author declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions

The author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.