Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition

• Autorzy: Feng L. , Gu M.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/acsc-2016-0009

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in the quality stage with the public firm acting as the high-quality producer and simultaneous play in the second period in the output stage turn out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

vertical differentiation; endogenous timing; public firm; private firms

• Wydawca: Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee of Automatic Control and Robotics
• Czasopismo: Archives of Control Sciences
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 26, no. 2
• Strony: 161--175
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 13 poz., wzory

Twórcy

autor

Feng L.

• Jiaxing University, School of Business, Jiaxing, China

autor

Gu M.

• Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai, China

Bibliografia

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• [7] K. Ishibashi and T. Kaneko: Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition. J. Economics, 95(3), (2008), 213-31.
• [8] L. Liu and Y. Lu: Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation. Bulletin of Economic Research, 66(3), (2012), 305-312.
• [9] Y. Lu: Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: the linear demand case. J. Economics, 88(1), (2006), 49-68.
• [10] S. Lutz and M. Pezzino: Vertically differentiated mixed oligopoly with qualitydependent fixed costs. Manchester School, 82(5), (2014), 596-619.
• [11] M. Motta: Endogenous quality choice: price vs. quantity competition. J. Industrial Economics, 41(2), (1993), 113-131.
• [12] D. Pal: Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. Economics Letters, 61(2), (1998), 181-185.
• [13] J. Tirole: The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988.

Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę