Opinion formation in social networks

• Autorzy: Taalaibekova A.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord180206

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

A number of selected works on the dynamics of opinions and beliefs in social networks has been discussed. Both Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches to social learning have been considered, but the analysis has been focused on a simple, tractable and widely used model of updating beliefs – the DeGroot model. The author studied the dynamics of opinions based on the DeGroot model from different points of view. First, its attractive features and shortcomings were discussed and then some of its extensions have been presented. These models are based on the DeGroot updating rule, but additionally incorporate the possibility of improvements and enrichments of the framework.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

social network; opinion formation; consensus; DeGroot model

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: Vol. 28, No. 2
• Strony: 85--108
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 43 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Taalaibekova A.

• Université catholique de Louvain, CORE & Université Paris 1, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne CORE, Voie du Roman Pays 34, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).