Supervised Credit, Government Strategies and Green Development: Evidence from China

• Autorzy: Zhang Bingbing

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35784/preko.4035

Warianty tytułu

Nadzorowany kredyt, strategie rządowe i zielony rozwój: przykład Chin

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This study examines the relationship between supervised credit (SC), government strategies, and green development (GD) utilizing the instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) and spatial econometric model and panel data from 30 provinces and cities in China from 2006 to 2020. The study reached the following main results. First, untrustworthy punishment and trustworthy incentives promote the environmental protection through optimal allocation of supervised resources, which can be positively regulated by the government transformation. Second, beggar-thy-neighbor and free rider can be found in government environmental SC. Strengthening punishment in neighboring regions will have a negative effect on the local GD, whereas increasing incentives will have the opposite effect. Third, strategic interactions among various governmental sections have varying effects on GD. The eastern regions implement difference-based promotion for trustworthy incentives and ineffective imitation for untrustworthy punishment. The central and western regions, on the other hand, use ineffective imitation for trustworthy incentives and inhibiting imitation for untrustworthy punishment, the eastern regions implement ineffective imitation and the central and western regions execute inhibiting imitation. Finally, when R&D investment exceeds a certain threshold, but the industrial structure is lower, the untrustworthy punishment can play its promoting role; otherwise, the trustworthy incentives will turn over. The study findings reveal the unique mechanism of SC and provides new impetus regional policymakers to promote sustainable GD.

PL

Niniejsze badanie analizuje związek między nadzorowanym kredytem (SC), strategiami rządowymi i zielonym rozwojem (GD) z wykorzystaniem zmiennej instrumentalnej dwustopniowej metody najmniejszych kwadratów (IV-2SLS) oraz przestrzennego modelu ekonometrycznego i danych panelowych z 30 prowincji i miast w Chinach od 2006 do 2020. W badaniu osiągnięto następujące główne wyniki. Po pierwsze, niegodne zaufania kary i wiarygodne zachęty sprzyjają ochronie środowiska poprzez optymalną alokację nadzorowanych środków, co może być pozytywnie uregulowane przez transformację rządową. Po drugie, żebraka-sąsiada i swobodnego jeźdźca można znaleźć w rządowym środowisku SC. Wzmocnienie kary w sąsiednich regionach będzie miało negatywny wpływ na lokalną GD, podczas gdy zwiększenie zachęt będzie miało odwrotny skutek. Po trzecie, strategiczne interakcje między różnymi sekcjami rządowymi mają różny wpływ na GD. Regiony wschodnie stosują promocję opartą na różnicach w przypadku godnych zaufania zachęt i nieskuteczną imitację w przypadku niegodnych zaufania kar. Z drugiej strony regiony centralne i zachodnie stosują nieskuteczne naśladownictwo w przypadku godnych zaufania zachęt i wstrzymywanie naśladowania w przypadku niegodnych zaufania kar, regiony wschodnie wdrażają nieskuteczne naśladownictwo, a regiony centralne i zachodnie wstrzymywanie naśladowania. Wreszcie, gdy inwestycje w badania i rozwój przekraczają określony próg, ale struktura przemysłowa jest niższa, niegodna zaufania kara może odgrywać rolę promocyjną; w przeciwnym razie godne zaufania zachęty się odwrócą. Wyniki badań ujawniają unikalny mechanizm SC i dostarczają nowego impulsu regionalnym decydentom do promowania zrównoważonego GD.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

supervised credit untrustworthy punishment; trustworthy incentives; green development

PL

nadzorowany kredyt; kara niezaufana; godne zaufania zachęty; zielony rozwój

• Wydawca: Lublin University of Technology
• Czasopismo: Problemy Ekorozwoju
• Rocznik: 2023
• Tom: Vol. 18, nr 2
• Strony: 216--228
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 33 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Zhang Bingbing

• Agricultural Development Bank of China, Nan‘an Sub-Branch, 362300, Nan‘an, China

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