Voting and MCDM: the pedagogy of the Saari triangle

• Autorzy: Hakula Jaakko
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The essay has a twofold objective: primarily, to present an application of voting theory as a possible evaluation method, and concurrently, to offer a pedagogic framework, based on that very application. Evaluation and certain notions of preference and value have common semantic roots. By equating preference and choice, we end up amidst social choice (SC) theory and voting methods, also manageable as joint decisions in multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM). With the aid of the Saari triangle some essential differences of pairwise and positional voting rules for up to three alternatives can be depicted. A voting or decision rule does not necessarily follow the true preferences of the actors, but may mirror the problematics of the chosen rule. The Saari triangle makes it possible to visualize some paradoxical results in the exemplary evaluations of digital websites through an imaginary case description via voting and MCDM. As candidates and voters in SC are put to stand for alternatives and criteria in MCDM, the methodological and pedagogical goals of the study are achieved.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

social choice; voting; Saari triangle; MCDM; pedagogy

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: Vol. 50, No. 3
• Strony: 401--412
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 26 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Hakula Jaakko

• University of Eastern Finland

Bibliografia

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