Inefficiency in spectrum auctions – empirical evidence

• Autorzy: Kuś Agnieszka

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.29119/1641-3466.2021.150.9

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Purpose: The spectrum is scarce recourses, so it is very important to allocate it in a way to maximize the economic and social returns to the countries` economies. Economists agree that the best way to allocate rare resources are auctions. Despite their good properties, in some environments, they can create inefficiency. We describe some potential sources of inefficiency in spectrum auctions and some negative effects of inefficient spectrum allocation. We also discuss how the government through appropriate spectrum policy and auction designing can promote efficient spectrum allocation. Design/methodology/approach: The paper is based on the literature on the spectrum auction and public documents published by national spectrum authorities. Theoretical discussions are supported by case studies of real world spectrum auctions. Much attention has been paid to the case of the Polish 4G auction. Findings: Extremely high reserve prices or rigorous approach to promoting entry could lead to price distortions, misallocation or even unsold spectrum which harm both competition and consumers. The case of the Polish 4G auction confirms that gaps in the detailed auction rules may lead to significant delays in frequency allocation and increase the risk of an ineffective auction outcome. Practical implications: In the light of our findings, it is important that the rules of the auction in the 3.6 GHz band currently planned in Poland should allow the regulator to control the pace of the auction and take into account the risk of inefficient outcome associated with passive bids. Originality/value: The discussions made in this paper could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in spectrum auction designing.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

spectrum auction; inefficiency; Polish 4G auction; spectrum policy; auction design

PL

aukcja widma; nieefektywność; polska aukcja 4G; polityka widmowa; projekt aukcji

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe. Organizacja i Zarządzanie / Politechnika Śląska
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: z. 150
• Strony: 115--130
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 27 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Kuś Agnieszka

• Pope John Paul II State School of Higher Education in Biała Podlaska. Faculty of Economic Sciences

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6258-6823

Bibliografia

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