Examining the asymptote in safety progress: a literature review

Dekker, S.; Pitzer, C.

Artykuł - szczegóły

Tytuł artykułu

Examining the asymptote in safety progress: a literature review

Autorzy

Dekker S. , Pitzer C.

Identyfikatory

Warianty tytułu

Języki publikacji

Abstrakty

Many industries are confronted by plateauing safety performance as measured by the absence of negative events – particularly lower-consequence incidents or injuries. At the same time, these industries are sometimes surprised by large fatal accidents that seem to have no connection with their understanding of the risks they faced; or with how they were measuring safety. This article reviews the safety literature to examine how both these surprises and the asymptote are linked to the very structures and practices organizations have in place to manage safety. The article finds that safety practices associated with compliance, control and quantification could be partly responsible. These can create a sense of invulnerability through safety performance close to zero; organizational resources can get deflected into unproductive or counterproductive initiatives; obsolete practices for keeping human performance within a pre-specified bandwidth are sustained; and accountability relationships can encourage suppression of the ‘bad news’ necessary to learn and improve.

Słowa kluczowe

asymptote safety bureaucracy vision zero behavioral safety resilience accidents

organizacja ochrony pracy stymulowanie bezpieczeństwa pracy planowanie bezpieczeństwa zachowanie się człowieka absencja powypadkowa niebezpieczeństwo wypadków

Wydawca

Taylor & Francis

Czasopismo

International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics

Rocznik

2016

Tom

Vol. 22, No. 1

Strony

57--65

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 56 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Dekker S.

s.dekker@griffith.edu.au

Griffith University, Australia
The University of Queensland, Australia

autor

Pitzer C.

Safemap International, Canada

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.

Typ dokumentu

Bibliografia

Identyfikator YADDA

bwmeta1.element.baztech-0c38428b-ac9f-4b18-a49c-a95a597dcceb