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Tytuł artykułu

The securitisation of foreign disinformation

Treść / Zawartość
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Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This paper analyses the Canadian government’s foreign and security policy responses to Russian disinformation in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It asks whether, how, and why the government has securitised the “crisis of Russian disinformation.” The paper first briefly reviews literature on the Copenhagen’s School’s “securitisation” theory and how it has been used to explain responses to other crises. It then adopts the framework to contextualise the Canadian federal government’s official rhetoric, and then to categorise government policies and actions. The sources consulted include government actors’ reports and stated intentions and policies from 2022 to 2024. Adopting a securitisation framework reveals that Russian disinformation has been rhetorically securitised by government actors as an existential threat to national security and democratic integrity which requires urgent action. Within a context of cascading risks, the government has taken a range of distinct yet reinforcing policies and actions, some more comprehensive than others. The paper argues that together this “pervasive rhetorical securitisation” and “ad hoc practical securitisation” comprise the Canadian government’s ongoing process of partial securitisation. This process is legitimising different methods of governance: security and warfare communications (to address threats to national defence and security), democratic resilience (to address threats to democracy), and, most controversially, blocking and sanctioning (to signal discontent to the Russian regime). The analysis further reveals that each approach has different benefits and limits. The paper concludes that the securitisation process is incomplete compared to the government's rhetoric, with no over-arching organisation or strategy. It outlines implications for future research.
Rocznik
Strony
118--138
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 86 poz.
Twórcy
  • School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Hastings St, V6J4Y2, Vancouver, Canada
Bibliografia
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Uwagi
Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2025).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-084c39c6-363b-4354-8400-1cad3df77bbd
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