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Defence in depth conception in nuclear power plants and requirements for instrumentation and control systems

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Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The aim of this article is to identify and discuss some issues of the safety systems’ design for nuclear power plants equipped with the light water reactors using a defence in depth (D-in-D) conception. Because the functional safety solutions play nowadays an important role for the risk control, the basic requirements for the instrumentation and control systems are specified with regard to relevant international standards. For the design purposes the safety functions are categorized into three categories. The I&C systems implementing these functions are assigned to one of three classes that conform to defined design, manufacturing and qualification requirements. These systems are designed to implement functions of relevant categories. Additional design requirements are discussed, including hardware and software aspects, to achieve and maintain the required reliability commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed to reduce risk.
Rocznik
Strony
87--100
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 23 poz., tab., wykr.
Twórcy
  • Gdańsk University of Technology, Gdańsk, Poland
Bibliografia
  • [1] Froome, P. & Jones, C. (2002). Developing Advisory Software to comply with IEC 61508. Contract Research Report 419, Series: HSE Books.
  • [2] Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. (2008). New York: Center for Chemical Process Safety, Wiley-Interscience, A John Wiley & Sons.
  • [3] IAEA INSAG-10 (1996). Defense in Depth in Nuclear Safety. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Group. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
  • [4] IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No NP-T-3.10 (2010). Integration of Analog and Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Hybrid Control Rooms. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
  • [5] IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No NP-T-3.12 (2011). Core Knowledge on Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
  • [6] IAEA Safety Guide (draft) (2011). Safety classification of structures, systems and components in nuclear power plants. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. Draft safety guide DS367, ver. 6.2.
  • [7] IAEA Safety Reports Series No 22 (2002). Quality Standards: Comparison between IAEA 50-C/SG-Q and ISO 9001:2000. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
  • [8] IAEA-TECDOC-719 (1993). Defining initiating events for purposes of probabilistic safety assessment. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
  • [9] IEC 60880 (2006). Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category A functions. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [10] IEC 60987 (2007). Nuclear power plants, Instrumentation and control important to safety, Hardware design requirements for computerbased systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [11] IEC 61226 (2009). Nuclear power plants, Instrumentation and control important to safety – Classification of instrumentation and control functions. International Electrotech-nical Commission, Geneva.
  • [12] IEC 61508 (2010). Functional Safety of Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems. Parts 1-7, International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [13] IEC 61511 (2005). Functional safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the process industry sector. Parts 1–3, International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [14] IEC 61513 (2011). Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety – General requirements for systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [15] IEC 62138 (2004). Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important for safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category B or C functions. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [16] IEC 62280 (2002). Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Part 2: Safety-related communication in closed transmission systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
  • [17] Kosmowski, K.T. (2003). Risk analysis methodology for reliability and safety management of nuclear power plants (in Polish). Monografie 33. Gdańsk University of Technology Publishers.
  • [18] Kosmowski, K.T. (2012). Current challenges and methodological issues of functional safety and security management in hazardous technical systems. Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association, Summer Safety and Reliability Seminars, 3, 1, 39-51.
  • [19] Kosmowski, K.T. (2013). Functional safety and reliability analysis methodology for hazardous industrial plants. Gdańsk University of Technology Publishers.
  • [20] Kosmowski, K.T. (2013). Problems in designing and operating the functional safety solutions of higher integrity levels. Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association, Summer Safety and Reliability Seminars, 4, 1, 83-99.
  • [21] Kosmowski, K.T. (2014). Human factors and functional safety analysis in designing the control rooms of industrial hazardous plants. SpringerVerlag Book/Volume of Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, Berlin.
  • [22] Kosmowski, K.T. (Ed.) (2007). Functional Safety Management in Critical Systems. Publishing House of Gdansk University of Technology.
  • [23] LOPA (2001): Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment. Center for Chemical Process Safety. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-0109636a-4c1c-44c6-8730-263019d6bfdb
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