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Content available remote Problém poznání v kriticko-racionalistickém pojetí Hanse Alberta
This article presents the particular treatment of selected epistemological problems in the framework of Hans Albert’s critical rationalism. The first part examines the question of whether true knowledge is possible. In his endeavour to address this question, Albert firstly distinguishes himself from classical epistemologists who connect true knowledge with the justification of certain truth. He shows that the requirement that knowledge must provide final justification leads to irresolvable paradoxes, if not to dogmatism. The justifying claims of classical epistemology, therefore, are strictly rejected in the framework of critical rationalism, and Albert postulates the permanent openess of all knowledge to critique. In the second part, the paper then focuses on Albert’s specific understanding of the question of whether pure theory of knowledge is possible. Albert, in looking for an answer to this question, distinguishes his own approach from that of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. At the same time, however, he is to an extent inspired by Kant, and he describes his own position as trancendental realism.
Content available remote Stoletý solitér Hans Albert v kontextu evropské filosofie (nejen) 20. století
On the occasion of the hundredth birthday of an important proponent of critical rationalism, Hans Albert, this article maps the key moments of his intellectual development and above all outlines his relationship to selected philosophical currents of (not only) the twentieth century. Albert’s philosophical “breakthrough” occurred in the 1960s in an open dispute with the Frankfurt School. He then published his Traktat über kritische Vernunft (Treatise on Critical Reason), which stands out especially because of its surprising observations about the context of seemingly unconnected concepts in various problem areas. Albert thus finds, for example, a common property between scholastic and modern approaches to justifying knowledge (see the problem of justifying knowledge) and a similar inclination on the part of both neo-positivism and existentialism to create a conflict between objective knowledge and subjective decision (see the problem of value-neutrality), as well as finding an effort to create autonomous areas in analytical metaethics and philosophical hermeneutics (see the problem of the relativization of truth). The aim of this article is to explain these apparent incommensurabilities, especially through the prism of Albert’s Traktat über kritische Vernunft that will soon be published in the Czech translation.
U příležitosti stých narozenin významného představitele kritického racionalismu, Hanse Alberta, mapuje tato stať klíčové momenty jeho intelektuálního vývoje, a především nastiňuje jeho vztah k vybraným filosofickým proudům (nejen) dvacátého století. Albertův filosofický „průlom“ nastal v šedesátých letech minulého století v otevřeném sporu s Frankfurtskou školou. Poté vydal svůj Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který vyniká zejména překvapivými postřehy ohledně souvislostí zdánlivě nespojitých koncepcí v různých problémových oblastech. Tak Albert například nachází společný rys mezi scholastickými a novověkými přístupy ke zdůvodnění poznání (viz problém zdůvodnění poznání) nebo podobný sklon novopozitivismu a existencialismu vytvářet rozpor mezi objektivním poznáním a subjektivním rozhodnutím (viz problém hodnotové neutrality) či snahu o vytvoření autonomních oblastí u analytické metaetiky či filosofické hermeneutiky (viz problém relativizace pravdy). Cílem této stati je vysvětlení těchto zdánlivých nesouměřitelností zejména prizmatem Albertova Traktat über kritische Vernunft, který se brzy dočká i českého vydání.
Content available remote Metodologická východiska kritického racionalismu H. Alberta
This study presents a systematic treatment of the critical rationalism of the German philosopher Hans Albert, a follower of Karl R. Popper. On the basis of an analysis of his key works (Traktat über kritische Vernunft, Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der Vernunft, Kritischer Rationalismus, Kritische Vernunft und Rationale Praxis etc.) the eight main methodological tenets of his philosophical conception are presented. They are: 1. universal criticism, 2. consequentialist fallibilism, 3. methodological revisionism, 4. critical realism, 5. theoretical pluralism, 6. constructive metaphysics, 7. the postulate of a single method of science, and 8. a proposal of a way of life. In reference to each of these tenets, the author explains the intellectual tradition in contrast to which Albert defines his own position and, at the same time, considers several critical objections to Albert’s assumptions. The study thus provides a relatively complex view of the subject-matter in question.
Die mimetische Theorie René Girards mit ihrem Instrumentar zur Opferkritik einerseits und die von Karl Popper entwickelte Methodologie des kritischen Rationalismus, welche im heutigen wissenschaftstheoretischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Diskurs fak tisch als allgemein akzeptiert gelten kann, andererseits weisen eine große systematische Affinität zueinander auf. Dies weist dieser Beitrag zunächst mit einer Analyse des Girard’schen Wissenschaftsverständnisses nach. Da nach werden typische Missverständnisse und Engführungen der beiden Ansätze in ihrer Analogie betrachtet und ihr Zustandekommen aus der mimetischen Perspektive heraus erklärt. Dabei zeigt sich, dass auch die Mimetische Theorie einen – recht verstandenen – Fallibilismus impliziert, der theoretisch wie auch ethisch‑praktisch motiviert ist.
Providing a critical instrument to identify structures of victimization, René Girard’s program is in fact very affine to Critical Rationalism methodology as developed by Charles Popper and widely assented in contemporary epistemology. In order to proof this thesis, in a first step, Girard’s understanding of epistemology is reconstructed. His occasionally very strict objection to any form of relativism thereby is shown to be due to an obviously polemic context. In claiming his theory to be scientific, Girard indeed knows very well that it is the specification of science to approach things not apodicti cally, but hypothetically, and he clearly assents this principle. In a second step, typical misunderstandings of both the Mimetic Theory and Poppers fallibilism are analysed and parallelized. They properly consist in an exaggeration of some aspects, while com plementary aspects are suppressed. With the Mimetic Theory, just this uneven exag geration can be explained as happening precisely in constellations of rivalry, as among the „hostile brothers”, and yet as happening unintentionally and therefore being so hard to detect. Therefore, the claim of showing this connection, as raised by the Mimetic Theory, itself cannot be presented in an apodictic manner because it so would force the counterpart into rivalry about the alleged truth, which would so again deform it, NB on both sides of the disputation. Besides this rather „ethical” reason, there also is a strongly „epistemic” reason why Mimetic Theory and the uncovering of scapegoat mechanism should consider themselves to be hypothetical and fallible: Without a continuous rising of this self‑critical attitude, the self‑vindicatory and self‑enclosing spell of myth would have never been broken.
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