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EN
According to epistemic requirement of scientific realism the truths – or near truths – about objects posited by scientific theories should be knowable. However, the optimistic view that a scientific theoretical system can be shown to be true is blocked by the familiar Hume’s arguments against induction. The paper shall not deal with them primarily but only marginally in order to compare Hume’s conclusions with the Duhem-Quine thesis. For the common reading of this thesis is that it shows the powerlessness of negative instances to disprove scientific theories, just as Hume’s critical arguments against induction have shown the powerlessness of positive instances to prove scientific theories. The paper aims to expose erroneous aspects of the analogy and to explain what the errors imply for the epistemic requirement of scientific realism, even if it is weakened from knowability of truths to knowability of near truths.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
tom 76
|
nr 8
581 – 595
EN
Pessimists predict that future scientific theories will replace present scientific theories. However, they do not specify when the predicted events will take place, so we do not have the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction, although we might have the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. Their predictions contrast with astronomers’ predictions. Astronomers specify when the next solar eclipse will happen, so we have both the chance to blame them for having made a false prediction and the chance to praise them for having made a true prediction. The pessimists’ prediction remains unvirtuous until they specify when scientific revolutions will occur. This critical point applies no less to the selectivist’s prediction.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
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tom 74
|
nr 4
278 – 290
EN
Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is warranted. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism because some arguments against scientific realism require that scientific realism is interpreted as a descriptive realism, and because scientific realists can retreat from descriptive to normative realism when descriptive realism is under attack. We should also distinguish between descriptive and normative pessimism because some arguments against scientific pessimism require that it be interpreted as descriptive pessimism, and because scientific pessimists can retreat from descriptive to normative pessimism when descriptive pessimism is under attack.
EN
M. Esfeld has recently argued that ontic structural realism may succeed only if it is based on causal structures. In order to meet this requirement, he offers a combination of dispositional/causal relations with moderate form ontic structural realism. This paper, however, demonstrates that moderate position, in relation to causation, faces a dilemma whose resolution leads to a monistic ontology that creates a rather hostile environment for structural metaphysics.
EN
The theory of the social fact faces the problem of differentiating between the ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects of the social fact. The discussion of the problem began when the naive realism has been criticized, and resulted in contrasting ontological constructivism and critical or scientific realism. A fact is the state or a change of the state of the object (thing for us), which are identified by the subject as something real and reconstructed in his mind in the form of true propositions about facts. The latter should be clearly distinguished from our beliefs about facts, which could be true or false. A social fact is the state or a change of the state of social system and human action. It serves as the basis of an integrative social explanation, which is a combination of the nomological explanation and humanistic interpretation. It is also necessary to distinguish between theoretical-methodological, valuation and ideological interpretations of the facts.
EN
There is a growing pessimism about objects based on the view that objects are mysterious un-observables. According to this line of thought objects can disturb our senses or measuring devices only indirectly, via properties or relations - only properties or relations are observables, not the objects per se. As a result, inaccessible objects open a gap between science and reality and scientific realism is lost. Defenders of objects may respond that the scope of this reasoning is rather limited, because its truth is restricted to very specific views of objects and scientific realism. The paper is concerned with three forms of scientific realism confronting them with three basic ontologies of objects. It appears, then, that seen from the perspective of scientific realism the least problematic picture of objects is given by the Spinozian conception of objects and their modes. However, even this conception faces some difficulties and it seems that the traditional metaphysics is not able to provide a scientifically unproblematic notion of object.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
tom 72
|
nr 5
381 – 391
EN
The aim of this article is to clarify scientific realism in connection with a few key questions that have recently been brought up by Jaroslav Peregrin. The author will try to provide a reaction to Peregrin on a number of issues, in particular, to explain in what sense we can talk about confirming or disconfirming realism. Next, he will focus on whether realism is a good, or indeed the best, explanation of the success of science, and how it fares in comparison with antirealism. To conclude, he will briefly sketch the directions in which contemporary debates have been heading. The unifying aspect of this article is the thesis that the question of scientific realism is a complex one and that it is also a topic which shows that philosophy, at least in some of its domains, has been progressive.
EN
The article consists of five parts. In the first part the author concentrates on the problem of realism in its philosophical context, on disputes from which it derives and it corresponds with. Afterwards, he analyzes and correct the canonical version of Putnam's No-miracle argument, viewed as the strongest argument in favour of scientific realism. In the next part, he is trying to confront the objections that can be raised against this type of argumentation. It will relate to an attempt to resolve the three questions, asked from three different perspectives: 1) An empiricist (The Vienna Circle) will ask if the success of the science needs an explanation 2) Next, a 'neutral' anti-realist or a critical realist will investigate: is the presented argument, logically coherent and historically adequate? 3) Finally, a constructionist (The sociology of knowledge / Postmodernism) will ask: is the success (understood approaching to the truth) of science is a fact, or the a (meta)fact? In the end, the author tries to explain why he did not succeed in giving unambiguous answer to those three questions.
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