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1
100%
EN
In the article the problem of truth in mathematics is presented by the example of the six following statements: 1. The continuum hypothesis. 2. The sum of angles in any triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles. 3. Every even natural number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes. 4. Every map could be coloured with four colours. 5. 2+2=4. The analyses carried out in the article show that in mathematics truth can be understood in various manners. We can use different criteria of truth: classical, coherence, pragmatic and others, so in mathematics truth is revealing different faces. Certain sentences are true only in a sense of coherence, but there exist such sentences, as for example truths of arithmetic, which are true independently of axiomatic systems, culture or any other factors.
EN
The author shows that in Parmenides' approach, Aristotelian division of being and the truth still does not exist (i.e. being as presence or an object in general, individual or universal; the truth as the value of the judgement), because for the Eleat the word being only means the truth. This word is the name of the truth as a transcendent nature (resp. essence) in general. In his poem, Parmenides, for whom the truth is the only being, praises and describes the existence of the truth (identified with what truly is or with pure being par exellence) in opposition to the multitude of opinions (appearances of the truth and being). Parmenides' poem is the testimony and account of experience (of existence) of the Truth as Being itself and the experience of its normative force as transcendent nature. This Parmenidean 'aletheism' allows us to understand how Plato's theory of eternal truths ever appeared (Ideas, or Forms, as norms and paradigms of nature, cognition, and action), as well as the importance of Parmenides himself for Neoplatonism.
3
The Zen Master Socrates
51%
EN
In intercultural comparative studies there is a tendency to emphasize differences in the development of solutions to similar problems; but in this short article I am trying to present a stand, where the actual pursuit of truth based on the innermost experience of our lives transcends the limitations of a particular culture, and enables us to benefit; not from the alterity of different forms, but the unity of genuine philosophical endeavor. Based on that, we may notice an alternative; such that instead of westernizing Zen, we may as well try to understand and follow Socrates; a great master who we already have in our tradition; to help us appreciate what genuine Zen is about.
EN
Two different interpretations of 'Huis clos' are proposed and both are presented as plausible. In the first reading the three protagonists are viewed as victims of the traditional, repressive society. Their difficulties are a result of social discrimination and stubborn adherence to stale morality of sham decency. In the second reading the three characters are viewed as selfish and inconsistent individuals who eagerly satisfy their desires and shamelessly neglect other people's needs. Now their difficulties are fully deserved as a punishment for cultivation of false ideas about their remarkable achievements, grand roles and fictitious obligations to others. Though both reading are plausible, the author argues that the second is more interesting and more characteristic of Sartre's philosophy. To sustain this claim the author offers a new, and rather unorthodox, interpretation of the concepts of 'etre-pour-autrui' and 'etre-pour-soi'. He concludes by presenting Sartre as a champion of an intellectualist ethics based on the concept of authentic life and a critical scrutiny of human motives.
EN
In the article the author is putting the cycle together New fairy tale the Polish writer and the fragment of Dusk of gods of German of the philosopher. He is advancing the hypothesis, in accordance which Parnicki is writing the Nietzschean thought down into his novel cycle, for especially with reference to moving away from the truth, making this scheme by Nietzsche unexpressed, but written down into the plot of the work. Essential, that both state the historicity of this process.
EN
The author interprets Cyprian Norwid's correspondence applying to it the categories of truth and word. From this perspective, Norwid's letters testify that the quest for truth, which one can attain through words only, was the most fundamental goal of the poet's life. The author also notes that word, on Norwid's conception of truth, is spiritual in nature, and, since it comes from God, it appears as an act of divine creation. An analysis of Norwid's correspondence leads the author of the article to the conclusion that truth and word are mutually dependent categories, both in Norwid's letters and in his poetry.
7
O pojęciu prawdy w matematyce
51%
EN
The paper is devoted to the concept of truth in mathematics. The starting point is Tarski's definition of truth. The philosophical background of this definition is discussed, its meaning for the language of mathematics and for philosophy, its relation to various definitions of truth. The relation provability vs. truth is also considered. With use of some results of mathematical logic, it is shown that the conditions from Tarski's definition are too weak to assure the uniqueness of interpretation of truth predicate. It is also shown that semantic notions such as satisfaction and truth are not finitistic and require the concept of infinity.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
tom 36
|
nr 3
63-81
EN
The article elucidates and assesses the account of truth of Bruno A. K. Bauch, a member of the late Baden School of neo-Kantianism. The account is based on Bauch's philosophy of validity. To begin with, we discuss some basic conceptual distinctions introduced by Bauch. Then, we put forward the constitutive and regulative notions of Truth, understood as the fundamentum veritatis. Finally, we attempt to contrast Bauch's account with Bertrand Russel's correspondence theory of truth. Our discussion allows us to conclude that Bauch's account is a valuable attempt at explaining the necessary connection between truth and validity. Moreover, it is a serious alternative to deflationary (inflationary) theories of truth, which deprive truth of theoretical significance.
9
Prawda historyczna, prawda religijna – Lessing i jego kontynuatorzy
51%
Filo-Sofija
|
2004
|
tom 4
|
nr 4
171-190
EN
In the work The Demonstration of the Spirit and of Power (1777) G. E. Lessing made the distinction between necessary truths of reason and historical (factual) truths. The latter include religious truths of revelation (as based on the Bible). He claimed in this way that the religious truth (which is the essence of religion) can not be identified with the historical truth. Thus established by Lessing the critique of revelation and of institutional religion was continued by S. Kierkegaard and F. Nietzsche among others and in the works of both thinkers explicit references to Lessing’s Demonstration can be found.
EN
The critique of the concept of analyticity undertaken by Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' met with various objections. In particular, he was criticized for certain alleged inconsistency. He was ready to accept an intra-linguistic definition of truth as truth-in-L for any established language L, but at the same time he required that the general notion of analyticity were conceived inter-linguistically and unrelativized to any language in question. The author attempts to defend Quine against this attack. He assumes that definitions are instruments introduced with a view to a purpose they should serve. It is essential therefore to find out what purpose was to be served by the introduction of the concept of analyticity by those authors who used it. The author tries to answer this question and focuses on the problem whether an intra-linguistic definition of analyticity serves the required function. Then he goes on to inquire if the inter-linguistic definition of truth serves its function. He argues in the end that the negative answer to the former question and the positive answer the latter are right and save Quine from the objections.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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tom 68
|
nr 7
549 – 561
EN
The paper deals with the so-called faultless disagreement which arises when two speakers believe in contradictory propositions, though neither of them makes any fault. This phenomenon is said to arise with respect to propositions about taste and similar propositions. The faultless disagreement is often used to support various versions of truth-conditional relativism. The main aim of the paper is to argue that what appears to be a faultless disagreement is by no means one. For an air of disagreement between speakers disappears once we (i) make it clear what notion of contradiction is invoked and (ii) explicitly adopt a relativistic notion of truth that is at most implicitly assumed in the relevant literature.
EN
This essay tries to justify the claim that the problem of madness is crucial for existentialist philosophy of J.-P. Sartre. Two sorts of arguments are given. First, Sartre worked out a theory of emotions propounding that some sane feelings may be deeply inimical to the world we live in. The mental state of a madman need not be seen as a sign of of his insanity but, instead, may be an indication of his deep but disapproving insight into the nature of being. Secondly, the madman is in most cases an alienated and lone individual who is doomed to struggle with society as well as with his own 'etre-en-soi'. In this respect, he paralells an existentialist who is capable of rising above his indifference and bad faith to take full responsibility for whatever he/she will or will not do.
13
ABSOLUTISM AND PLURALISM
51%
EN
Alethic absolutism is a thesis that propositions can not be more or less true, that they are true or false for ever (if true at all) and that their truth is independent on any circumstances of their assertion. In negative version, easier to defend, alethic absolutism claims the very same proposition can not be both true and false relative to circumstances of its assertion. Simple alethic pluralism is a thesis that we have many concepts of truth. It is a very good way to dissolve the controversy between alethic relativism and absolutism. Many philosophical concepts of truth are the best reason for such pluralism. If concept is meaning of a name, we have many concepts of truth because the name 'truth' was understood in many ways. The variety of meanings however can be superficial. Under it we can find one idea of truth expressed in correspondence truism or schema (T). The content of the truism is too poor to be content of anyone concept of truth, so it usually is connected with some picture of the world (ontology) and we have so many concepts of truth as many pictures of the world. The authoress proposes the hierarchical pluralism with privileged classic (or correspondence in weak sense) concept of truth as absolute property.
EN
The main thesis of this essay is that the basic phenomenon of truth (aletheia), 'the openness of the world' could be crucial for the concept of 'state of affairs' (Bewandtnis) identified with a set of practical and intersubjective rules of actions. Truth is to be identified with implicit and pre-conceptual 'knowledge-how' rather than an explicit '‘knowledge-that' articulated in theoretical statements. If such practical understanding of environment offers the only and basic access to the world, and if it simultaneously discloses meaningful entities (tools) for theoretical thinking, the idea of a theory being true, understood as being adequate or correspondent to the world, becomes quite problematic. In fact, the relation of correspondence implies a comparison of statements about present entities with practical action-rules. Since alternative articulations of the world in the terms of 'handiness' on the one hand, and 'presence' on the other, belong to two reciprocally irreducible and incomparable conceptual systems (what corresponds to eg. Quine's distinction between the 'mental' and the 'physical'), Heidegger's 'early' philosophy points to the necessity of distinguishing between a practical context of discovery and theoretical context of justification.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
tom 71
|
nr 1
60 – 69
EN
The paper invites to rethink Michel Foucault’s last course at Collège de France significantly entitled Le courage de la vérité, which can be read as a philosophical statement (re)defining and embodying at the same time the idea of philosophy and its “epistemological”, political and ethical perimeters by proposing a reflection on the risks and the duties involved in the tasks of thinking and publicly sharing thoughts. While he seems to reconsider and readjust his own pedagogical and philosophical methodologies, Michel Foucault looks back at the history of philosophy, and notably to its ancient Greek roots, to emphasize some of the crucial turning points, at which a new and different ethos related to the task of telling the truth demands a redefinition of philosophy, its goals, and even the idea of metaphysics. Seeing the ideal as embodied by Socrates and the cynics, Foucault leaves us with the image of philosophy as a statement in the first person, and a commitment to truth to be pursued regardless extreme consequences.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
tom 72
|
nr 7
581 – 585
EN
This article responds to the criticism of M. Zach, who challenges my view that it makes no sense to try to prove metaphysical realism. The author argues that Zach's criticism is based on several confusions and that the conclusion he eventually reaches is not far from what the author has been claiming from the beginning.
Filo-Sofija
|
2009
|
tom 9
|
nr 9
183-186
EN
The author formulates hypothesis that there is confusion between the predicate ‘it is true’ and some epistemic concepts, namely the predicate itself eliminates those concepts.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
tom 71
|
nr 9
791 – 802
EN
The author examines the concept of the art of life on the background of taking care of the self and others. His conclusion is that for Mill there are two patterns of right life. In the 3rd edition of his System of Logic (1851) he gives a brief outline of the art of life, i.e. the symbiosis of the good, truth and beauty, which should help an individual to achieve happiness in her/his life. This idea of the art of life he later developed in his works On Liberty (1859) and Utilitarianism (1861). Especially in the first one he was concerned with fundamental attributes of taking care of the self and others in the context of practicing liberty. Liberty is the presupposition of the individual’s well-being and as such it contributes to utility which is the fundamental principle of ethics. Self-cultivation and perfection of individual’s morality make for Mill the fundament of the individual’s as well as humankind’s self-fulfilment. Taking care of the self includes the duty to care for the others, i.e. the obligation to contribute to their well-being.
EN
Two essential concepts of Plato's philosophy are brought into focus - anamnesis and truth. Anamnesis is interpreted as a mental presentation of thought that already fell into oblivion. This interpretation is brought out by linguistic analysis, as anamnesis means reverting the process of forgetting. In Plato, the immortal soul moves from the spiritual world to the corporal world and carries with itself traces of knowledge it has acquired before the incarnation. Thereafter anamnesis is provoked by signals from the sensory world, for instance, by leading questions, physical resemblance to once contemplated ideas or written text. When the soul encounters such signals, it finds in them a faint replica of what it has experienced in the spiritual world. Thereby the soul establishes contact with truth, aletheia and true beings. As alethes, truth is unforgettable, it can recede from what is immediately known but it is never entirely lost. By turning back to its own memory the soul retrieves intelligible images, foregoes the sensory world and concentrates on what precedes it. It is also a practice of renouncing the physical aspects of one's existence, and for this reason philosophy is an exercise in dying, in the separation of the soul from its mortal body.
EN
The article analyzes the veritative credibility of the Catholic Church according to H. U. von Balthasar. We are trying to answer the question: Does the Church transmit the truth revealed in Jesus Christ in an honest and intact way? Despite changeable, philosophical and cultural directions the doctrine and moral rules of the Church remain constant and in accordance with ecclesiastical tradition. Christianity creates its credibility trough consequent interpretation and proclamation of the Divine Word. The Church interprets mysteries revealed by God in an infallible way, cares about the Biblical canon, meditates on Divine books, explores them and lives according to them. Existence of the ecclesiastical office eliminates attempts of subjective and incorrect understanding of the revelation. The Church fulfils its veritative mission with help of theology, which reads the Divine revelation in new contexts. Church's veritative credibility is created also by the liturgy which makes saving work present and shows the God's Revelation as something living and dynamic. Compatibility between confessed faith and life is the greatest argument for authenticity and credibility of the Church. The revealed truth shows its beauty and power in acts of charity and love.
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