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The paper purports to show that in order to formulate the hypothesis that all our beliefs are collectively false - which is taken to be the core of Cartesian skepticism - one must accept the presumption that semantic properties of subject's beliefs locally supervene on 'internal' properties of said subject. In order to show that the responses to skepticism from semantic externalism, i.e. those formulated by Putnam and Davidson, are analyzed. It is argued that even though these arguments are controversial they indicate that Cartesian skeptic must assume that subject beliefs' semantic properties can remain the same in different surroundings, which is exactly what the supervenience thesis amounts to. Finally, it is pointed out that the skepticism introduced by Kripke in his discussion of rule-following is indeed more radical than traditional, Cartesian one, as the former denies the very thesis that the latter must assume.
In the research project, which is to be composed of two substantively and logically connected papers, the authors form such a conceptual framework, that enables characteristic of fractal structures from the point of view of philosophical concept of emergence. In the first part, they present main ideas of the philosophy of emergence as well as they attempt at capturing emergent units in the process of fractals' generating. However, they maintain classical understanding of the relation in question. In the second part, due to demonstration of weaknesses of classical accounts as insufficient in specific context of mathematical structures under scrutiny, the authors show that the discourse about emergence in mathematics becomes meaningful and valid trough adaptation of quasi-empiric approach towards some issues in mathematics, approach grounded in philosophy of formal sciences.
The author reconstructs and critcally examines Richard Hare's 'Principles of of Universalizability of Supervenience' and contrasts it with another principle defended by the author of the 'Language of Morals' - the principle of supervenience. It is argued that Hare's views regarding the former underwent a very significant but unjustified change in 'Moral Thinking' as compared with their exposition in his earilier 'Freedom and Reason'. The change considered in a transition from regarding preference utilitarinism as one of many possible normative systems that can be accepted in conformity with universalizability of moral judgments, to treating it as the only normative theory bearing this characteristic. It is also shown that Hare's point of departure chosen in 'Freedom and Reason' allows him to reach merely the principle of universalizability that is equivalent to weak supervenience (according to J. Kim's classification) admitting of singular terms, and that only the latter principle can by recongized as analytically true in moral language.
Content available remote Superweniencja – pytanie o trywialność
tom 2
nr 2
When it comes to the mind-body problem, different kinds of physicalism were the most popular approaches among philosophers. The presence of anomalous monism with its lack of (the) laws concerning mental events and multiple realizability led to a doubt regarding reductionism and a slow movement away from it. It did not, however, weaken the popularity of physicalism. Thus, the problem that had to be faced was to create such a form of physicalism that would reject the reduction of what was mental to what was physical. No difference of one sort without a difference of another sort is a slogan that expresses the idea of supervenience, the idea that according to many philosophers was supposed to be the right expression of physicalism of this particular type. The text briefly presents the intuitions that are hidden behind the notion of supervenience and its main varieties: weak, strong and global. Moreover, the text touches upon the fault of supervenience which was observed in its symmetry and, most of all, in its triviality. This type of fault would force the philosophers to admit that this relation is metaphysically irrelevant
The aim of the second part of this philosophical diptych is an attempt at discussing the place of the meta-subject reflection concerning fractal structures in classical issues of the philosophy of mathematics. The authors show that fractal structures lead toward essential broadening of that issues beyond traditional frames of the questions about the nature of mathematical objects (ontology of mathematics) or the status of mathematical knowledge (epistemology of mathematics). Particularly, they are interested in two problems: (1) Does process of generating fractal structures prove that co-called new mathematics has quasi-empirical character and in what meaning of that? and (2) Can the philosophical idea of emergence be applied to characterise the features of that structures?
Content available remote Aesthetic Supervenience versus Aesthetic Grounding
The claim that having aesthetic properties supervenes on having non-aesthetic properties has been widely discussed and, in various ways, defended. In this article, I aim to demonstrate that even if it is sometimes true that a supervenience relation holds between aesthetic properties and ‘subvenient’ non-aesthetic ones, it is not the interesting relation in the neighbourhood. As we shall see, a richer, asymmetric, and irreflexive relation is required, and I shall defend the claim that the increasingly popular relation of grounding does amuch better job than supervenience.
The Thomistic proof of the immateriality of human reason consists in the argument from the fact that intellection has as its object not empirical particulars but abstract universals. A standard objection against dualism plays up the problem with the causal influence of the soul on the body (psychophysical problem). The Thomistic solution depends on the hylemorphic conception of the soul as a substantial form of body, i.e. on the view that the human soul is (also) that in virtue of which a human body has those essential properties which it has.
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