Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Zjawisko śmierci – zmora medycyny

100%

Pala A.

Semina Scientiarum

|

2014

|

tom 13

EN

The article is an attempt to show the evolution of the medical explanation of the phenomenon of death. Characteristic features of this evolution are the following:1. In the history of medicine there are two main ideas that explain the phenomenon of death: the idea of qualitative transformations, which means the stopping of metabolism, and the idea of quantitative transformations, which means the loss of the “essence of life”. It may be the loss of consciousness (irreversible dysfunction of the higher brain) or the loss of an important factor that sustains life (irreversible dysfunction of the brain stem).2. From a biological point of view, death is a process, but for practical purposes, medicine also tried to express it in the form of moment.3. Medical progress leads to the formulating of new definitions of death, but that does not mean that medicine is able to decide which one to choose. Rather, it needs philosophy for this.

2

The role of understanding the brain death concept in individuals’ willingness to donate organs – preliminary study

94%

Hulewska A.

Progress in Health Sciences

|

2011

|

tom 1

|

nr 1

57-62

EN

Purpose: The study tries to explore if there is an association between the level of understanding the brain death concept and the willingness to organ donation. Methods: For the purpose of that study the two-step method was introduced. The first stage was planned to test people’s ideas about brain death and then separate main groups of responses from these ideas. Those general categories were used in the second phase of the study. 550 respondents completed self-administered questionnaire comprised three sections: (1) understanding the term brain death scale; (2) willingness to donate scale; and (3) general demographic questions. Results: It turned out that just over 50% of respondents correctly associated the death of the human brain with the patient’s death. The rest of the subjects was convinced that the diagnosis of brain death means that the organism had a chance to survive. Significant association between the participants’ willingness to donate their organs after death and their understanding of the concept of brain death was found. Conclusions: The results supported the prediction that having a thorough knowledge of the concept of brain death is associated with a greater willingness to become an organ donor after one’s death. Our findings show how important providing professional education on transplantation in our society is.

3

Defining Death: Beyond Biology

94%

Lizza J. P.

Diametros

|

2018

|

nr 55

1-19

EN

The debate over whether brain death is death has focused on whether individuals who have sustained total brain failure have satisfied the biological definition of death as “the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole.” In this paper, I argue that what it means for an organism to be integrated “as a whole” is undefined and vague in the views of those who attempt to define death as the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole. I show how what it means for a living thing to be integrated as a whole depends on the sortal (kind) concept by which it is identified. Since interests, values, and ontological considerations besides strictly biological ones affect the concepts by which we individuate and identify living things, those non-biological considerations have a bearing on what it means for a particular kind of living thing to exist as a whole and thus what it means for one of us to die. Even if our bodies may remain organically integrated in some sense despite total brain failure, this fact should not lead us to reject brain death as death. Artificially sustained brain-dead human bodies are not human beings, but the remains of them. While such bodies may be alive in some sense, they are not human beings or human persons. They are not one of us.

4

What Does a Definition of Death Do?

94%

Specker Sullivan L.

Diametros

|

2018

|

nr 55

63-67

EN

In his article, “Defining Death: Beyond Biology,” John Lizza argues in favor of a civil definition of death, according to which the potential for consciousness and social interaction marks us as the “kind of being that we are.” In this commentary, I critically discuss this approach to the bioethical debate on the definition of death. I question whether Lizza’s account is based on a full recognition of the “practical, moral, religious, philosophical, and cultural considerations” at play in this debate. I further propose that a truly ethical debate on definitions of death ought to concentrate on how different definitions of death are used in diverse contexts – what definitions of death do – and focus less on who has the right definition of death for all situations.

5

A Biological Theory of Death: Characterization, Justification, and Implications

83%

Nair-Collins M.

Diametros

|

2018

|

nr 55

27-43

EN

John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is certainly right to point out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas (as opposed to biology), I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy.

6

Between the human and the corpse: the popular reaction to a new definition of death as seen in chosen works of science fiction

71%

Wójcicka N.

Physiotherapy

|

2010

|

tom 18

|

nr 3

60-65

PL

Zmiana definicji śmierci, jaka nastąpiła w połowie dwudziestego wieku, oznaczała przejście od tradycyjnych kryteriów orzekania śmierci do uznania śmierci mózgowej za moment zgonu. Zmiana ta, niezbędna pod względem prawnym i medycznym ze względu na rozwój transplantologii oraz techniki związanej z podtrzymywaniem życia, okazała się jednak trudna do zrozumienia i przyjęcia w powszechnej świadomości. Sytuacja ta rodziła szereg problemów i niepokojów, które znalazły odbicie w kulturze popularnej. Bieżąca praca stanowi analizę ujęcia badanej problematyki w dwóch utworach należących do gatunku fantastyki naukowej: "Przekładańca" Stanisława Lema oraz "Pozytronowego człowieka" Isaaca Asimova i Roberta Silverberga.

EN

The middle of the twentieth century witnessed a change in the definition of death, involving a shift from the traditional cardio-respiratory standard of death to the newly developed brain death standard. This change, though necessary both for medical and legal purposes due to the development in organ transplants and in the technology involved in life support, proved to be difficult to acknowledge, or even to understand, for the unprofessional. This gave rise to a number of problems and anxieties, many of which were reflected in popular culture. The resent study seeks to analyse the ways in which two science fiction texts, Isaac Asimov and Robert Silverberg's "The Bicentennial Man" and Stanisław Lem's "Layer-Cake" deal with the fears arising from the new definition of death.

7

Czy ciało po śmierci mózgu może się ruszać?

71%

Bujnowska M.

Zeszyty Naukowe Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej im. Witelona w Legnicy

|

2018

|

nr 1(26)

PL

Odruchy rdzeniowe są fizjologicznym objawem spotykanym u zmarłych w mechanizmie śmierci mózgu. Nierzadko skutecznie wprowadzają element niepewności u personelu medycznego opiekującego się zmarłym dawcą narządów. Motoryczne odruchy rdzeniowe występujące pośmiertnie odbywają się na drodze łuku odruchowego – połączenia nerwowego między rdzeniem kręgowym a mięśniami szkieletowymi. Połączenia te są odpowiedzialne za odruchy bezwarunkowe – a więc za te, których przewodzenie odbywa się szlakami nerwowymi z pominięciem mózgowia. Jednym z takich odruchów jest objaw Łazarza, który objawia się krótkotrwałym uniesieniem i skrzyżowaniem rąk a następnie opuszczeniem ich na klatkę piersiową

EN

Core remissions are a pathophysiological symptom found in the dead in the mechanism of cerebral death. Often, they effectively introduce an element of uncertainty in medical personnel taking care of a dead organ donor. Motor core reflexes occurring postmortem are performed by the reflex arc – the nerve connection between the spinal cord and the skeletal muscles. These connections are responsible for unconditioned reflexes – that is, those whose conduct is nerve-bound pathways without the brain.

8

A Holistic Understanding of Death: Ontological and Medical Considerations

71%

Nguyen D.

Diametros

|

2018

|

nr 55

44-62

EN

In the ongoing ‘brain death’ controversy, there has been a constant push for the use of the ‘higher brain’ formulation as the criterion for the determination of death on the grounds that brain-dead individuals are no longer human beings because of their irreversible loss of consciousness and mental functions. This essay demonstrates that such a position flows from a Lockean view of human persons. Compared to the ‘consciousness-related definition of death,’ the substance view is superior, especially because it provides a holistic vision of the human person, and coheres with the perennial axiom about the ‘whole and parts.’

9

Dylematy etyczne wokół definicji śmierci mózgowej

71%

Picewicz J.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

|

2016

|

nr 62

21-33

XX

In the article I discuss the ethical aspects of the definition of brain death. Persistent and irreversible cessation in determining of a brain stem, also known as brain death, is the basic criterion in determining human death. Patients classified as brain-dead are no longer subject to medical treatment, which turns aimless in their condition, and can have their organs removed for the purpose of donation. The main problem with current transplantation practice is the legitimacy of equating brain death with the dead of a person. Biological death of the brain does not automatically involve the biological death of the whole organism. The brain is the governor, the coordinator of a biological human structure, so its death means disintegration of the ability to biologically exist any further. The death of the brain stem is the core indicator, a landmark between life and full death. Defining brain death captures the difficulty of determining the very exact moment of death. The organs must remain alive for as long as possible and, at the same time, dead for as long as necessary, in order to implant them to another human being. This raises many ethical doubts which opens up philosophical debate.

10

In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan

59%

Lizza J. P.

Diametros

|

2018

|

nr 55

68-90

EN

In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death.

11

Śmierć mózgowa - kontrowersje i uzgodnienia

59%

Alichniewicz A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2018

|

tom 42

131-144

EN

Human death is challenging from both philosophical and medical points of view, because of an apparent ontological discrepancy between the diagnosis of death of the organism as a whole and the declaration of death of a human person. In my paper I make an attempt to analyze the main controversies as well as agreements concerning ontological and medico-epistemological problems that have created the evolution of the definition of brain death, arguing that: 1. It is impossible to define death; 2. What functions as the definition of death is rather a set of criteria of death than a definition in a proper sense; 3. The debate concerning so-called definition of death refers not to death as such, universally conceptualized, but to a specific problem of death of a human being; 4. Analyzing the problem of human death it is impossible to make a clear distinction between biological and philosophical dimensions.

PL

Śmierć człowieka jest wyzwaniem zarówno dla analiz filozoficznych, jak i nauki oraz praktyki medycyny ze względu na napięcie między diagnozą śmierci organizmu jako całości a stwierdzeniem zgonu osoby. W artykule podejmuję próbę przyjrzenia się głównym kontrowersjom, a także uzgodnieniom natury ontologicznej i epistemologiczno-medycznej, składającym się na ewolucję definicji śmierci mózgowej.

12

Biologiczna definicja śmierci

59%

Bombik M.

Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae

|

2009

|

tom 7

|

nr 2

19-29

DE

In dem Ausatz geht es um die biologischen Todesbegrife, die der Rafael Ferber in dem Buch: Philosophische Grundbegrife, Band 2, Kapitel V: Tod, München 2003, 197-227, behandelt. Die biologische Definition des Todes, die von August Weismann stammt. bildet einen Ausgangspunkt zu weiteren Űberlegungen dieses Problems. Es wurde fest betont der Unterschied zwischen einer Todesdefinition und den Todeskriterien, die in der Medizin, als einer praktischen Disziplin, wichtige Rolle spielen. Man hat herasgehebt folgende Todeskriterien: 1. Herztod, 2. Hirntod, 2.1. Ganzhirntod, 2.2. Teilhirntod und 3. Testverfahren – ob die Kriterien erfüllt sind. Die Todeskrieterien kann man auch in einer formaler Gestalt, als eine Operationsdefinition darstellen. Entscheidend ist an den Bestimmungen des Todeskriteriums, daβ das Eintreten des menschlichen Todes heute auf einer Festsetzung beruht. Deshalb ist in der Gegenwart das Eintreten des Todes häufig keine natürliche oder reale Tatsache mehr, sondern eine institutionelle Tatsache, die durch semantischen Regeln konstituiert wurde. Die biologische Todesdefinition ist keine Menschentodesdefinition.

13

Pobieranie narządów po zatrzymaniu krążenia. O nadrzędności neurologicznego kryterium śmierci nad krążeniowym – kwestie regulacyjne

48%

Nowak P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2018

|

tom 42

35-53

EN

This two-part article concerns with bioethical issues associated with organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). Part 1 is devoted to legal and regulatory matters. Here I prove that in Poland organ retrieval from donors of all categories, specified in the modified Maastricht classification, is permissible. Particularly I argue that in our country there already is a legal basis for development of program of organ retrieval from donors in whom circulatory arrest have occurred after foregoing of life sustaining treatment. I also examine whether from the point of view of the law such donors might be considered dead when organ retrieval takes place.

PL

Przedmiotem tego dwuczęściowego artykułu są zagadnienia bioetyczne związane z pobieraniem narządów po zatrzymaniu krążenia. Część pierwsza jest poświęcona problematyce prawno-regulacyjnej. Dowodzę tutaj, że w Polsce dopuszczalne jest pobieranie narządów od dawców wszystkich kategorii wyszczególnionych w tzw. zmodyfikowanej klasyfikacji z Maastricht. W szczególności argumentuję, że w naszym kraju już obecnie istnieją podstawy prawne do rozwijania programu pobierania narządów od osób, u których doszło do zatrzymania krążenia po rezygnacji z terapii podtrzymującej życie. Z perspektywy prawa rozważam także, czy tego rodzaju dawcy mogą być uznani za zmarłych w momencie dokonywania eksplantacji.

14

Pobieranie narządów po zatrzymaniu krążenia. O nadrzędności neurologicznego kryterium śmierci nad krążeniowym – kwestie filozoficzne

48%

Nowak P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2018

|

tom 42

55-71

EN

This two-part article concerns with bioethical issues associated with organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). Part 2 is devoted to philosophical problems. I analyze three concepts of death, that identify the end of life with a) somatic disintegration of the organism, b) irreversible cessation of vital work of self-preservation and c) irreversible loss of patient’s moral status. By referring to these positions I argue that circulatory criterion of death is reliable only if cessation of circulation lasts long enough for brain death to occur. Taking this into account, it might be supposed that the 5 minutes period of observation of cessation of circulation is not enough for patient’s death to take place.

PL

Przedmiotem tego dwuczęściowego artykułu są zagadnienia bioetyczne związane z pobieraniem narządów po zatrzymaniu krążenia. Cześć druga poświęcona jest problemom filozoficznym. Analizuję tutaj trzy koncepcje śmierci, które utożsamiają koniec życia z (a) somatyczną dezintegracją organizmu, (b) nieodwracalną utratą zdolności do samozachowania oraz (c) nieodwracalną utratą statusu moralnego pacjenta. Odwołując się do tych trzech stanowisk, argumentuję, że krążeniowe kryterium śmierci jest wiarygodne tylko wtedy, jeśli zatrzymanie krążenia trwa na tyle długo, że prowadzi do śmierci mózgu. Wziąwszy to pod uwagę, można przypuszczać, że przyjęty obecnie 5 minutowy okres obserwacji zatrzymania krążenia nie wystarcza do tego, aby nastąpiła śmierć pacjenta.

15

The Buddhism's view on biotechnology

48%

Wachowicz P.

Biotechnologia

|

2005

|

nr 1