Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

REASON TO AVOID THE CAUSAL CONSTRUAL OF DISPOSITIONAL EXPLANATIONS

100%

Gurova L.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2017

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tom 24

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nr 4

438 - 455

EN

Those who argue that dispositional explanations are genuine explanations usually construe them as causal explanations. There are several well-known arguments against the causal efficacy of dispositions, but there are as well demonstrations that on some minimal conditions, dispositions could be viewed as causally relevant to the effects which they are taken to explain. Although the latter position is generally tenable, it may be shown that in some important cases it is not a good idea to commit to a causal construal of dispositional explanations. The argument goes as follows: (1) Dispositional explanations are valued for certain specific extra-inferences which they allow us to draw; (2) The causal construal of dispositional explanations can account for some of these extra-inferences only on the assumption that the disposition is a common cause of its manifestations; (3) However, under certain circumstances, the common cause assumption is refuted on theoretical or empirical grounds; Therefore, (4) under certain circumstances, the causal construal of dispositional explanations cannot account for what these explanations are valued for. The latter conclusion is a reason to argue that in some cases at least, the causal construal of dispositional explanations should be avoided.

2

ON PRAGMATIC AND NON-PRAGMATIC CONCEPT OF EXPLANATION

100%

Zelenak E.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2006

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tom 13

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nr 3

334-348

EN

This paper attempts to analyze in detail the difference between a pragmatic and non-pragmatic approach to the explanation. The proponents of a pragmatic explanation analyze it by means of the concepts of context or audience. However, there could be various disguises of this type of the approach. It is possible to include the pragmatic concepts into the characterization of the item to be explained or the item that explains. On the other hand, the pragmatic approach may focus on the specific relation between the item to be explained or the item that explains. Finally, the paper underlines that there is a distinction between a pragmatic approach to the explanation and the pragmatics of the explanation, which should not be ignored.

3

ON SO-CALLED COMPUTER METAPHOR (O tzw. metaforze komputerowej)

100%

Milkowski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2009

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nr 9

163-185

EN

In many sciences, including cognitive science and biology, it is assumed that certain physical systems process information and effectively realize computation. For example, it is being claimed that DNA is being decoded in a manner that is best described as computational or that brains are analog computers. The skeptics, however, propose that the notion of computation is purely in the eye of the observer and computational properties cannot be hold to be objective. In this paper, the author discussws the criteria for realistic ascription of computational properties to physical systems. Computational ascriptions are treated as a kind of abstract mathematical ascriptions, and he shows in what sense these ascriptions are not merely conventional but refer to natural kinds. Along with general criteria that apply to other abstract properties being ascribed in sciences, such as explanatory and predictive value and implementation of functional properties vs. instantiation, he discusses specific problems of computational descriptions. The proposed criteria cover both analog and digital computation as kinds of information processing. As a result, the claims in biology about the nature of DNA information decoding turn out to be empirical and falsifiable, and not decidable a priori in a philosopher's armchair.

4

HEMPEL'S CRITERIA OF EXPLANATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION MODEL

100%

Bielik L.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2007

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tom 14

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nr 4

498-517

EN

The so-called 'Covering Law Model' of explanation proposed by C. Hempel and R. Oppenheim was claimed to have been applied as an explanatory model in natural sciences as well as in humanities. Several objections were raised against this explanatory model during the second half of 20th century. This article considers the proposed criteria of adequacy of scientific explanation and, in particular, the possibilities and limitations connected with the idea of its applicability in the process of logical reconstruction of the historical explanations. In the final part of the paper the author introduces some remarks concerning the 'methodological' relation of dependence between the explanandum and the explanans which could also illuminate the proper role of this explanatory model in history.

5

METÓDA EXPLANÁCIE AKO POSTUPNOSŤ INŠTRUKCIÍ

100%

Halas J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 9

711 – 723

EN

The paper proposes a sequence of instructions that corresponds to the method of explanation in its ideal form. The method of explanation is not analytic. Nevertheless, its particular executions may be analytic without affecting its specific cognitive goal (the growth in understanding). Therefore, the method is characterized as “potentially analytic”. Drawing on Zeleňák’s critique of a purely causal view of the explanation relation, as well as on some arguments against Zeleňák’s “mixed view”, the paper argues for a view of the explanation relation as obtaining between abstract objects (the explanans and the explanandum). In the classic case, these are propositions: what is described by (the proposition in) the explanans explains what is described by (the proposition in) the explanandum.

6

TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL ACCOUNT OF ASYMMETRY IN NON-CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS

88%

Zámečník L.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2021

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tom 76

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nr 6

407 – 422

EN

In this paper, I provide a conceptual analysis of the issue of asymmetry in non-causal explanations. I aim to fulfil three sub-tasks: 1) To define a conceptual space for problem solving (Cf. Reutlinger and Saatsi 2018; Lange 2017); 2) To reflect ongoing debates (Cf. Jansson and Saatsi 2019; Lange 2019; Khalifa et al. 2018); 3) To reflect a model of topological explanation (Cf. Kostić 2020). I focus only on non-causal explanations in the context of scientific research. I formulate several counter-arguments against distinctively mathematical explanations. I reflect the ongoing debate on the question of the universal applicability of a counterfactual solution to the problem of asymmetry for both causal and non-causal explanations (Cf. Woodward 2018). I reveal that none of the approaches discussed is without problems and that the proposed solutions to them are unsatisfactory. I consider the model of topological explanation in Kostić's view to be the most cogent solution to the discussed problem. His model successfully incorporates a counterfactual approach and also offers a solution to the problem of explanation asymmetry in non-causal explanations from a pragmatic point of view.

7

EXPLANAČNÍ MONISMUS U NEKAUZÁLNÍCH VYSVĚTLENÍ

88%

Zámečník L.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2022

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tom 77

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nr 8

590 – 607

EN

The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of noncausal explanations.

8

HODNOTY A VYSVĚTLENÍ

75%

Tomeček M.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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tom 20

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nr suppl. 1

196 – 205

EN

The article analyses the terms “value” and “explanation” as used in ethical studies, offers a critique of this usage and an alternative, pragmatically oriented semantics of ethical terms, based on the illocutionary act of judging. The term “value” is supposed to describe a super-predicate common to both ethical and aesthetical value judgments. However, the traditional over-reliance on the copulative predication and the idea that language describes reality lead to a one-sided view of ethical terms, and a construction of sentences like “The intentional torturing of little children is morally wrong”, whose pragmatic function, and consequently meaning, is very unclear. If, on the other hand, we take as our paradigm the act of judging (in the literal sense of a judge presiding over a case) we will be able to sketch a new, lighter ethics which, admittedly, falls short of the traditional demands placed on this discipline, but whose semantics is closer to the actual words used in expressing approval and disapproval.

9

UNIFICATION AND THE MYTH OF PURELY REDUCTIVE UNDERSTANDING

75%

Shaffer M. J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2020

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tom 27

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nr 2

142 – 168

EN

In this paper significant challenges are raised with respect to the view that explanation essentially involves unification. These objections are raised specifically with respect to the well-known versions of unificationism developed and defended by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher. The objections involve the explanatory regress argument and the concepts of reduction and scientific understanding. Essentially, the contention made here is that these versions of unificationism wrongly assume that reduction secures understanding.

10

SPÄTNÉ KONTRAFAKTUÁLY

75%

Gahér F.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2018

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tom 73

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nr 5

400 – 407

EN

The article discusses the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. It offers an explanation according to which in the case of the latter the negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e. explanations of unreal effects by introducing possible causes while the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The counterfactual abductive retrodictions´ backtracking time direction is in accordance with the postulating the positive time direction from cause to effect. Thus we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals there is no need to consider the backtracking impact of the present on the past. Further, there is no need to violate natural laws or to have a special logic. What we need is to take into account the third parameter, i.e. a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as our background. When the power of logic is not overestimated, there is no need to change the direction of causality. And a correct analysis does not require any special logic. Last, but not least, we showed, how to correctly make the abductive retrodiction by the contraposition of the deductive retrodiction.

11

THE STRUCTURE OF NIKLAS LUHMANN'S THEORY

63%

Brunczel B.

Tarsadalomkutatas (Social Science Research)

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2007

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tom 25

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nr 3

297-320

EN

There are more factors that make especially difficult to understand Niklas Luhmann's theory of society, e.g. its extraordinarily abstract and at the same time unusual language, some theoretical decisions that are surprising in the light of sociological tradition and the complicated interdependence between the parts of his theory. All of these can imply the danger of misinterpretation. In his paper the author endeavours to give an interpretative framework that through exploring the structure of Luhmann's theory and through revealing the efforts for theory-constitution lying behind it contributes to the elimination of these difficulties.The assumption underlying this is that the strange and un-understandable points of his theory are strange and un-understandable only separately, but if we reveal the inherent interdependences of Luhmann's theory and the inducements of its elaboration then all of them will lose these unusual characters. In fact Luhmann's theoretical efforts and theory-constituting aims are those things that in consequence of their grandiosity and radicalism are unusual in the field of social sciences; and the real key to the resolution of strangeness and un-understandability is to understand these efforts and aims. The author is going to perform this task by means of exploring five questions, i.e. analyzing (1) Luhmann's theoretical aim, (2) the circularity of his theory, (3) the abstraction levels of his theory, (4) the explanative power of his theory and (5) his theory's relation to philosophy. His paper's aim is not to defend or to criticize this theory; he will leave the questions concerning its assessment unanswered. What he would like to reach is that we leave the right questions unanswered.