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1
Content available remote Descartes’a myślenie o człowieku
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Filo-Sofija
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2008
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tom 8
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nr 8
55-77
EN
Modern thinking about human is connected with the statement Cogito, ergo sum. Descartes has been criticized for having divided human into two kinds of substance: extended (res extensa) and unextended (res cogitans), and, thus, for having created a false problem. In the author’s opinion this criticism is implausible. The aim of the article is to support the view that Descartes thought about human as an existing psychophysical unity, and the division of substances into different kinds is possible only in epistemological considerations.
2
Content available remote De revolutionibus orbium coelestium Mikołaja Kopernika jako rozprawka o metodzie
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EN
In addition to the calculations comprehensible to the astronomers, the work of Copernicus presented to Pope Paul III for approval, De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, includes also a descriptive introduction. The author uses it to report on the current astronomical knowledge, explains the importance of the accomplishments of his great predecessors, as well as the reasons for which a correction of their theories is necessary. In this part of the work the importance of discovery and adjustment of a proper method to a specific area of nature research is stressed as well-long before the Descartian Discourse on the Method. Copernicus stresses that the mistakes of his predecessors occurred because “something necessary” would be often discarded, and replaced by something “alien, not belonging to the matter”. The selective treatment of the phenomena and justification of the relations between them using non-meritorical indications and arguments might, but does not have to lead to the correct conclusions. The introduction and the first tome of De revolutionibus provide an example of a discourse on a method of creating knowledge. Copernicus displayed the benefits of his method, relating mainly to the authority of Aristotle, Ptolemy and Euclid. His accomplishment opened the way leading to revealing many other invisible assumptions, limiting the possibilities of researching nature. Some of them – the relation of subject and object, the trap of idealisation and usage of the models of researched phenomena – are discussed in the following article.
3
Content available remote Naturalistyczna opozycja wobec kartezjanizmu
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EN
My aim is to point out the foundations of Descartes’s programmatic antinaturalism, but also the margin left by Descartes in his program for a dialogue with the followers of naturalism. The latter used it more than once, but this opening for a dialogue was interpreted by them as Descartes’s support for naturalism. In my opinion it is not only a false interpretation of the philosopher’s intention, but also a false presentation of his views on human nature and the world that surrounds us.
EN
Spinoza searched for a language that could help him to create a monistic system of ethics. Latin was in the 17th century a fairly malleable medium of communication. In its philosophical use it was largely a creation of Descartes. Spinoza wanted to use it in a way that would resemble Euclid's treatment of geometry. He needed a language that would clearly and precisely describe the process by which a man could liberate himself from the power of passions that hamper natural propensity for social peace and mental equanimity. He decided to begin by describing nature, which was responsible for man's proclivities and abilities. Consequently he needed a new concept of substance which on the one hand could be defined by some initial axioms, and on the other hand would be sufficiently flexible to include various aspects of human thought. It is interesting that when Spinoza had to make a choice between flexibility and content, he resolved to adopt a strict method of reasoning at the cost of the received understanding of substance. It is possible that these linguistic considerations led him to adopt the view that substance is identical with God and as such encompasses all principles of operation of the human mind and premises for the deriving of all fundamental concepts popular in his times.
5
Content available remote Namiętności duszy a współczesny spór o naturę emocji
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EN
In my article I discuss the connection between the Cartesian theory of passions of the soul and the contemporary dispute between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions. Defenders of the cognitive theory of emotions identify emotions with judgments. On the other hand, non-cognitivists claim that emotions are feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions relating to the autonomic and motor functions. Both cognitivists’ and non-cognitivists’ approaches meet serious problems. In the paper, I want to show that the Cartesian theory of passions can be considered an anticipation of contemporary views and a compromise between the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions.
EN
The following article summarises some of the aspects of joy as a spiritual state (Descartes), and as an affect/stimulation of the modi of nature (Spinoza). The psycho-physiological (Descartes) and ontological (Spinoza) placement of joy creates basic differences in evaluation of the said state by the two philosophers. As a result, the moral instructions provided by them to the reader vary in an approach to the emotions and their effect on human actions. Descartes values the importance of sadness as an affect warning us from dangers; Spinoza claims that joy (as different from pleasure) can never be excessive and encourages pursuing it as a mean to achieve happiness.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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tom 74
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nr 4
308 – 317
EN
Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown are not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition “a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver”; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver.
EN
The appearance of 'the transcendental motif' in the history of philosophy is, by Husserl, related to the situation, in which the naive determination of the world became problematic. By the universal character of this motif we cast doubt on the world and also on the sciences, which examine it. 'Descartes, however, does not comprehend the object in its meaning'; hence the main Husserl's reproach against Descartes: instead of the meaning of the object Descartes sees 'in cogitatum' a visual object. Husserl sees this 'self-misinterpretation' as Descartes' misunderstanding of his own promising origins. This self-misinterpretation culminated in identifying ego, which Descartes discovered due to reduction, with 'I' - the human being. Husserl made use of Descartes in transcendental phenomenology to justify the claim of phenomenology to be a universal strict science. 'Thus we get a picture of Descartes for phenomenology' (Husserl's Descartes), while the historical character of Descartes' philosophy (Descartes' Descartes) is diminishing. It is one of the deformations caused by Husserl' effort to get foundation for a strictly and apodictically transcendental phenomenology. One of its victims was also Descartes' philosophy, whose greatness is in being this victim.
9
Content available remote Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny i jej konsekwencje
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EN
Descartes claims that an animal is an automaton that operates by laws of mechanics. It doesn’t think, it doesn’t feel, and, therefore, it doesn’t suffer. So animals can be exploited without a guilty conscience and scientific experiments can be carried out on them. This view, very convenient for people, has followers nowadays, too.
EN
Similarly to Husserl's gradually developing view of the fundamental phenomenological questions also his relationship to the philosophy of R. Descartes and to the history of philosophy as a whole underwent several changes. There is for example his shift from stressing (Descartes') 'universal attempt at doubt' to 'misunderstanding of Descartes' own discovery of ego'. Husserl sees Descartes' methodical skepticism as a crucial historical impulse for articulating his own conception of 'epoché'. Descartes' methodical skepticism and Husserl's putting in brackets the general thesis about the existence of the world show the closest parallel between their philosophical doctrines. Further, similarly to Descartes Husserl also aims at reforming the philosophy of his time; in Descartes' 'Meditations on first philosophy' he finds the way leading to transcendental phenomenology. However, there are also differences in their projects of universal philosophy. While for Descartes the model of his 'mathesis universalis' is mathematical science, Husserl aims - with far reaching consequences - at creating transcendental phenomenology as a strictly scientific philosophy which must offer a fundamental organon to all other sciences and thus enable them to undergo fundamental reforms.
11
Content available Descartes’ Socratic Method
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EN
Descartes considered himself as an originator of the method of methodical doubting, but, at the same time, he viewed his ideas as most ancient of all. In fact, he fairly closely followed in the footsteps of Socrates and his maieutic method of extracting the truth from an interlocutor in two phases: the elenctic method to demolish the interlocutor’s convictions and then coaxing the truth from him. Descartes’ methodical doubt is but a version of the elenctic method. Descartes also shares with Socrates the conviction of the existence of truth independent of the cognitive subject, which assured the possibility of successful conclusion of methodical doubting as well as the maieutic method.
EN
The article focuses on social context and consequences of Descartes' method. The method demands rejection of human society as an intrusion into the development of human rationality. Though a declared acceptance of human society in its historically established facticity makes part of this rejection, it is necessary to defend oneself against it at first. The philosopher of method defends himself against society not only by means of isolation, but by external integration as well. When thus secured, he convinces the authorities not only about social harmlessness of his method, but also about its usefulness. He presents his method as ready to contribute a great deal to stability or to solid foundation of hitherto society. But even this cautious claim is guided by a pursuit of protection - now of the protection by authorities - for the benefit of the most important thing in the human world, the method itself, and the freedom of reason.
13
Content available remote Kartezjańska droga Edmunda Husserla do redukcji transcendentalnej
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Filo-Sofija
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2007
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tom 7
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nr 7
141-162
EN
This article intends to bring up the very core of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy, it means the issue of the transcendental reduction, which, according to the idea of the creator of phenomenology, could solve the problems like: the correlation between subject and object, the issue of transcendence, and the precision of philosophy as well. The present text is tied only to showing the transcendental reduction, conducted by Husserl by the Cartesian way. This method of doing reduction is the most fundamental, because of the fact that philosopher intends to break the new ground of sure, imperturbable, irreducible and resistant to any doubt base of recognition. Similar searches were conducted by René Descartes. The author shortly describes the issue of the correlation between subject and object in the point of view of George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant; these philosophers concentrated on the pretences of recognition. Edmund Husserl was inspired by their philosophy. Then, author describes the way to the transcendental reduction, the pretence of the “natural world” and concentrates on showing the issue of reduction- the most controversial point in Husserl’s philosophy. The article is finished by the short philosophical meditation, which is the try of realization the theoretical think.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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tom 76
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nr 2
137 – 150
EN
This article aims to analyse the philosophical relationship between Descartes and Montaigne on divine power and human reason. Within Cartesian historiography, a relationship was usually established between Descartes and Montaigne to cast more light on the originality of the approach that Descartes introduced to the philosophical scene. On the contrary, the main goal of this article is to show how Descartes’ theory of eternal truths positively incorporated and preserved some aspects of Montaigne’s reflection on divine power. Were this the case, the historiographical interpretation that tends to establish a link between the two authors in order to separate Descartes from Montaigne would at least need to be integrated. This does not mean denying the originality of Cartesian approach, but more broadly defining the context in which Descartes voices his opinion.
EN
The aim of the paper is to show the role and the meaning of Descartes' philosophy in the context of Heidegger's way of philosophizing, focusing on his metaphysics of subjectivity. According to Heidegger the latter is marked by a transformation in understanding the being of existence. By this he meant the fact, that the representation of being is determined by the subject. What really is and is valid as existing, is only the object in the re-presentation of the re-presenting person. Heidegger argues that the modern history of being, from its understanding as re-presentation (Descartes) up to the will to power (Nietzsche) can be conceived as the history of metaphysics of subjectivity. For Heidegger Descartes' metaphysics is an instantiation of thinking which is limited by the existence without recurring to the most fundamental aspect, namely its being.
EN
This article is devoted to the correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth. In the first part the author presents and analyzes the passages about guilt (the sense of sinfulness, regret, remorse, contempt for oneself). Attention is drawn to Descartes' reluctance to undergo feelings of guilt and to convince the Princess that the experience of guilt is necessary for man. The second part presents some of the remarks of Edmund Husserl on the philosophy of Descartes and the possibility of experiencing the sense of reality, contained in the book: "The Crisis ...". The author highlights some parallels between the statements of Husserl and Princess Elizabeth. These similarities lead him to believe that Princess Elizabeth was aware that the removal of the experience of guilt prevents a person from experiencing the sense of reality. The author argues for the hypothesis that feelings of guilt are a condition of experiencing the sense of reality.
EN
The paper deals with the fundamental problems of Juraj Ciger's philosophical and ethical thinking. Its focus is on Ciger's understanding and explaining of the legacy of the R. Descartes founder of modern philosophy as an enigmatic philosopher. In this context it shows that Descartes was the clue philosopher for Ciger and that in a sense Ciger himself can be seen as an enigmatic philosopher. The author offers an analysis of Ciger's interpretation of Descartes' philosophical conception, which on his opinion was not dualistic, but rather trialistic. The impact of Ciger's thinking on the theoretical and practical (medical) ethics is shown as well.
18
Content available remote Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny
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Filo-Sofija
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2012
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tom 12
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nr 2(17)
51-64
EN
According to standard interpretations, Descartes asserted that animals were mere automata and did not feel pain. This interpretation is based on his notion of the beast-machine. In this article, I revise John Cottingham’s sevenfold analysis of that thesis. In Cottingham’s view, Descartes did insist that animals were automata and denied them consciousness and self-consciousness but it did not involve that animals do not feel. I support this view with some new arguments. I also point to the difference between Descartes’s original conception of animal and animality and the standpoint of his followers.
EN
Philosophical translation is one of a philosophical culture's constitutive elements. The specific characters of a philosophical community's historical situation determine a characteristic features of a philosophical translations, as well as the criterions of the translation's 'exactness' and the 'adequacy'. In the article, there are confronted the historical situations of French ('post-scholastic) and Ukrainian ('post-soviet') philosophical communities. The author notes following comparative characters of the Ukrainian philosophical community's contemporary historical situation: 1) significantly more deep rupture with the previous tradition; 2) isolation from contemporary out-philosophical sources of philosophical ideas' importance and from the world philosophical process of the time; 3) significantly more high (than in the 17th cent.) status of the history of philosophy as one of the most important philosophical culture's sources; 4) decline of the educational institutions; 5) post-colonial stereotypes which put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian philosophical language's formation. The author analyses the situation and the perspectives of contemporary Ukrainian philosophical translation. Our philosophical community needs today considerably more developed terminological and conceptual resource for the history of philosophy which must to overcome the soviet positivism's heritage and pay attention to the history of terms. The matter is to examine any historical object ('scholasticism', 'rationalism', 'aristotelianism' etc.) first of all by way of the terminological systems and respective semantic nets.
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