Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 12

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  NORMATIVITY
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The main target of the article is an attempt to draw a reflection on the theoretical contexts of moral upbringing. What was discussed in particular is the question of relations between morality, psychological concepts of moral development and possibilities of pedagogic influence. The priority was given to Kohlberg’s philosophical basis of a cognitive and developmental concept and other psychological concepts. Thanks to it, in the further part of the text, it was possible to reflect on problems connected with the normativity of moral upbringing.
EN
The paper presents the problem of norms and normativity in its broad scope and relevance for philosophy and social theory. In section one, the author provides a brief outline of his topic as present in the history of philosophy. Section two deals with a variety of approaches towards defining the concept of norms. Section three is devoted to the concept of social norms. Social norms are social representations (and social facts) comprising both mental and behavioral attributes such as beliefs of 'ougthness' to act in a certain way, consciousness of risk of exclusion in case of failure to act in a given way, real social obligations and conformity, etc. In conclusion, the author points to the topicality of the questions arising with respect to norms in the contemporary social context and practice.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
tom 72
|
nr 3
173 – 180
EN
In her article Athens and Jerusalem: The Relationship of Philosophy and Theology, Eleonore Stump answers the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology via considering both disciplines doctrinally. Stump sees the difference between them mainly in their goals. Philosophy seeks to build a body of knowledge characterized in terms of abstract universals (wisdom). Theology seeks to reach an insight into a concrete particular (God). In this article, the author aims to show that normative definition of the relationship between philosophy and theology a la Stump fails. Firstly, it fails systematically because it misinterprets several aspects of these two disciplines. Secondly, it fails historically because it fails to cover historical exempla. In conclusion he proposes a sketch of an alternative dynamic model that allows us to describe the historical changes of both disciplines, and trace the changes of their relationship through time.
Studia Psychologica
|
2015
|
tom 57
|
nr 4
315 – 325
EN
The Theory of Planned Behaviour has been criticized for the fact that it reflects an instinctive and naïve psychology leading to a bias of congruence between intention and its determinants. We proceed from this hypothesis to evaluate the normativity of this type of judgment. 72 subjects had to evaluate the normativity of judgments congruent or not between intention, attitude, the subjective norm and behavioural control. The results revealed that congruent judgments were judged to be more normative when attitude and the subjective norm were involved. It is also the expression of a strong intention, which is perceived as normative when the item in the questionnaire refers to behavioural control. Normativity of congruence may explain why it is possible to observe a consistency between responses to this type of questionnaire. Our study suggests, furthermore, that this bias is the product of social influences particular to the context of the study.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
tom 67
|
nr 5
353 – 361
EN
Aesthetic judgments are intrinsically both subjective and normative. Asking what our aesthetic judgments are linked to leads us to the question about metaphysical commitments of the aesthetic experience. This fundamental metaphysical level opens up two basic positions: realism and non-realism. Realism claims that in our experience we face true aesthetic properties independent of our minds. Non-realistic theoretical framework presupposes an essential contribution of the recipient into the aesthetic experience insofar that it is not possible to identify work’s propositions as such. The paper argues for drawing the realistic position from the normative aspect of aesthetic judgments. It claims that normativity presupposes mind-independent actual aesthetic properties of the objects/artefacts. Subsequently, non-realistic claims are incompatible with accepting the normative character of the aesthetic experience.
EN
The paper sheds light on different approaches to normativity and on current tendencies to consider social and moral norms from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. The main objective of the paper is to show the similarities as well as differences between social and moral norms. Further, the author argues, that the different characteristics, such as the influence of an external authority, the role of emotions and the role of conscious and subconscious judgments are not qualitative, but rather quantitative. Although the moral norms are more universal and breaking them involves more emotions, the role of the social context is as important as with social norms.
EN
The paper examines Rousseau’s approach to the classical “state of nature” conception. Is Rousseau’s system coherent or not? For Rousseau, the state of nature seems to be a hypothetical abstract concept on one hand and a real state of intersubjective relationships within specific human communities on the other.
EN
The thesis that meaning is normative, i.e. that statements ascribing meaning to sentences express norms, advocated by Kripke-Wittgenstein, has been subjected to numerous critical arguments. However, these doubts can be refuted if certain modifications are made. Firstly, one must reject Boghossian's requirement that a correct use is a true use and allow for correctness of speech acts which do not aim at truth. Secondly, one must reject conflation of correct use and correct application. Thirdly, the fact that the normativity of meaning sentences is not the normativity of moral sentences does not prove that meaning sentences are not normative in a different way. In line with the 'folk' theory of meaning, presented in the paper, the author accepts the meaning normativity thesis, which, however, does not mean embracing the existence of a set of rules shared by all users of a given language, which was questioned by Davidson. The idea that uses of language can be classified as correct or incorrect is central to our ordinary concept of meaning.
EN
Classical pragmatists (Peirce, James, Dewey) have already circumscribed their conceptions overcoming reductionism of naturalism in the forms of physicalism and scientism. Thereby they laid down grounds of pragmatist non-reductive naturalism. In connection to this as well as to conceptions of post analytic naturalists such as Quine and Davidson, but in particular the normative turn of W. Sellars, contemporary neopragmatism develops its varieties of non-reductive naturalism: liberal naturalism (John McDowell), normative naturalism (Robert Brandom), metaphilosophical naturalism (Richard Rorty) and object/subject naturalism (Huw Price). The paper provides an analysis of these topical conceptions which are inspirational for resolution of relations between causation and normativity, nature and culture and relations between nonhuman and human realities, respectively.
EN
The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman’s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical respective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
tom 67
|
nr 5
362 – 374
EN
The paper examines the position of realism in the aesthetics and philosophy of art. It analyses the stereotypes in discussions about the possibility of aesthetic realism and points out to some consequences of these for the ontology of a work of art. Further, it shows the position of realism in the ontological theories of an artwork. Various interpretations of Peircean type-token distinction lead to different solutions of the problem of ontology and identity of a work of art. In the final part, the relationship between philosophy and art is reconsidered. The author suggests a new account of realism, which avoids the current debates stereotypes and is suitable for solving philosophical problems concerning art (e.g. normativity of aesthetic judgements, identity of a work of art, art’s cognitive value).
EN
In an account of what we might call fundamental practical normativity, it is helpful, the author thinks, to distinguish between the normativity of reasons and that of rationality. But when we do so the question of the relation between these two realms arises: are these two independent kinds of normativity? Can we account for the normativity of rationality in terms of the normativity of reasons? Or is it the other way around; is rationality explanatorily prior to reasons? This paper discusses a positive answer to the last of these questions. In a number of articles, as well as in his first book, Michael Smith has argued that the nature of reasons can be accounted for in terms of ideal rationality. The author argues that Smith is unsuccessful in his analysis of normative reasons in terms of full rationality, and that the failure of his analysis leaves his closely related argument for normative judgement internalism unconvincing.
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.