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On several occasions Roman Ingarden accused Hartmann of using his ideas concerning the stratified structure of a work of art. In this paper, thw aurhor shows that the dependence between the two concepts has no genetic character. First of all, Hartmann formulated general solutions about such objects before Ingarden published 'Das literarische Kunstwerk'. Already in the 'Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis', Hartmann spoke about the two-layer structure of works of art. Secondly, unlike Ingarden, Hartmann argued that the material layer belongs to a work of art. These two arguments show that Ingarden's accusations are unfounded.
The traditional conception of ontology as a theory of being included an unexpressed belief of that time, namely that an ontologically oriented philosophy has to be concerned either with the nonhuman being of nature, or with the human one conceived experientially. The critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann came close to the evolutionary ontological conception in that it has incorporated the person in the reality and underlined the meanings of the course of events, time and multidimensionality of being. However, the subject in all traditional ontologies (including that of Hartmann) has been reduced, i.e. its structure has been conceived inadequately. They have ignored the different 'ontic' kind of reality, namely the 'human cultural being', which followed the birth of human beings on the planet Earth.
The paper gives an analysis of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s, which was a shared philosophical platform for Hartmann and Heidegger. Both philosophers are to be conceived of mainly in the context of Neo-Kantianism, which ends, when the conception of epistemology as prima philosophia is replaced by ontology. While Hartmann conceived of metaphysics through the optics of what remains unknowable in grasping the problems logically, Heidegger saw the metaphysics of that time on the background of the forgetfulness of being.
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