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The essay outlines a non-substantialist ontological conception of the work of art, which should grasp the process-like nature of the works of visual art. This process-like ontological model of the work of art draws on following conceptions: (a) the conception of the work of art as an experience in J. Dewey; (b) the conception of the virtual and actual existences as developed in informatics; (c) the conception of a semantic gesture of Jan Mukarovsky. In this conception the work of art is seen as a product created by the author/authors together with the viewer/viewers, as an experience, which could be shared inter-subjectively. The whole process is controlled by the semantic gesture, which is unique in each work of art, and which is our guide in actual experience.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
tom 74
nr 7
556 – 570
The aim of this paper is to outline the historical context of Whitehead’s philosophical work with a special focus on the comparison to classical pragmatism. The paper is divided in two main parts. The first part deals with the characterization of process philosophy in general, especially with Whitehead’s version of this philosophical movement, and contrasts it to traditional (substantial and mechanistic) philosophies. The second part examines some important common features of Whitehead’s process philosophy and James’ and Dewey’s classical pragmatism. The most important point of connection of their philosophical work is the concept of experience. It is also important to mention that for all of them the common epistemological basis is radical empiricism (or naturalistic empiricism in case of Dewey) and the ontological assumption of (some form of) realism.
The aim of the paper is to expose the main characteristics of the philosophy of science as developed in classical pragmatism. The author differentiates between philosophy of science in narrow (internal, epistemological) and broader (externalist, sociocultural) senses. Classical pragmatist philosophy of science embodies the integration of social, historical, anthropological, axiological, ethical and other aspects of science as substantial for its philosophical understanding. The relation between pragmatist philosophy and science is complex, both respectful and critical. It is neither anti-scientist nor scientist philosophy. To understand it, the author provides the reconstruction of the key historical stages of the relations between classical pragmatism and logical positivism/empiricism. Further, the overall outline of the main features of the conceptions of science in Ch. S. Peirce, W. James and J. Dewey with the focus on the concept of inquiry and its sociocultural context is provided. This all adds up to the conclusion that the core of the classical pragmatist philosophy of science is the Deweyan “cultural naturalism”.
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