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Among valuable documents from the Rozmberk and Svamberk archives, which are deposited in the Historica collection of the regional archive in Trebon, several hundred manuscript newspapers and news items from the 16th century have been preserved. This extensive collection contains a unique report on the Turkish policy towards the Polish-Lithuanian state. It was written by an unknown Polish reporter on his return journey from Constantinople in 1576. He wanted to warn his patron, probably a senator, against the schemes of the Ottoman government about which he had heard from spies on the Sultan's court. He accompanied his information by numerous commentaries. Thus his report provides a peek into the 16th century Polish noblemen's lives and portraits the image of the Turks in their minds. Conversely, citations by the Viziers, their reporters and advisors provide information about the way the Rzeczpospolita was regarded by foreigners. The newspaper opens with plots concerning the Black Sea region, where the Turks aspired to prevent further Cossacks' interventions. However, the Grand Vizier's hunger to pillage or conquer the Polish-Lithuanian state seemed to be much more important. The reporter dealt with this topic in the second, more extensive part of his report. With great apprehension he informed on a counsel between the Grand Vizier and an unknown Frenchman, who willingly offered his intelligence on the Polish-Lithuanian state and instigated the Turks to attack it.
Polish-Russian negotiations from the first half of 1683 constitute an important stage in the history of relations between the two countries during the second half of the seventeenth century. Both Russia and the Commonwealth aimed at a compromise at the time of a successive phase in the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern and Central Europe. The anti-Ottoman rapprochement of those countries was rendered complicated by their rivalry for Ukraine. In the course of the Crimean-Russian negotiations of 1681, Moscow unsuccessfully demanded terrains on the right bank of the Dnieper and the Zaporozhe region. In 1682 the Commonwealth, profiting from the political crisis in Russia, embarked upon a failed attempt at depriving Russia of Ukraine and the Smolensk region. All these factors adversely affected Polish-Russian relations on the eve of the Ottoman expedition against Vienna. The Russian mission arrived in Warsaw at a time when the parliamentary session of 1683 had almost ended. Up to then, a defensive-offensive alliance had been already signed by Austria and the Commonwealth. The prime objective of both allies was to draw Russia into the league. The latter, however, did not hasten joining the alliance, since it was still facing the threat of unrest on the part of the Cossacks and the 'streltsy'. Furthermore, the government of Tsarevna Sophia and Chancellor Golitsyn wished to benefit from the international situation in order to improve the conditions of the Bakhchisarai alliance. Fearing that the Commonwealth would conduct a revision of the treaty of Andruszów (1667), the Russian diplomats insisted that King Jan Sobieski swear an oath, pledging the observance of all the earlier signed Polish-Russian treaties. The Commonwealth opted for an unwavering stand vis-a-vis Russia: Jan III refused the oath, and already in 1683 the Polish side made considerable efforts to engage Russia into an anti-Ottoman league. A Polish envoy was dispatched to Moscow. Russian diplomacy considered a grant to the state of Muscovy of terrains annexed upon the basis of the treaty of Andruszów to be an indispensable condition for joining the coalition. Despite the fact that both sides did not reach an agreement about the alliance, the negotiations conducted during the first half of 1683 delineated an eternal peace and alliance, signed in 1686 (the so-called Grzymultowski treaty).
Due to European diplomatic and military cooperation, the Great Turkish War, lasting from 1683 to 1699, resulted in the nearly complete recapture of Hungary from Ottoman rule. Although the events of the long war are known in detail, little research has been dedicated to what hardships and conflicts the recaptured territories encountered during the organization of the military and financial, followed by the civil and ecclesiastical administration. The present study aims to focus on these issues by synthesizing the research results of the past decades. It presents the challenges of the reconstruction that began during the war, as well as the conflicts among the military, financial, and civil authorities. During the Great Turkish War, the fate of Hungary was determined primarily by the interests of the Habsburg standing army, the Aulic Chamber (Hofkammer), and the Viennese court. During the war, the Hungarian political elite, had very little say in the shaping of events and the new administration of the country. For this reason, the revival of civil and ecclesiastical institutions could only commence very slowly and in the face of great difficulties in the liberated areas, which were under close control from the military and financial points of view. Consequently, a part of the country’s population often regarded the liberation as occupation by the imperial generals, war commissioners, and chamber officials, and even as a series of devastations caused by the Habsburg forces. The recapture of the historical state of Hungary was, therefore, not without fierce political, social, and religious debates. Paradoxically enough, the Great Turkish War fundamentally contributed to the outbreak of the first independence movement in the history of Hungary, the War of Independence (1703–1711) led by Francis II Rákóczi.
This study analyses how and why did the most active Arab anti-Zionists in the pre-WWI period respond to Zionism. A rather unusual approach was chosen to accomplish this task: instead of an attempt at a flowing narrative, the historical period in questions is laid out in the form of personal profiles of half a dozen leading personalities who in one way or another dealt with various issues related to Zionism. The present study shows how these personalities responded to Zionism, Jewish immigration and land purchases, to various Zionist approaches to the coexistence with the local population, public communications and other statements of Zionists published in the press.
The modern Serbian state (the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia) was created and its territory enlarged gradually during the 19th and early 20th century, in a process of emancipation from the Ottoman Empire, where specific agrarian relations existed based on Ottoman feudalism. Consequently the development of the modern Serbian state proceeded parallel to the replacement of Ottoman agrarian relations with a new type of land ownership, with formerly dependent peasants becoming private owners of the land that they had farmed under Ottoman rule. This led to deep-rooted social changes and even changes in the national culture. For this purpose the paper presents an overview of the creation and the territorial expansion of the modern Serbian state, in the context of the change in the international position of the Ottoman Empire and its social structure. A thorough analysis of the Ottoman agrarian relations in the Balkan regions of the Ottoman Empire is carried out, specifying the changes that occurred during the armed springs of the Serbian peasants – the First and Second Serbian Uprising (1804–1813, 1815). The process of abolishing Ottoman agrarian relations (with the constitution of private land ownership) is treated in detail in the territory of the Principality of Serbia, following the attainment of formal autonomy within the Ottoman Empire (1830) and after gaining independence (1878), including all the international implications.
The article presents images of the Turks in the Czech environment and their development in the last half century of the existence of the Ottoman Empire, namely from the 1870s to 1923. It analyses works that reacted to the Balkan uprisings and Russo – Turkish War of the 1870s, travel reports and literature written after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and briefly outlines the view of the Turks in scholarly literature, especially the emerging Oriental or Turkish studies. Attitudes to the Turks are placed in the context of relations with other ethnic and religious groups. The article points to the stereotypes and Orientalist ideas we encounter in works with Turkish themes.
Content available remote Sovětská zahraniční politika a Osmanská říše na přelomu let 1917 a 1918
The issue of relationships between the newly founded Soviet Russia and the declining Ottoman Empire during the final stage of World War I is one the blank spaces on the margins of an otherwise well-discussed topic. Negligible interest in this topic is primarily caused by the fact that this was a relatively short and relatively unimportant episode set against the background of much more significant events. In the period from November 1917 to March 1918 the policy of Soviet Russia towards the Ottoman Empire represented part of a more general problem – namely Soviet policy towards the Four Central Powers. At the beginning of the period under research Soviet Russia was at war with the Ottoman Empire. The Soviet Government therefore considered the conclusion of peace to be its principal problem of policy towards the Ottoman Empire. It was to give Russia space to disseminate revolutionary ideas amongst the Ottoman population. In case these ideas fell onto fertile ground, a revolutionary uprising in the Ottoman Empire (envisaged naturally as one of a generally democratic and anti-imperialist nature, albeit not a proletarian revolution) could contribute to the weakening of the European powers and thus to the final victory of a proletarian revolution in the developed countries of Europe and America. High expectations and hopes placed on proclamations and peace offers, intentionally targeted to promote revolutionary potential in the countries of the Central Powers (and not merely within them), did not, however, come to fruition in the case of the Ottoman Empire, nor in the case of their allies. Revolutions did not materialise in the above mentioned countries in the period under research. Therefore, during truce talks, which took place shortly after Soviet offers of peace, the Soviet side attempted to ensure favourable conditions for the spread of its propaganda, especially among the troops of the Central Powers. The questions of a peace settlement between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire became a matter of peripheral importance during the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, which followed. Nevertheless, Soviet foreign policy had to deal with three main problems in her relationship to the Ottoman Empire: 1) the fate of Eastern Anatolia and especially the question of the Armenians there, 2)the recognition of the independence of Persia and the withdrawal of both Ottoman and Soviet troops from there and 3) the question of Ottoman territorial demands in South Caucasus. However, Soviet foreign policy in all these three areas conflicted with the entirely opposing Ottoman views on a future settlement of the above mentioned problems. It was the irony of fate that both countries evoked the idea of national self-determination in order to promote their own demands, yet each of them envisaged its realization in completely different terms. With a view to the overall results of peace talks the Soviet Government failed, at the end, to have her own demands incorporated in the peace treaty. Similar to her situation with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Soviet Russia incurred territorial losses in the case of the Ottoman Empire, also. Thus, the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk came to embody, to a greater degree, the failure of Soviet foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire.
Content available remote Význam Dunaje pro Metternichovo Rakousko
Relying on thorough examination of relevant archival documents housed in several European archives, this paper analyzes the attitude of the leading personalities of the Austrian Empire towards the importance of the Danube for Austrian commerce and geopolitical position in Europe in the first half of 19th century. The content is divided into the two main parts, the first dealing with the general views of the Austrian elites of the problematic. It is particularly based upon the crucial memoir of Franz Freiherr von Ottenfels from early 1834 that summarized the advantages for the Danube Monarchy if the river became navigable on its lower reach. This document reflects the views generally maintained by the Austrian authorities and, simultaneously, based the foundations of the further policy in the question of the Danube. The second part of the paper deals with Austria's attempts to make the river navigable from its southeastern frontier to the delta and to persuade the Sublime Porte to agree with regulating works in the Iron Gate constituting the most serious impediment to the shipping and Russia to maintain the water-level navigable in the Sulina Arm being in the tsar's possession after 1829.
Municipality of Kotor, since 1420 part of the Republic of Venice, was in the sense of ecclesiastical administration a vast diocese. The bishop of Kotor had because of former position of Kotor in the realm of Nemanjić´s dynasty jurisdiction over catholic parishes in the territory of Serbia at that time. Those parishes developed in the places of the mines and centres, where were concentrated merchants and mining specialist from the catholic areas. However, expanding the Osmans, the centres were on the decline and catholic minority in the situation of growing pression of Osmans began to migrate of change the religion. Big extent of diocesis, as well as political situation and heavy position of Kotor were the cause of impossibility to administrate the diocesis as it should be. The ties with the Dalmatian and Venetian Albanian coast went weakening. At the end of the XVI. century, the title primas Serbiae, reservated for the bishop of Kotor, was only blank concept. This article introduces this slowly process based on the testimonies of archives in Kotor and others
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