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The article is a commentary on Rush Rhees’s paper Some developments in Wittgenstein’s view of ethics which appeared in “The Philosophical Review” in 1965. Rhees’s article falls into two parts. The first one features mainly the author’s comments on Wittgenstein’s Lecture on ethics, whereas in the second one Rhees relates a discussion on ethics which he had with Wittgenstein in the late period of the latter’s life. It is the second part that I focus on in my article and I consider points where Wittgenstein’s view of ethics has changed. Two most significant traits of his new approach are: the shift from analysing Ethics in itself to analysing various systems of ethics, and relativism. I discuss possible causes and consequences of this standpoint and its relation to Wittgenstein’s earlier thoughts about ethics.
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In the article 'The change a way of life' - with reference to hermeneutic ideas of philosophy I present a hermeneutic conceptions of Gadamer's, Ricoeur's and the late Wittgenstein's from a therapeutic perspective. I point out that terms such as: the understanding conditions, changing a way of life and being in the world, plays the fundamental role in the hermeneutic conceptions. Ricoeur as well as Wittgenstein, analising these terms from language perspective, schow us, that the philosophical thinking suppouse to lead to expansion of man's self-consciousness and to understending the different forms of life. From that angle that idea of philosophy could be understanded as a kind of efford tend towards to change our looking at things, providing the subject to a kind of transformation. This process can be recognized as therapeutical because it force us to schake a many of our opinions, hidden prejudices, beliefs about ourselfs and about the world, which are treated as a background of our daily life. In connection with that I analyze the similarities between Ricoeur's and Wittgenstein's projects on one hand, and the Freud's psychoanalysis on the other.
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Wittgenstein the saviour? The problem of rules in Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practiceThe text constitutes a thorough and exhaustive analysis of the impact of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice and especially on his notions of practical sense and logic of practice. The author first considers both philosophers’ attitude to objectivism. Then she proposes a reading of Wittgenstein’s theory that might prove useful and inspiring in the sociological field. In the final section, the author analyses the other, partly oppositional in relation to Bourdieu’s, theories of practice, proposed by Anthony Giddens and Michel de Certeau, putting them in the light of Wittgenstein’s analyses. Wybawca Wittgenstein? Problem reguł w teorii praktyki Pierre’a BourdieuTekst stanowi dociekliwą i wyczerpującą analizę wpływu filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina na teorię praktyki Pierre’a Bourdieu, a zwłaszcza na wypracowane przez Bourdieu pojęcia zmysłu praktycznego i logiki praktycznej. Autorka rozważa stosunek do obiektywizmu obu filozofów. Następnie proponuje takie odczytanie teorii Wittgensteina, które mogłoby okazać się pożyteczne i inspirujące w polu socjologicznym. W ostatniej części artykułu autorka analizuje inne, po części opozycyjne wobec teorii Pierre’a Bourdieu teorie praktyki, zaproponowane przez Anthony’ego Giddensa i Michela de Certeau i stawia je w świetle analiz Wittgensteina.
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This article focuses on Wittgenstein influence and contribution to political theory. The structure of the paper is linear and follows chronologically the period of Wittgenstein’s work, from the early work represented by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to late Wittgenstein focusing on the theory of language games and the work on Philosophical Investigations and previous preparatory texts known as the Blue and Brown Books. To understand the author’s thought development and his relatively conflicting theories in both stages of Wittgenstein’s thinking, the paper considers it appropriate to interpolate the interpretation with a biographical method. However, the aim of the paper is not a comprehensive biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, but to explain why the author’s work has changed so significantly and how his reflection in the field of political representation has changed. The paper concludes that even at a time when political science is dominated by empirical analytical directions, political theory does not lose its significance and can turn to many authors who at first glance fall into completely different areas of scientific research. Many problems typical of the analytical philosophy of language find analogous topics in political theory or political science. Misunderstandings and analytical philosophy, if not the starting point, can offer clues to solve or explain these problems. And as Wittgenstein’s early theory of language influenced Hanna Pitkin’s classical theory of representation, it provides a possible way to explain the practice of constituting undemocratic regimes through language rules and threat representation. The late Wittgenstein offers a way to understand political debates about the nature of democracy, but also to explain why and on what basis citizens choose their representatives.
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The aim of the present paper is to find a way of the theological method after Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks, especially in his Philosophical Investigations. As he maintains, language and human behaviour is connected, and so we cannot judge religious discourse without observing other nonverbal phenomena. We focused on works and authors who influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts such as William James and James G. Frazer; and we briefly introduced to Wittgenstein’s argumentation against scientism.
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Content available remote Povaha vlivu Karla Krause na Wittgensteinovu filosofii
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The article concerns the influence of Karl Kraus, the Austrian cultural critic, on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It starts by pointing out the significance attributed to the influence of Kraus by Wittgenstein himself, and this is then compared with the inspiration he took from other authors. Then the mottos to both central books by Wittgenstein are identified as the key Krausian indicators. And, interpreting both mottos, the article comes to the conclusion that, for the most part, Wittgenstein was inspired by Kraus to conceive his own work as a linguistic satire. The end of the article uses examples of Wittgenstein’s use of comical elements to show satire as a key aspect of his philosophy.
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Text zkoumá vliv literáta Karla Krause na Wittgensteinovu filosofii. Nejprve upozorňuje na význam, který tomuto vlivu, ve srovnání s podněty jiných autorů, přičítal sám Wittgenstein. Následně identifikuje jako klíčovou známku Krausova vlivu, vedle jednotlivých paralel v textech obou zde zmiňovaných autorů, motta ke dvěma hlavním Wittgensteinovým knihám. A jejich interpretací dochází k závěru, že Wittgenstein od Krause přebral především jazykovou satiru. Nakonec proto článek prostřednictvím příkladů využití komiky ve Wittgensteinově díle navrhuje brát při interpretaci Wittgensteinovy filosofie v potaz její satirický aspekt jako jeden z hlavních autorových nástrojů.
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Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza kilku uwag L. Wittgensteina, których tematem jest Pismo Święte. Egzegeza tych fragmentów będzie miała charakter pewnego wglądu i rozjaśnienia często niejasnych wypowiedzi austriackiego filozofa na temat Biblii. Uwagi Wittgensteina zestawione zostaną również ze współczesnymi historyczno-krytycznymi poglądami na temat ksiąg biblijnych. Wybrane do analizy fragmenty, mimo że nie pochodzą z „oficjalnych” dzieł austriackiego filozofa, czyli Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego oraz Dociekań filozoficznych i prawdopodobnie nigdy nie miały zostać opublikowane, są jednak świadectwem jego intelektualnej aktywności i stanowią ważne źródło dla filozofii religii.
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The purpose of this article is to discuss a few of L. Wittgenstein's remarks on the Bible. The exegesis has the character of a certain insight and clarification of the vague statements on the Bible given by an Austrian philosopher. Wittgenstein's remarks are compared with contemporary, historical and critical views on the biblical books. The texts selected for the analysis do not belong to the “official” works of the Austrian philosopher as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, and might never have been published. Nevertheless, they are a testimony of his intellectual activity and the important source of religious philosophy.
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Celem artykułu jest krytyczna ocena teorii interpretacji stworzonych przez dwóch prominentnych filozofów – Stanleya Fisha i Ronalda Dworkina. Po opisie i rekonstrukcji ich poglądów, w tekście identyfikuje się problemy związane ze stanowiskiem, że w procesie stosowania prawa wszystko zależy od interpretacji. Krytyka ta oparta jest na uwadze Ludwiga Wittgensteina, że musi istnieć sposób uchwycenia znaczenia, który nie jest interpretacją, w przeciwnym bowiem razie zasadny staje się zarzut regresu w nieskończoność. Główną tezą artykułu jest twierdzenie, że choć teoria Dworkina nie jest wolna od wad, to jednak ma większą siłę eksplanacyjną niż propozycje jego oponenta.
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The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.
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This article deals with the proposal, by the early-Wittgenstein, that we avoid antinomies by excluding talk about talk. Given that such a policy is in its very character controversial, we consider whether antimonies might not be better dealt with by a shift from the sphere of epistemology to that of aesthetics. To this end we develop some of the principles of Wittgensteinian aesthetics, taking in the whole of Wittgenstein’s work, both early and late, and its roots in German idealism. Key themes are an analogy between Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s (later) approach to contradiction, and an analysis of Hegel’s thesis according to which beauty is the sensuous manifestation of truth.
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Der Artikel befasst sich mit dem Vorschlag des frühen Wittgenstein, Antinomien durch ein Verbot des Sprechens über die Sprache zu vermeiden. In Anbetracht dessen, dass ein solches Verbot von seinem Wesen her ebenfalls strittig ist, wird die Möglichkeit in Erwägung gezogen, ob Antinomien nicht adäquater durch einen Übergang vom epistemischen in den ästhetischen Bereich angegangen werden konnten. Zu diesem Zweck werden im Kontext des Gesamtwerks Wittgensteins, d. h. sowohl des Früh- als auch des Spätwerks, sowie hinsichtlich von Wittgensteins Wurzeln im deutschen Idealismus, bestimmte Grundsatze der Ästhetik Wittgensteins entwickelt. Dabei zeigt sich die entscheidende Bedeutung der Analogie der Ansätze Hegels und des (späteren) Wittgensteins hinsichtlich dieser Streitfrage sowie die Analyse der These Hegels, der gemäß die Schönheit die Sinnesmanifestation der Wahrheit ist.
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Content available Mysticism and Early Analytic Philosophy
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Early analytic philosophy is known for its logical rigor that seems to leave no place for non-rational sources of knowledge such as mystical experiences. The following paper shows on the example of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein that despite of this early analytic philosophy was interested in mysticism and it also shows the roots of this interest. For Russell an application of logical methods to solving philosophical puzzled was an expression of a more fundamental striving – to know the world as it is, sub specie aeternitatis – which is mystical in nature. In turn early Wittgenstein’s philosophy sets the limits of meaningful propositions and provides the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and what manifests itself in the world. The latter belongs to the realm of the mystical.
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An attempt to interpret Ludwig Wittgenstein’s attitude towards religion and ethics. This article has been submitted statements and behavior Ludwig Wittgenstein on religion and ethics. The author relied mostly on the biography of the Austrian philosopher, written by Ray Monk. The work was also carried out evaluation and interpretation of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards religion and ethics. The conclusionsstated among others, that the Austrian thinker was a philosopher steeped in a deep religiousness, which, however, does not fit completely in the mainstream traditional religious ideas.
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In Polish legal theory there is a generally accepted distinction between legal norms (normative standards) and legal provisions (independent editorial units of a legal text). One of the most developed theories of the interpretation of law, the derivative theory of M. Zieliński, however, also includes the postulate of the reconstruction of the entire legal system as one comprehensive norm (the so-called holistic approach) in the process of applying the law. This postulate stems mainly from assumptions regarding the adopted methods of interpretation. The holistic approach has often been criticized as inadequate in pragmatic terms, but the derivative theory has not yet been thoroughly modified in this respect. In this paper, I propose to apply Wittgenstein's concept of aspect perception as providing adequate conceptual framework to describe the mechanism of identifying relevant parts of the legal norm that deals with the pragmatic inadequacy of the holistic approach, but does not affect the core of the derivative theory of interpretation.
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In Polish legal theory there is a generally accepted distinction between legal norms (normative standards) and legal provisions (independent editorial units of a legal text). One of the most developed theories of the interpretation of law, the derivative theory of M. Zieliński, however, also includes the postulate of the reconstruction of the entire legal system as one comprehensive norm (the so-called holistic approach) in the process of applying the law. This postulate stems mainly from assumptions regarding the adopted methods of interpretation. The holistic approach has often been criticized as inadequate in pragmatic terms, but the derivative theory has not yet been thoroughly modified in this respect. In this paper, I propose to apply Wittgenstein's concept of aspect perception as providing adequate conceptual framework to describe the mechanism of identifying relevant parts of the legal norm that deals with the pragmatic inadequacy of the holistic approach, but does not affect the core of the derivative theory of interpretation.
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Content available Wittgenstein a problem reguł
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The problem of rules and the private language argument are among the most renowned and disputable themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Presumably today’s best known interpretation of the themes was presented in Saul Kripke’s famous and often commented book Wittgenstein on Rules and the Private Language, published in 1982. The interpretation, nicknamed “Kripkenstein”, became the target of numerous attacks of authors convinced that it did justice neither to Wittgenstein nor to the real way our language worked.This article begins with the examination of Wittgenstein’s problem of identification of action which may be counted as justified by the rule, that is, the problem of criteria of correctness. This is Kripke’s starting point in his binding the problem of rules with the private language argument. He believes that Wittgenstein did not question the mere possibility of such a language but the possibility of any language at all. Further, we survey the rejected solutions to the problem of criteria: the mentalistic and the dispositional. This leads us toKripke’s sceptical solution: there are no reasons of actions which occur before these actions. There are certain trained ways of doing things which “tell” us what to do in typical situations but they are not criteria of correctness. Such criteria may only be public and therefore social.In conclusion it’s argued that Kripkenstein’s view is really Wittgenstein’s view: contrary to the popular opinion Kripke did not put forward a new solution, he just gave us a different way of presenting it.
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Content available remote „Nic tu nie jest ukryte”. Poza hermeneutyką podejrzeń
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W rozdziale 8. książki Revolution of the Ordinary Toril Moi prezentuje swoją autorską koncepcję lektury utworu literackiego, polegającą na wnikliwej analizie tekstu poprzez odnoszenie go do pytania „Dlaczego to?”, tutaj funkcjonującego na zasadzie kategorii teoretycznej łączącej w sobie koncepcje m.in. Stanleya Cavella, Carla Ginzburga czy Sharon Marcus. Posługując się filozofią języka Ludwiga Wittgensteina, badaczka wskazuje na niedobory różnych skodyfikowanych postaw krytycznych względem tekstu literackiego, które nazywa zbiorczo hermeneutyką podejrzeń. Wspólne im wszystkim jest przeświadczenie, że teksty i język w ogólności ukrywają coś za tym (pod tym), o czym mówią „bezpośrednio”; ich znaczenie dzieli się na „powierzchowne” i „głębokie”. Autorka przekonuje, że tego rodzaju założenia teoretyczne kłócą się z tym, co rzeczywiście, jako czytelnicy, robimy, czytając. Celem każdej lektury powinno być zrozumienie tekstu, a więc zrozumienie, dlaczego taki a nie inny element znajduje się w takim a nie innym miejscu tekstu, w takim a nie innym kontekście. To zaś możliwe jest tylko poprzez wnikliwe przyglądanie się temu, co tekst jawnie prezentuje czytelnikowi, nie zaś poprzez aprioryczne podważanie jego wiarygodności. Pytanie „Dlaczego to?” jest wyrazem otwartości na znaczenia komunikowane przez tekst i gotowości do wnikliwej eksploracji motywacji stojącej za elementem, który w wyniku wielu czynników zwrócił na siebie uwagę czytelniczki. Poszukując narzędzi do prezentowania świadectw takiej lektury tekstu w praktyce literaturoznawczej, Toril Moi dowartościowuje kategorię opisu. Odpowiednio skonstruowany i dociekliwy opis tekstu okazuje się zawierać w sobie odpowiedzi na najistotniejsze pytania dotyczące utworu literackiego.
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Istnieje w myśleniu religijnym punkt szczególnie krytyczny, gdy ktoś z jednej strony uważa, że świat może i powinien być analizowany wyłącznie środkami naturalistycznej nauki, a z drugiej strony dostrzega w nim obecność Boga, którego nie sposób nimi ująć. W jaki sposób można pogodzić determinizm naukowego obrazu świata oraz wiarę, że jest w nim obecny Bóg? W artykule analizuję stanowiska z dwu różnych dziedzin, które starają się stawić czoła temu problemowi. Tezy mistyczne z Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego Ludwiga Wittgensteina zestawiam z rozważaniami niemieckiego teologa Karla Rahnera. Idea, jaką można odnaleźć u obu myślicieli, jest następująca: działalność Boga, sama w sobie nadprzyrodzona, w świecie dokonuje się zawsze środkami przyrodzonymi. W tekście wskazuję na możliwe konsekwencje powyższego stanowiska oraz perspektywy, jakie ono ze sobą niesie.
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It is an especially critical moment in religious thinking when someone claims that the world can and should be analyzed solely in terms of naturalist science, and at the same time believes in the existence of God who cannot be expressed in such terms. How can the determinism of the scientific image of the world be reconciled with the religious belief in the presence of God in such a world? In my paper I present views from two different domains which try to face that problem. On the one hand, there is Ludwig Wittgenstein with his mystical theses in Tractatus logico-philosophicus and, on the other, there is the german theologian Karl Rahner. The idea that can be found in their writings is that God’s actions in the world, supernatural in themselves, are always carried out by natural means. I discuss what follows from this and what differences there are between the thinkers.
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The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology. There are many similarities and analogies between those works, and the key concept for them is the category of the inner and acknowledged importance of consideration based on basic categories of thinking about the world. The Leibnizian prospect allows for a broader look at Wittgenstein’s analysis of the relation between propositions and facts, between language and the world. Using the Hanoverian philosopher’s terminology allows for the demonstration of the ambivalence of the concept of logical form in the philosophy of Wittgenstein and also the metaphysical nature of his first book.
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Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic principles, pertaining to the methods of justification and argumentation. Relying on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concep- tual metaphor of “hinges,” researchers arrive at the conclusion that deep disagreement cannot be resolved. This conclusion leads to relativism in the theory of argumentation. The aim of the article is to show that in the situation of deep disagreement it is theoreti- cally possible to ascertain which of the positions of the participants of the argument has a better epistemic status, and hence, is argumentatively virtuous.
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Content available Wittgenstein i zagadka Anzelma
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The paper is devoted to the problem of the two paradoxes: the paradox of absolute value in Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics and the paradox of Anselm’s Name of God from the Proslogion. I try to present semantic determinants of the paradoxes as well as similarities of their structures. However, the main part of the article focuses on the solution of Anselm’s paradox given by Cora Diamond, the prominent Wittgensteinian scholar in her paper Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle. Diamond develops extensive comparison of the concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived and a series of peculiar riddles – she calls the Anselm’s concept the great riddle, since, as in other riddles presented, we cannot deal with it in a usual way. The author shows that what enables us to resolve, say, the riddle of Sphinx, is our obtaining a new way of understanding the words which compose the riddle itself, for the old way will not lead us to the proper answer. However, when it comes to the great riddle we know that we cannot obtain any way of understanding which will enable us to conceive it. This does not mean that the riddle cannot make any sense for us. We can believe that there is a solution (in fact, we have the solution – it has been given to us in the Revelation – but we cannot understand it) so we can treat the great riddle as an euqation which we lack proof but we know there is one. As Diamond calls it, we have the promissory meaning of the riddle. In my opinion the idea of the promissory meaning is an interesting solution of Anselm’s paradox, but I notice that the idea itself is conditioned by religious faith or by something I call the empathic atheism (in short: an attitude which lets atheists take the believers’ point of view).
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