Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 3

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
w słowach kluczowych:  AESTHETIC JUDGMENT
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
tom 12
nr 1
108 – 128
One of the aims of Aesthetics is to understand aesthetic experience, that of our own and that of others. Yet, the underlying question of how we can get information about other people’s aesthetic experience has not been granted enough attention. This article contributes to bridging this gap. The main argument is that by resorting to aesthetic judging, we can get information about other people’s aesthetic experience without sharing it. This article outlines how aesthetic judging works as an interface to aesthetic experience. Aesthetic judging allows us to access aesthetic experience indirectly: with it, we can get some information about aesthetic experience. Aesthetic judging thus positions us in relation to someone else’s aesthetic experience. In a nutshell, learning about aesthetic experience happens via aesthetic judging in at least three ways proposed and analysed here: “aesthetic participation”, “affective appropriation”, and “distanced aesthetic empathy”.
Pierre Bourdieu argues that in modern times, every aesthetic choice is a factor of social classification. His theory demonstrates that the judgment of taste is socially constructed and at the same time itself serves to establish social distance and hierarchy. In his analysis of kitsch, however, Tomaš Kulka posits that kitsch cannot come under the judgment of taste since, by its very definition, it is devoid of 'artistic value', which is the basis of any aesthetic judgment. From the structural point of view, argues Kulka, kitsch is not art at all. Since most miraculous images worshipped by Christians are quite different from those worshipped in museums, the applicability of the judgment of taste to so-called 'religious art' should clearly be called into question. The article quotes examples from field research to argue that the factors deemed essential for judging religious images by people who use them in their religious practice suggest that their evaluation should be based on concepts such as the Gadamerian indistinguishability or Michael Taussig's mimesis rather than on modern aesthetic values.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
tom 67
nr 5
353 – 361
Aesthetic judgments are intrinsically both subjective and normative. Asking what our aesthetic judgments are linked to leads us to the question about metaphysical commitments of the aesthetic experience. This fundamental metaphysical level opens up two basic positions: realism and non-realism. Realism claims that in our experience we face true aesthetic properties independent of our minds. Non-realistic theoretical framework presupposes an essential contribution of the recipient into the aesthetic experience insofar that it is not possible to identify work’s propositions as such. The paper argues for drawing the realistic position from the normative aspect of aesthetic judgments. It claims that normativity presupposes mind-independent actual aesthetic properties of the objects/artefacts. Subsequently, non-realistic claims are incompatible with accepting the normative character of the aesthetic experience.
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.