Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Teorie idejí Davida Huma

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Novotný Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2008

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tom 56

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nr 2

185-198

EN

The epistemological priority of consciousness in modern philosophy, starting with Descartes, brings with it a new understanding of ideas that, in contrast to the Platonic conception, become the immediate objects of the mind. This stand-point is also accepted by the line of the British empirical sensationalism that comprises Locke, Berkeley and Hume. In Locke ideas still have what might be called a representative character – they refer to assumed existences outside consciousness (real essences). Berkeley, rejecting any sort of materiality, anticipates to a degree Hume’s sceptical position where there is a conscious abandonment of any attempt to seek the origin of perceptions. Hume divides perceptions into impressions (original sense data) and ideas (which are derived from impressions as their copies). Perception works with the first; imagination and thinking with the second. In addition to impressions being primary and ideas secondary, the two kinds of perceptions differ from one another in their strength and vivacity, which are higher in impressions. This seemingly simple doctrine brings with it, however, many problems and objections. In spite of the variety of critical viewpoints, among which straightforward misunderstandings are included, most commentators agree that Hume is interested not so much in a theory as in a procedural rule (allowing the possibility of exceptions), and that Hume’s originality does not consist in this psychological foundation, which he more or less took over from his precursors, but more especially in his deep and penetrating analyses.

2

Proto-Humean Strains in Leibniz’s Analysis of Causal Relation

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Palkoska J.

Acta Comeniana (International review of Comenius studies and early modern intellectual history)

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2012

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tom 26

141-159

EN

My aim in the present paper is to challenge an established doctrine according to which Leibniz conceives of causation – in sharp contrast to Hume – in terms of a sort of the so-called hypothetical necessity, to the effect that causation involves a hypothetical necessitation a parte rei explicable in terms of purely conceptual connections. I argue that as far as one can tell from the direct textual evidence, Leibniz's concept of causation can be interpreted as coming surprisingly close to an essentially Humean view according to which far from implying any necessities a parte rei, conceptual connections impose necessity only on our thought while in reality causation involves only regularities in the conjunction of contiguous objects. Then I try to reconcile this claim with the well-documented fact that within the larger framework of Leibniz's theory of truth and his principle of suffi cient reason, Leibniz was indeed committed to a 'necessitarian' position – in the sense that every item in the actual world is, after all, a matter of hypothetical necessity in rebus (or nearly so) – and that he was prepared to integrate causes into this larger picture. My point will be that the apparent confl ict between these two views is due to our failure to distinguish the analytic task concerning causation from various explanatory tasks in which causation is involved.

3

David Hume a jeho common life

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Novotný Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2010

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tom 58

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nr 3

413-425

EN

In the past few years the philosophy of David Hume has as last begun to enjoy the high level of attention that it deserves. This undoubtedly welcome fact is, however, marred by the widespread currency of a serious misinterpretation of Hume’s conception of knowledge which arises from a trivial error in translation from English into Czech. The author of this misinterpretation has not only deepened its character, but he is now also being increasingly cited. Meanwhile the most detailed monograph on Hume in Czech, which drew attention to the error in question, has been quite overlooked. This article demonstrates, step by step, how the original error came to be made, how it has then been developed, and the effects it has subsequently had. The article also formulates a corrective viewpoint, offering arguments in its favour.

4

Je „zdravý rozum“ zdravý – a je to rozum?

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Parusniková Z.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2008

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tom 56

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nr 2

199-223

EN

The relation between the sceptical and the natural capacities, constituting the human condition, is the most fundamental problem of Hume’s epistemology. The author claims that there is a permanent dichotomy and incompatibility between these two capacities, with natural inclinations of our mind being the only constructive epistemological force. Hume’s sceptical arguments are – following Richard Popkin – analyzed in the context of the revival of the Pyrrhonian scepticism in 17th century. In this perspective, Hume develops a strategy of alternatively hiding and exposing one of these aspects, sceptical and natural, without providing any grounds for unifying them: theoretical scepticism remains wholly unmitigated and natural instincts remain totally unaffected by doubts. Hume’s sceptic is a split, schizophrenic personality, living in two distinct worlds. In this way, Hume evokes some postmodern views, especially by undermining the universal authority and the liberating mission of reason, the privileged status of philosophy, and the credibility of Grand meta-narratives.

5

Racje wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne

71%

Williams B. , Żuradzki T.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2019

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tom 67

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nr 1

231-246

PL

Artykuł, opublikowany po raz pierwszy w 1979 r., jest jednym z najczęściej cytowanych tekstów filozoficznych z drugiej połowy XX wieku. Tekst Bernarda Williamsa zainicjował kilka ważnych debat, toczących się do dziś w etyce i filozofii działania. Zaproponowana przez niego interpretacja pojęcia racji działania jest, z jednej strony, niezwykle wpływowa, ale z drugiej bardzo niejednoznaczna i często krytykowana. Williams broni stanowiska, które z czasem zaczęto określać jako internalizm racji: pewne względy są racjami działania dla danego podmiotu tylko wtedy, gdy mają ścisły związek z „subiektywnym układem motywacyjnym” tego podmiotu, czyli z jakimiś aspektami jego psychiki, charakteru, celów, pragnień, planów, relacji z innymi itd. Stwierdzenie, że ktoś ma rację, by coś zrobić (a jeśli uznajemy, że jest to racja przeważająca — to, że powinien to coś zrobić), znaczy więc wedle tego stanowiska tyle, że ten ktoś jest w stanie być motywowany, by to coś zrobić. W przeciwieństwie do tego stanowisko określane obecnie jako eksternalizm racji głosi, że pewne względy mogą być racjami działania dla danego podmiotu także wtedy, gdy odwołują się do niezależnych od jego układu motywacyjnego własności świata. Williams wychodzi od modelu działania nawiązującego do koncepcji Hume’owskiej, następnie przedstawia jego bardziej rozbudowaną wersję, omawia rolę namysłu, naturę potrzeb, a także przedstawia argument za internalizmem racji, określany jako argument z wyjaśniania działania. Głosi on, że nawet gdyby istniały zewnętrzne racje działania, niezwiązane z subiektywnym układem motywacyjnym danego podmiotu, to odwołanie się do nich nie byłoby w stanie wyjaśnić, dlaczego dany podmiot postąpił tak, a nie inaczej, gdyż „nic nie jest w stanie wyjaśnić (zamierzonych) działań podmiotu za wyjątkiem czegoś, co motywuje go działania”. Rozważania na temat tego argumentu są dla Williamsa okazją m.in. do przedstawienia własnej interpretacji głośnej tezy Davida Hume’a, głoszącej, że rozum nie może być źródłem motywacji do działania.

EN

The paper, originally published in 1979, is one of the most cited philosophical texts written in the second half of the 20th century and initiated a series of important discussions in ethics and the philosophy of action that continue to be of relevance in the present. Bernard Williams’ interpretation of the concept of internal reasons is, on the one hand, extraordinarily influential but very ambiguous and highly criticized on the other. Williams defends the view that was later termed reasons internalism: some considerations are reasons for actions for an agent only if they are closely linked with “the subjective motivational set” of an agent, i.e. with some aspects of his psyche, character, aims, desires, projects, relations with other etc. According to this view, saying that an agent has a reason to do something (or if one thinks that this is a prevailing reason — that an agent ought to do something) means that the agent could be motivated to do it. In contrast, reasons externalism claims that some considerations may be reasons for action for an agent, even if they refer to some things independent of his motivation set. Williams starts with the simplified Humean model of motivation, then builds on it a more adequate model, he discusses the role of deliberation, the nature of needs, and then he presents an argument for reasons internalism. The argument from explanation claims that even if there existed external reasons for action unconnected with a subjective motivation set of an agent, appealing to them could not explain why an agent acts in such a way, because “nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act.” The discussion around this argument gives Williams the opportunity to present his own interpretation of the well-known thesis by David Hume that reason cannot give rise to a motivation for action.

6

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma:

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Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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tom 68

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nr 4

623-633

EN

The study examines Zuzana Parusniková’s book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume’s philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume’s concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume’s view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova’s interpretation of abstruse philosophy.

CS

Text studie analyzuje knihu Zuzany Parsunikové David Hume, Sceptic, jež klade filosofii Davida Huma do rozporu mezi radikální skepsí plynoucí z reflexe lidského poznání a přirozenou vírou, jejíž genezi nedokáží skeptické pochybnosti narušit. Hume přijímá radikální skepsi i meze, které stanovuje lidskému rozumu. Praktikovatelná filosofie se však musí podřídit víře ve společný svět a prospěšně zkoumat principy lidského jednání a soužití ve společensko-morální oblasti. Vposledu se filosofie stává návodem ke šťastnému životu. Ve své druhé části zde předkládaná studie využívá Humovu koncepci lásky k pravdě, aby ukázala hlubší souvislost mezi funkcemi filosofie u Huma, a na základě výkladu Humova pojetí vztahu obtížné a snadné filosofie kritizuje autorčin výklad epistemologické funkce obtížné filosofie.

7

Lék na zlořády stranictví: Humův vliv na Madisonův "List federalistů č. 10"

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Rádková A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2021

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tom 69

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nr 4

777-794

EN

According to Douglass Greybill Adair’s influential interpretation, when James Madison was formulating his famous theses on the benefits of a large republic, he was influenced by his reading of David Hume’s essays. However, as far back as the 1980s, Edmund Morgan sharply criticized Adair, claiming that Madison had only been inspired by his political career and not by the reading of theoretical works. In addition, Morgan attempted to show that Hume’s and Madison’s theories of partisanship only give the appearance of being similar, while in reality they contradict one another. The intent of this article is to show that Morgan’s much discussed critique is based on a misleading interpretation of Hume’s theory, and that Madison truly found inspiration in his reading of the philosopher’s works. By analyzing not just Hume’s essays but other of his writings, the author also proves that this influence on Madison is much greater than the traditional interpretive literature has taken into account.

CS

Podle vlivné intepretace Douglasse Greybilla Adaira byl James Madison při formulování svých slavných tezí o výhodách velké republiky ovlivněn četbou esejů Davida Huma. Adairovy názory však podrobil již v 80. letech minulého století ostré kritice Edmund Morgan, který tvrdil, že se Madison inspiroval pouze svou politickou kariérou, a nikoliv četbou teoretizujících knih. Navíc se Morgan pokusil dokázat, že teorie stranictví jsou u Huma a Madisona podobné jen zdánlivě, ve skutečnosti si však protiřečí. Záměrem předkládaného článku je ukázat, že Morganova hojně diskutovaná kritika je založena na zavádějící interpretaci Humovy teorie a že Madison skutečně našel inspiraci v četbě jeho děl. Analýzou dalších Humových spisů, nejen esejů, autorka navíc dokazuje, že je tento vliv mnohem větší, než je zohledňováno v tradiční interpretační literatuře.

8

"Zrcadlo přírody" a druhých u Davida Huma:

71%

Hanzal T.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2020

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tom 68

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nr 5

697-715

EN

The article interprets Hume’s theory of association of ideas, primarily with respect to resemblance as one of the principles of association and to general ideas (or concepts) as a principal consequence of association. On the basis of this interpretation, the author argues that Hume’s conception of resemblance and general terms is not conditioned by the acceptance of the so-called “myth of the given”. As a result of accepting this assumption, however, new questions arise; in particular, why is it that just those general concepts arise that in fact arise and how are they intersubjectively shared. These questions lead to the need to supplement the image of the mind as a “mirror of nature” from the beginning of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, with the image of the mind as a “mirror of others” from book II.

CS

Článek interpretuje Humovu teorii asociace idejí především se zřetelem k podobnosti jako jednomu z principů asociace a k obecným idejím (či pojmům) jako zásadnímu produktu asociace. Na základě této interpretace autor tvrdí, že Humovo pojetí podobnosti a obecných termínů není podmíněno přijetím tzv. „mýtu daného“. V důsledku přijetí tohoto předpokladu však vyvstávají nové otázky, zejména proč asociací vznikají zrovna ty obecné pojmy, které reálně vznikají, a jak dochází k jejich intersubjektivnímu sdílení. Tyto otázky vedou k nutnosti doplnit obrázek mysli jako „zrcadla přírody“ ze začátku první knihy Humova Pojednání o lidské přirozenosti obrázkem mysli jako „zrcadla druhých“ z jeho druhé knihy.

9

David Hume a logika soudů vkusu

70%

Dadejík O.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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tom 65

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nr 2

275-296

EN

David Hume‘s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” remains a source of interpretational controversy to this day. On the one hand, Hume’s conception is meant to have reduced the evaluation of beauty to a merely passive reaction to a certain impulse; on the other hand, he is treated as anticipating Kant’s aesthetic theory. The main aim of this study is to present the principal points of these controversies and to present a case for the view that Hume was capable of (1) not only perceiving an original philosophical problem, but also (2) of presenting an effective treatment, anticipating important motifs of contemporary aesthetics. In the first and second parts, the introductory passages of the essay are examined, in which Hume surveys the initial contradiction between the proverbial absence of agreement in matters of taste and, at the same time, its manifest presence. The contradiction is revealed to be the point of departure for reflections, and not as itself a problem into which Hume has been led into by his own assumptions. In the third part, the study returns to the beginnings of the interpretational controversy, so as to sketch the basic characteristics of a critical approach, and in the fourth part the ground-plan of an interpretation is presented which defends the possibility of a positive reading and finds in Hume’s essay an effective conception of critical practice.

10

Czy Bóg jest moralnie obojętny? Problem wynikania według Davida Hume'a

70%

Jakubiak M.

Diametros

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2018

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nr 58

34-48

PL

Celem artykułu jest ustalenie, jakie stanowisko w kwestii dobroci Boga zajmuje David Hume w Dialogach o religii naturalnej. Omawiam przede wszystkim problem wynikania i związane z nim argumenty dotyczące relacji dobra do zła oraz cztery okoliczności występowania zła w świecie. Na zakończenie poddaję analizie hipotezę moralnej obojętności jako sceptyczny głos Hume’a w debacie nad możliwością wykazania moralnych atrybutów Boga na podstawie doświadczenia.

EN

The article is devoted to an analysis of David Hume’s position on God’s benevolence in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. The focal point is the problem of inference and the accompanying arguments concerning the relations between good and evil, as well as the four circumstances in which evil enters the world. In the conclusion, I discuss the hypothesis of moral indifference as Hume’s skeptical voice in the debate on the possibility of inferring the moral attributes of God on the basis of experience.

11

Hume's Humanity and the Protection of the Vulnerable

70%

Zagorac I.

Diametros

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2015

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nr Diametros 44

189-203

EN

It is well known that Hume excluded inferior rational beings, who are incapable of resistance and weak resentment, from his concept of justice. This resulted in a critique of Hume’s theory of justice, as it would not protect those who were the most vulnerable against ill treatment. The typical answer to this critique is that Hume excluded inferior rational beings from the concept of justice, but not from that of morality, and that he considered their protection to be the task of humanity. The subject of this text is the range of Hume’s humanity. What manner of protection does Hume’s humanity truly offer? Despite the conclusion that this manner of protection of the vulnerable is insufficient, Hume’s humanity contains valuable characteristics worthy of re-evaluation in modern debate — both on the limits of humanity and on the conditions and models of protecting the vulnerable.

12

Hume on Church Establishments, Secular Politics and History

70%

Szymkowiak A.

Diametros

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2017

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nr 54

95-117

EN

In the third volume of the History of England, David Hume considers the political ramifications of the Protestant reformation with a “Digression concerning the ecclesiastical state.” He advocates the establishment of a state church, believing it will dampen religious “enthusiasm” in the polity. Unlike later secularization theorists, Hume assumes an intractable basis for religion in the human passions. Tensions in Hume’s “cooptation” strategy are evident from Adam Smith’s famous attack upon it in section five of The Wealth of Nations, and in Hume’s own treatment of seventeenth century independency in the fifth volume of the History. Smith argues that public competition among sects facilitates political moderation. In History V Hume stresses the positive role of enthusiasm in fostering civil liberty. This article traces Hume’s indecision to his “external” mode of moral and historical analysis, arguing that a secular policy on religion cannot proceed fruitfully without engaging the theological particulars of the religions at issue.

13

Hume proti náboženství

70%

Tvrdý F.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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tom 65

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nr 2

207-220

EN

David Hume gave more attention to no subject – except for the history of England – than religion. As is usual with Hume’s philosophical legacy, however, his theory of religion has been subject to a wide range of interpretations, many of which are straightforwardly contradictory – and it is just those which are the focus of the first part of my article. There have, after all, been attempts to present Hume as a theist, fideist, deist, agnostic and atheist. In the second part I will defend the claim that any attempt to categorise Hume according to a single, allegedly true, interpretation, is groundless because every such attempt comes up against insurmountable terminological disputes, interpretational difficulties and doubt concerning argumentation. We do not, however, have to concern ourselves as to what Hume actually thought about religion, or what kind of believer or non-believer he took himself to be. A much more fruitful approach is to understand how Hume’s conception anticipates and enriches contemporary atheology. In the third part I will therefore present textual proof from the primary sources to show how Hume offered a critique of revealed and natural religion, of moral and psychological aspects of religiosity. By way of conclusion, I will reflect on Hume’s conception of “true religion” and its application in secular society.

14

Hume o nutnosti, svobodě a odpovědnosti

70%

Marvan T.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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tom 65

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nr 2

221-235

EN

The paper presents a reconstruction of Hume’s complex argument that takes determinism as a prerequisite for moral evaluation of actions and for the attribution of moral and criminal responsibility for an act. The paper falls into three sections. The first outlines Hume’s “doctrine of necessity”, i. e., his deterministic theory of action, and shows how determinism can be reconciled with the possibility of free action. The second section focuses on Hume’s view of moral judgement and explains how determinism and the denial of free will can be reconciled with the notion of moral responsibility for an act. The last section, devoted to Hume’s ideas about just punishment, canvasses Hume’s hybrid conception of the different purposes of punishment.

15

Příběh Humova příběhu

70%

Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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tom 65

|

nr 2

183-197

EN

The text is an interpretation of, and a commentary on, Hume’s self-presentation given in his autobiography, My Own Life, which he wrote shortly before his death. In the first section, the discussion aims at pointing out a hidden biographical and contemporary background, including the events of Hume’s life suppressed from the autobiography (the unsuccessful attempts to gain a professorship, Hume’s dispute with Rousseau). Some reactions to Hume’s death are also discussed. In the final section, the self-image offered by Hume is discussed in relation to the interpretation of the standpoint and style in the work of man of letters in the 18th century as advanced by James Harris and Lorrain Daston. The result of this analysis is to show that the question of Hume’s vanity is to a large degree an artificial problem arising from a misunderstanding of the context to which Hume, as a man of letters, belonged.

16

Against Psychological Atomism

70%

Slote M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2022

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nr 1

249-263

EN

Total permissiveness can be captured by the phrase “anything goes.” Psychological atomism can be informally characterized by the idea that in the mind anything goes with anything. There is a strong tendency toward such thinking in Western philosophical thought—both in classical antiquity and during and since the Enlightenment. Perhaps the two most important philosophers of the Enlightenment, Hume and Kant, accepted more or less limited forms of atomism, and I shall explain in what follows in the main text and footnotes, why and how I think their atomism goes astray. Since much of Western philosophy since the Enlightenment to some extent bears its imprint, we shall also be seeing some recent examples of ill-conceived atomism. However, and despite the main themes of the present volume, I shall go well beyond the task of dealing with themes in Enlightenment thinking. In fact, I shall be relying on some unfamiliar aspects of Chinese thought to correct quite generally what I take to be erroneous atomistic thinking.

17

Naturalizm, antynaturalizm i metaetyka

61%

Woleński J.

Folia Philosophica

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2011

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tom 29

241-256

EN

The paper deals with dispute between naturalism and antinaturalism in meta-ethics. Different standpoints are discussed, especially those of cognitivism, non-cognitivism and emotivism, which leads to certain typology. The author introduces the category of bonitive statements, statements concerning the good, which logic is analogous to the one which determinates relations between deontic statemens. Generalized Hume’s argument on the axiological statements as impossible to be derived from non-axiological is concerned. In particular, it is argued that it does not support antinaturalistic thesis. The standpoint of axiological presentationism is proposed, which makes a link between non-cognitivism and the thesis according to which bonitive statements can be true or false and axiological presentationism can taken as a form of naturalism.

DE

Das Thema des Artikels ist der Streit zwischen dem Naturalismus und Antinaturalismus im Bereich der Metaethik. Der Verfasser bespricht verschiedene metaethische Anschauungen und insbesondere den Kognitivismus, Non-Kognitivismus und Emotivismus, was zu einer bestimmten Typologie der Anschauungen führt. Es wird hier eine Kategorie der bonitiven (vom Gute handelnden) Sätze angewandt, deren Logik zu der die Wechselbeziehung zwischen deontischen Sätzen bestimmenden Logik analog ist. Der Verfasser erörtert das verallgemeinerte Argument von Hume, dass axiologische Sätze aus nicht-axiologischen Sätzen nicht folgen. Seiner Meinung nach ist das kein Argument für den Antinaturalismus, deshalb schlägt er vor, den Standpunkt des axiologischen Präsentationismus anzunehmen, der den Non-Kognitivismus mit der These verbindet, dass bonitive Sätze entweder richtig oder falsch werden können, und der als Naturalismus interpretiert werden kann.

18

„Otvorený vesmír“ ako podmienka možnosti slobody podľa K. R. Poppera

61%

Karaba M.

Studia Bobolanum

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2020

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tom 31

|

nr 1

233-251

PL

Analizując problem wolności i wolnej woli, Popper dostrzegał, że w celu zrozumienia racjonalnego ludzkiego postępowania potrzeba czegoś, co będzie pośrodku między czystym przypadkiem a absolutnym determinizmem. W artykule autor wykazuje, że Popper nie wnosi nowych treści, które wyjaśniałyby problem ludzkiej wolności. Argumenty Poppera to są czyste założenia, dzięki którym pragnie on niejako oddalić trudny do rozwiązania problem. Otwartość w sobie natury otaczającego nas świata ukazuje również, że nie jest on kompletnie zdeterminowany swoimi wewnętrznymi prawami czy przyczynami. W świecie bytów rozumnych mogą zaistnieć zjawiska mające wpływ na nasze postępowanie i determinować nas mentalnie nawet wtedy, kiedy fizycznie jesteśmy wolni od przymusu. Wydaje się, że Popper wypowiada się za indeterminizmem, gdyż dostrzega w tym możliwość wykazania ludzkiej wolności. Jednak taki argument nie ma żadnych podstaw, a jedynie przeświadczenie, że bez prawdziwie wolnych decyzji ludzka egzystencja byłaby tragiczną farsą. I tak, w obronie ludzkiej wolności, Popper powraca ostatecznie do racji moralnych.

EN

In analysing the problem of freedom and free will, Popper concluded that we need something in order to understand rational human behaviour that is by its very nature between total chance and complete determinism. In this article, we state that Popper has in fact not produced any evidence in favour of human freedom. Rather, his arguments are based on an attempt to avert a situation which he finds unacceptable. The openness of the physical world involves only that this world is not entirely determined by its own laws or causes. In the world of mental entities, however, there may be certain phenomena that affect our behaviour, so even though we are not physically determined, we could be mentally determined. Popper’s effort to promote indeterminism and the consequent possibility of human freedom do not seem to be based on evidence, but rather on the belief that without freedom of choice our situation would be merely a tragic farce. That is why Popper ultimately turns to moral motives in his defence of human freedom.

19

Of British Representational Practices in the Age of Capitalism/Territorialism (1743-1776)

60%

Kobialka M.

Pamiętnik Teatralny

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2021

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nr 4(279)

41-59

EN

The issue addressed in this essay is how the notion of history was altered by the embedding of commerce into the discursive field of eighteenth-century Britain. Even though current eighteenth-century, and Enlightenment, studies draw attention to historiographic questions challenging traditional modes of periodization, the methods by which we acquire and organize knowledge, or the extent to which accounts of the eighteenth century have been driven by the imperatives of the times, this project argues that one historiographic issue that has been significantly underplayed is a different concept of history produced in eighteenth-century Britain by the fundamental operation of mercantile society, its logic of exchange, and the predominance of trade within it. David Hume and Adam Smith’s historiographic trajectory was obscured (and, ultimately, eliminated) by the scientific or materialist notion of history advanced in nineteenth-century historiography.

20

Empirismus, naturalismus a ideje

60%

Hříbek T.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2017

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tom 65

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nr 2

297-315

EN

The author analyses the modern reception of key themes in Hume’s philosophy during the past century. The first part presents Hume’s version of three such themes – empiricism, naturalism and the theory of ideas. The following three parts give an exposition of modern forms of each of these themes, with the choice of modern reception being directed to those contemporary authors who not only developed Hume’s motifs in the most original way, but who also explicitly traced the origin of their modern theory to Hume. For this reason, in the second part, which deals with the reception of empiricism in logical positivism, Hans Reichenbach and his treatment of Hume’s problem of inductive knowledge is discussed. In the third part, dealing with naturalism, the obvious choice is the most influential version of this doctrine in the work of W. V. O. Quine. The fourth part deals with the modern reception of Hume’s theory of ideas in a recent monograph by Jerry Fodor. The author considers Hume’s naturalism as the most live part of Hume’s legacy. Empirismus has, after all, been considerably transformed in content, or has even been rejected by later philosophers; while Fodor’s updating of the theory of ideas does not offer an adequate answer to the question of the place of thinking and intentionality in the material world.