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EN
This paper addresses the relation between the need for cognition and rationality in decision-making and also reconsiders the relation between need for cognition and the framing effect using modified versions of the Asian disease task. In the first study (N = 205), a significant and positive relationship was obtained between need for cognition and the rationality of decision-makers. Also a negative and significant relationship was obtained between need for cognition and indecisiveness. These findings are consistent with the theoretical propositions hypothesized in the need for cognition theory (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The second study (N = 462) is an in-depth analysis of the relation between the need for cognition and the framing effect, revealing a positive and significant relation between need for cognition and the respondents' preference for the probabilistic framed alternatives in two risky choice framing effect tasks.
Studia Psychologica
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2013
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tom 55
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nr 2
123 – 138
EN
The article uncovers the role of aging of monetary saving proposition in its topical mental accounting. The monetary saving propositions were formulated from the first- and the third-person perspective to investigate whether a self-other discrepancy impacts on an aging of saving proposition. Also, the absolute and relative amount of monetary saving was varied in two stages (high vs. low), and two dates of the beginning of a sell-out were applied (past and present). The discrepancy between aging of propositions formulated from the first and the third person perspectives appears to have a different impact on the high and low relative monetary savings, which seems to be almost opposite. A high relative saving proposition ages quicker than a low relative one, but only when it is formulated from the first person perspective. When a saving proposition is formulated from a third-person perspective, aging runs quicker for low relative saving, and a high relative saving proposition seems to age slower. Correspondingly, the framing effect is modulated by two factors: 1) aging of monetary saving proposition and 2) personal perspective in formulation of saving proposition.
EN
Risk taking behavior was studied in a field experiment, where, unlike experiments in laboratory settings, subjects had to make real decisions, gain or loose real stakes. In real situations, not only the few factors chosen by the researcher influence risk taking behavior, but also a number of interdependent constituent effects. This research investigated the impact of the positive or negative framing, the available resources, the aspiration levels, and the risk taking propensity of the individual in a real situation. A second experiment was run in a laboratory to control for the difference in the two approaches. It was found that people take much smaller risk in real situations where they have to face real consequences. In real situations, when subjects get close to the survival point, they do not engage in extreme risk taking strategies, such as complete avoidance or extreme risk taking. This result contradicts the findings of research undertaken in laboratory settings. In this study the amount of the previously accumulated resources seems to be the most important determinant of risk taking behavior. Subjects with limited resources perceived the situation as riskier, experienced more serious uncertainty, and lowered their aspiration level. Our results contradicted the prediction of prospect theory which indicates risk avoidance in a positively framed (gaining), and risk avoidance in a negatively framed (loosing) situation. Our subjects radically reduced their willingness to take risks in the negative frame both in the real and the hypothetical situations.
Studia Psychologica
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2014
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tom 56
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nr 4
253 – 265
EN
The research study reveals a subjective readiness to wait for an advertised monetary savings presented from the first- and third-person perspectives. The properties of simple waiting were studied in relation to the personal perspective on savings proposition and the level of monetary savings. Findings for the first-person perspective replicate our previous results, the propositions in the present time mode with high and low relative savings have high preference and lead to the framing effect, similar to the one described by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). When they are formulated in the future time, both of them loose their attractiveness because of the need of waiting. Unlike savings propositions formulated in the present time mode from the third person perspective, in this case the classical framing effect is eliminated. When the tasks are formulated from the third person perspective with a savings proposition in the future, a pronounced framing effect was found. This result is attributed to the differential impact of waiting time on the propositions with different levels of relative savings. The discrepancy found by this study is the key property of the differentiation between the first- and the third-person perspectives in terms of waiting for a savings proposition made in the future.
EN
The present study deals with temporal processes which are essential for decision making in topical mental account (Thaler, 1999). The experiment focuses on temporal processes (zero-probability barrier and aging of proposition) in future time mode. It was found that the decision outcome is sensitive to both of the above. The results revealed a classical framing effect (Kahneman, Tversky, 1984) for the present and future time modes. The elimination of the framing effect for the past time mode (Polunin, 2009) was replicated and it was also found for the future time mode when aging predefines a decision outcome. The current results and the temporal processes described earlier (Polunin, 2009) provide the reasoning for an introduction of multiple temporal processes influencing a decision outcome in topical mental account.
EN
The present study examines the role of the temporal dimension of mental topical account. Based on J.J. Freyd's (1987) assumption about the temporal dimension of a mental representation a temporal variable was introduced into a topical account paradigm (Tversky, Kahneman, 1981). The temporal variable includes the time mode (past, present and future) and the temporal distance. A study has been made of the sensitivity of mental accounting to manipulations of its temporal parameters. The classical framing effect (Kahneman, Tversky, 1984) was found for the present and future time modes. For the past time mode a complete elimination and even inversion of framing effect appear. Depending on the time mode there are different temporal processes influencing mental topical account. In the future time mode topical account is influenced by the inhibiting 'zero-probability barrier'. Two other temporal processes predefine topical account in the past time mode: a) aging of a proposition of a price reduction and b) the past openness, which extends the relevance of a proposition from the past up to the present time moment.
Studia Psychologica
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2011
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tom 53
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nr 4
327 – 338
EN
The present study deals with the framing effect in topical mental account (Tversky, Kahneman, 1981) and with factors of its elimination. The elimination of the framing effect was described earlier (Polunin, 2009) and explained by the influence of two temporal processes (aging of proposition and past openness). The question raised in this study is whether different velocity of proposition aging can be sufficient to eliminate the framing effect. It was assumed that aging of proposition depends upon two factors: the absolute and the relative level of savings proposition. Two levels of absolute and relative monetary savings were introduced as variables in the experiment. Their influence on aging of proposition and finally on the framing effect was examined. The results confirmed the classical framing effect (Kahneman, Tversky, 1984) for the tasks with the savings proposition beginning in the present time mode. The complete elimination of the framing effect was replicated for tasks with the savings proposition beginning in the past time mode (Polunin, 2009). As a new finding, it was shown that an absolute and a relative amount of monetary savings oppositely influence the aging of proposition. Furthermore, the amount of relative price reduction (monetary savings) causes an essential difference in the velocity of aging, which alone could be sufficient for the explanation of the complete elimination of the framing effect.
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