Since 1999 studies are conducted of specific form of corruption known as 'state capture'. This term refers to a situation in which individual agents and groups of interests are seeking to shape and affect the process of formulating regulations to their advantage through illicit and non-transparent means. In other words, state capture is an attempt of a group of interest to change institutionalized rules of the market game in a way favorable for them in order to gain political rents. This paper is a reconstruction of economic studies on phenomenon of state capture. The first part of paper is devoted to presentation of state capture in context of other forms of corruption. It focuses mainly on series of survey studies known as Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by World Bank and EBRD. The second part of the paper is a critical analysis of state capture conception and methodology. The text points out limitations of economical research procedures in domain of corruption analysis. Methodological difficulties and restrictions of conception of state capture are discussed on an example of chosen political affair - Buchacz Triangle. The paper ends with sociological reinterpretation of conception of state capture.