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The author reconstructs and estimates the William James' attitude to classical conception of truth. James considers some epistemological and ontological problems conntected with the classical theory of truth, and comes to a conclusion that the theory of truth must be epistemic by theory of rational acceptance. But in his pragmatic theory of truth James keeps some intuitions linked with the classical conception. First, classical formula is a starting point of the pragmatist's consideration. Second, in the case of knowledge by acquaintance Jemes uses the meaning of truth as a correspondence. And third, the truths in classical meaning are regarded as asymptotes, to which all human beliefs come.
In this article the author deals with the admissibility of ad hominem argumentation. Firstly, he presents logical and pragmatic reasons why ad hominem argumentation is considered to be fallacious. Secondly, he proposes that in some instances the use of ad hominem arguments is justifiable. The author grounds this claim on the observation that people in their everyday reasoning practice usually distinguish between right and wrong use of these arguments. Subsequently he proceeds to analyse briefly what factors have impact on the admissibility of ad hominem. Finally, he applies the results of my analysis to the problem of objecting the judicial bias. His main conclusion is that if we want to analyse ad hominem argumentation thoroughly we need to separate its description from its evaluation and consequently when delimiting this argument we should avoid mentioning that it is necessary fallacious.
In the paper, the author addresses the situation of the classical theory of truth and of the postulate of rationality of procedures of justification after the discovery of quantum of action, creation of quantum mechanics an its Copenhagen interpretation. He shows, that this interpretation undermines general significance of the classical theory of truth as well as of the postulate of rationality of procedures of justification.
The paper tries to offer an overall pragmatic perspective on the concepts 'knowledge', 'truth', and 'reality'. The perspective should also pick out the so-called metaphysics of 'true world' and show that the metaphysics is created by a long historical, and that's why unnecessary, tradition. This arbitrary tradition is a reason for popularity of the correspondence theory of truth, in spite of the fact that nobody can explain what 'correspondence' means exactly. The author contrasts this metaphysics with the pragmatic metaphysics of 'un-demarcation of organism and environment'. In the pragmatic terms, one truth is defined as a function of language, and hence as a function of the life.
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