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ARS
|
2023
|
tom 56
|
nr 1
63-71
EN
The paper analyses mutual relationships between three processes from the title on the example of three paintings by Slovak painter Rastislav Podoba. The analysis of the painting Observation from 2011 leads to the need for a deeper examination of the character of relations between observation, painting, and interpretation. The central problem is the problem of observation which leads to questioning the place and the role of theoretical reflection in the creation, experience, and perception of the work of art. The standard philosophical approach to interpreting as an ascription of meaning is questioned. Finally, the paper proposes a different approach to interpretation that could better explain running processes in analysed works.
EN
The essay outlines a non-substantialist ontological conception of the work of art, which should grasp the process-like nature of the works of visual art. This process-like ontological model of the work of art draws on following conceptions: (a) the conception of the work of art as an experience in J. Dewey; (b) the conception of the virtual and actual existences as developed in informatics; (c) the conception of a semantic gesture of Jan Mukarovsky. In this conception the work of art is seen as a product created by the author/authors together with the viewer/viewers, as an experience, which could be shared inter-subjectively. The whole process is controlled by the semantic gesture, which is unique in each work of art, and which is our guide in actual experience.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
|
tom 76
|
nr 8
608 – 623
EN
Philosophical conceptions of representation developed by Nelson Goodman and Charles Sanders Peirce come from different metaphysical positions (Goodman’s nominalism and Peirce’s realism). This fact causes serious problems when comparing both conceptions and often results in inaccuracies or oversimplifications. The aim of this paper is to find a framework for the comparison of the two conceptions of representation and consider their possible role in understanding representation as a source of knowledge. The first and the second part of the paper shortly introduce Peirce’s and Goodman’s conceptions of representation. Subsequently, a comparison of these conceptions is proposed in the context of limits of our representations. The limits of representations are suggested as a basis for further comparison without the need to reject one of the conceptions. The conclusion outlines some consequences of this approach for the analysis of representations as a source of knowledge.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
|
tom 73
|
nr 8
647 – 659
EN
This article analyses the epistemological status of work of art. It starts with two propositions. The first one is an ontological proposition: (1) “Something new emerges in the creation of a work of art”. The second proposition is: (2) “A work of art can be the result / means of research and brings knowledge”. At first sight, the two theses contradict each other. If we understand the work of art as the result of research (2), we are expecting that it is a representation of reality independent of that work. However, if the work of art creates reality (1), then we are dealing with ontological constructivism where we do not distinguish between reality and its representation. The paper suggests the perspective within which we can answer the question in what sense art may bring us knowledge (2) and maintain the proposition (1) at the same time.
EN
Cognitive overlap between art and science can be found in the processes of the learning through experience. What necessarily needs to be present in these processes are not good reasons in favour of what is known or learnt, but the following features: The first feature of art and science have in common the negativity of learning processes: What a cognizer C learns through experience is that his/her theories, expectations, attitudes, trials, etc. are wrong and should be abandoned in order to advance. This leads us to the second common feature of art and science: if C is to make mistake, and thus to learn through experience, he/she must create (produce, invent, etc.) something in advance. It is further argued that C learns through experience due to causal relations between the environment (including other cognizers as well as cultural context) and his/her sensations and beliefs. This cannot be accomplished, however, if C is not aware of the notion of objective truth. Empirical knowledge is social and public, yet its truth is not reducible to social agreement. More could be learnt about the learning through experience in art and science, if anyone showed that some of the features or relations proposed in this paper are not necessary for learning.
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