The study aims to verify the level of conspiracy beliefs and the relationship of conspiracy beliefs with the conspiracy mentality and analytic cognitive style. A total of 470 participants (49.4% women) aged 18-73 years old (M = 42.35; SD = 13.12) participated in the study. They completed the Slovak Conspiracy Belief Scale, the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, the Cognitive Reflection Test, the Jellybean Task, the Rational-Experiential Inventory, and the Master Rationality Motive Scale. Conspiracy beliefs were at the midpoint level, and the beliefs that participants most trusted were identified. Although conspiracy beliefs correlated negatively with cognitive reflection, denominator neglect and motivation for rational integration and positively with conspiracy mentality and preference for experiential thinking, only conspiracy mentality, cognitive reflection and motivation for rational integration were significant predictors of conspiracy beliefs.
Relatively little is known about actual cognitive skills and thinking dispositions of teachers, despite their possible importance. In the current paper we examined two predictions related to rational performance of teachers. First, we expected that more experienced teachers have more rational thinking dispositions, are more cognitively reflective and discount the future less in comparison to novice teachers. Second, we expected that cognitive reflection is related to options involving more patience. 109 novice teachers (undergraduate students) and 55 experienced teachers participated in the study. Thinking dispositions were measured by Rational-Experiential Inventory, cognitive reflection was measured by CRT, to measure future discounting we used intertemporal choice tasks and Consideration for Future Consequences questionnaire. We found that teachers differed significantly from undergraduate students in CRT and all subscales of these measures in the expected direction, with the exception of CFC-Immediate and REI-Experiential Engagement, but we found no significant differences between teachers and students (with one exception) on intertemporal choice tasks. The results also confirmed the expected relationships between CRT, CFC and REI. These results pose some important implications for educating future teachers.
In some circumstances, the social visibility of a person we interact with can distort our evaluations and predictions by inducing people to overestimate the value of choices that included renowned individuals. Individuals who show a propensity for cognitive reflection have been shown to be less susceptible to biases in reasoning and decision-making, and therefore they should be less influenced by overestimation of choices that include renowned individuals. To test such a hypothesis, the Cognitive Reflection Test and a decision task that included a choice to interact with a renowned individual were administered. Results demonstrated that participants who had a greater ability to implement cognitive reflection were less influenced by celebrity status. Findings support the idea that cognitive reflection is associated with a reduction of decision-making bias associated with social status.
Prompting mental simulation with a counterfactual scenario has been found to enhance rationality in individuals and groups. Building upon previous findings and the dual-process accounts of reasoning, we hypothesized that de biasing power of mental simulation lies in inhibiting System 1 and facilitating System 2 responses. Therefore, we examined whether counterfactual priming mitigates biased reasoning via changes in cognitive reflection. Each participant of our between-subject experiment (N = 462) solved two out of three tasks on biased reasoning: one before and one after being exposed to the counterfactual scenario. The tasks were designed to elicit selectively seeking hypothesis-confirming evidence, ignoring alternative explanations, and unwillingness to reconsider the default option. In addition, the participants completed two sets of cognitive reflection problems at the beginning and at the end of the experiment. Mental simulation reduced people’s tendencies to ignore alternative explanations and hypothesis-disconfirming evidence, and the latter effect was mediated by intuition inhibition.
In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that correct responders are at a metacognitive advantage compared to intuitively incorrect responders because they are aware that there exists an appealing but incorrect response that many would fall for. A total of 169 participants solved three CRT tasks, followed by questions about the perceived difficulty of the tasks and the most probable incorrect response that others gave. The results mainly confirmed the hypothesis: the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants gave, the more they were correct about the most prevalent incorrect responses of others. Furthermore, the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants had, the more difficult they found the tasks to be, perhaps due to the awareness of the incorrect but appealing response that would trick many others into giving a wrong response. Interestingly, the number of nonsensical responses (those neither correct nor intuitive) was positively related both to awareness of appealing incorrect responses and to the perceived difficulty of the task. This indicates that even those participants who seemingly gave nonsensical responses to CRT tasks might have a metacognitive advantage over intuitively incorrect responders. We discuss how our results fit into contemporary dual-process theories.
The cognitive reflection test (CRT) has been popular because it has demonstrated a good predictive validity of a variety of biases in judgment and decision making. Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) further developed a second version of the cognitive reflection test, CRT-2. Although CRT-2 has been found to be associated with several biases in judgment and decision making, its relationship with intertemporal choice remains unclear. Previous studies have shown that intertemporal choice characterizes the competition between intuition and reflection, and can be predicted by the original CRT. To further validate CRT-2, the present study tests the relationship between CRT-2 and intertemporal choice. The study finds that better performance on CRT-2 is significantly associated with fewer impulsive intertemporal choices in both gain and payment conditions. Moreover, impulsive choices are related to intuitive errors but not non intuitive errors generated from CRT-2. The study suggests that CRT-2 provides some more items for researchers to select to characterize individual differences in thinking style and judgment and decision making.
Following the growing body of evidence suggesting that substantial individual differences in reasoning exist already at the early stages of the reasoning process and that reasoners might be able to produce logical intuitions, the model of mindware automatization posits that the mindware acquired to the extent that it is fully automatized can cue the logically correct type 1 response. We asked 908 participants to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test presented under the two-response paradigm, to obtain both intuitive and analytical response, while measuring mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These variables explained approximately 10% of the variance in the accuracy of intuitive answers. We also observed that in more than half of the cases when the response was correct in the final response stage, it was already correct at the initial response stage. These results are in line with the theoretical model of mindware automatization to a large extent and raise a question about the main attribute of the Cognitive Reflection Test – the ability to measure the tendency to override a misleading intuitive answer.
The facilitative effect of natural frequencies in Bayesian reasoning task is a robust phenomenon. However, it does not benefit everyone the same way and the reasons why remain open. This paper examines to what extent numeracy and cognitive reflection can account for individual differences in Bayesian task performance. Our results showed that participants with good numerical ability and cognitive reflection performed better than participant with lower numerical ability and cognitive reflection. Furthermore, mediation analysis showed that numeracy does not mediate the effect of cognitive reflection on Bayesian performance. The role of numeracy in performance was clarified and cognitive reflection was identified as a new determinant of Bayesian performance. Numeracy and cognitive reflection account for the individual differences of the facilitative effect of the natural frequencies in the process of belief revision. These findings have implications for the debate on the nature of the facilitation effect and for improving communication of risk, such as informed consent concerning treatment.