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Filozofia Nauki
|
2015
|
tom 23
|
nr 1
5-26
PL
The paper clarifies the role of idealizations in the formulation of scientific laws and scientific explanations. It starts with a differentiation between idealization, ab-straction, and ceteris paribus clauses. Next, it provides a differentiated typology of idealizations and shows how the various types of idealization can be made more precise by approaching them from the point of view of their role and place in scientific laws and scientific explanations. Then it provides a model for such laws and explan¬ations which corresponds to the practice of empirical sciences. Based on this, it dispels the myth that the “end”-point of explanations in terms of idealized laws should be factual laws in the sense assigned to them by logical empiricists. Finally, it delin¬eates the inner boundaries beyond which the model cannot be applied any more as a tool for the analysis and explication of idealizations as they occur in scientific laws and explanations in empirical sciences.
2
100%
Filozofia Nauki
|
2019
|
tom 27
|
nr 2
17-37
PL
The paper reconstructs the methods used by Schrödinger in the construction of wave mechanics as given in his four Mitteilungen. These methods are described from the point of view of modern philosophy of science, with a focus on the relationships between scientific theories and on the reconstruction of the structure of scientific laws and the relations between scientific laws. After reconstructing the derivation of the first equation in Mitteilung 1, it analyzes the methodology of the optical-mechanical analogy in Mitteilung 2 and reconstructs the two heuristic pathways that led to the construction of wave equations as the basis of wave mechanics in the first two Mitteilungen. Finally, it addresses the methods of generalization, application, and explanation by which the second, third, and fourth Mitteilungen are constructed.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his 'Science of Logic' and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
tom 70
|
nr 3
188 – 201
EN
The aim of the paper is to show that in the framework of philosophy of science it is possible to choose such an approach to the reconstruction of scientific laws and scientific explanation and also to the testing of scientific theories which enables us to avoid the well-known raven paradox as stated by C. G. Hempel. The paper starts with an analysis of Hempel’s approach to the so-called “purely qualitative predicates.” Then it shows how this approach, which has its origins in the perceptualist philosophy, led Hempel to a completely distorted view on the structure of scientific laws and scientific explanation, that in turn led him to a distorted view on the testing of scientific theories. As an alternative the paper proposes another view on the structure of scientific laws, scientific explanation and introduction of theoretical magnitudes using the method of definition by abstraction. Consequently, it also proposes an alternative view on the testing of scientific theories which eliminates the raven paradox.
EN
The paper aims at unification of the two directions in contemporary philosophy of science: the direction which deals with the relation of data to phenomena with the direction which deals with the knowledge about mechanism and its employment in scientific thinking. It aims also at a reconstruction of the development of scientific knowledge which is characterized in contemporary philosophy of science as a movement from data, via phenomena, to mechanisms. An attempt will be made to show that this in fact amounts to an assignment of philosophical categories like data, phenomena, mechanisms, etc. This unification and reconstruction draws also on the reconstruction of the main stages of the development of knowledge leading from A.-J. Ǻngström’s measurement of the wave-lengths of spectral lines of hydrogen in 1868 to N. Bohr’s theory of hydrogen atom proposed in 1913.
EN
The aim of the paper is to investigate, from the point of view of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science, the turn in the ape language project as accomplished in the works of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and her collaborators. In this project took place a highly interesting turn from the orientation of research on natural sciences to that on humanities. We shall analyse all the relevant works of Savage-Rumbaugh from the point of view of the two central levels of ALP: its scientific level and the methodological level.
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