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EN
WHERE THERE’S A WILL, THERE’S A WAY: PHILOSOPHICAL METAPHOR IN ŠVANTNER’S A LIFE WITHOUT END
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Content available remote "Moci už nechtít." K Schopenhauerově kritice Kanta
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The aim of the paper is to provide an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kantian philosophy in its three pivotal areas: the notion of metaphysics, the basics of epistemology and ethical theory. The study shows the grounding of this criticism in the rehabilitation of the world in its immediate givenness. The next point of discussion is an analogy of Schopenhauer’s ethics in relation to Kant, its inner contradiction related to the concepts of compassion and resignation, as well as their inspiring character.
CS
Stať interpretuje hlavní body Schopenhauerovy kritiky Kantovy filosofie: koncept metafyziky, východiska teorie poznání a rozvrh etiky. Jejich společným jmenovatelem je rehabilitace bezprostředně daného světa, „v němž žijeme a jsme“. Spolu s tím se ukazuje jednak analogie Schopenhauerova projektu metafyziky vůle ke Kantově metafyzice autonomie, za druhé jeho rozporuplnost, projevující se zejména v motivech soucitu a rezignace, a nakonec inspirativní význam těchto motivů.
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Content available remote O filosofickém eskapismu
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EN
The study is concerned with the issue of philosophical pessimism and escapism in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Arthur Schopenhauer. I start from Levinas’ early texts On Escape (De l’évasion), Existence and Existents (De l’existence à l’existant ) and Time and the Other (Le temps et l’autre), in which the French phenomenologist holds a strongly pessimistic point of view and where he also formulates a metaphysical need for an “escape from being.” That same tendency – i.e. the need to escape from an inhospitable existential situation – is then examined in Schopenhauer’s seminal work The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung). In the first part of the study (i), I thematize the moods of boredom (Schopenhauer) and anxiety (Levinas), in which being appears to both authors as inhospitable. I then examine (ii) the metaphysical assumptions of Schopenhauer’s and Levinas’ pessimism and escapism, or more precisely the non-theistic starting points of their philosophical concepts. In the third part (iii), I focus on experiential assumptions, specifically on negative forms of the subject’s experience with the world – i.e. the experience of physical and psychological suffering, existential loneliness and aimlessness. The last part of the study (iv) briefly outlines the various “escape vectors” from being that both philosophers offer: Schopenhauer demarcates the way out of being – towards nothingness – through asceticism, through the gradual mortification of all bodily and spiritual desires; Levinas, to the contrary, holds in his early texts onto the emotion of pleasure [plaisir], whose ecstaticity pointing to transcendence seems to be for him – however inadequate it remains – a pathway towards the exit from being; in his late work, Levinas then finds a solution in the turn towards ethics.
CS
Studie je věnována problematice filosofického pesimismu a eskapismu v díle Emmanuela Lévinase a Arthura Schopenhauera. Vycházím z Lévinasových raných textů O úniku (De l’évasion), Existence a ten, kdo existuje (De l’existence à l’existant) a Čas a jiné (Le temps et l’autre), v nichž francouzský fenomenolog zastává silně pesimistické stanovisko a kde taktéž formuluje metafyzickou potřebu po „úniku z bytí“. Stejnou tendenci – tj. potřebu uniknout z nehostinné existenciální situace – poté sleduji v Schopenhauerově stěžejním spise Svět jako vůle a představa (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung). V první části studie (i) tematizuji nálady nudy (Schopenhauer) a znepokojení (Lévinas), v kterých se oběma autorům bytí vyjevuje coby nehostinné. Následně (ii) zkoumám metafyzické předpoklady Schopenhauerova a Lévinasova pesimismu a eskapismu, respektive tedy non-teistická východiska jejich filosofických koncepcí. Ve třetí části (iii) se soustřeďuji na předpoklady zkušenostní, konkrétně na negativní formy zkušenosti subjektu se světem – tj. zkušenosti fyzického i psychického utrpení, existenciální osamělosti a bezcílnosti. Poslední část studie (iv) stručně načrtává rozličné „vektory úniku“ z bytí, které oba autoři nabízejí: Schopenhauer vytyčuje cestu ven z bytí – směrem k nicotě – skrze asketismus, skrze postupné umrtvování všech tělesných i duševních tužeb. Lévinas se v raných textech naopak upíná k emoci potěšení [plaisir], jejíž extatičnost poukazující k transcendenci se mu zdá být – jakkoli však stále nedostačující – cestou k vystoupení z bytí; v pozdní tvorbě poté Lévinas nachází řešení v obratu k etice.
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EN
The notion of wisdom in Schopenhauer’s grasp is analyzed in two different perspectives. First, in the context of early philosophy with the supreme term “better consciousness” (das bessere Bewußtsein). The crowning achievement of this period was The World as Will and Representation and radically formulated cognitive elitism. Second, in the context of Parerga and Paralipomena essays, in particular the Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life essay, when Schopenhauer transforms himself from a metaphysician and a Buddhist into a moralist and teacher of life’s wisdom, who teaches what to do to minimize the suffering of our lives. This shift of accents was connected with the thorough reading of B. Gracian’s The Art of Worldly Wisdom. A Pocket Oracle. Gracian did not teach how to free oneself from the world, but how to live in a world full of evil, adversity, intrigues and wickedness.
DE
Schopenhauers Weisheitsbegriff wurde aus zwei verschiedenen Perspektiven analysiert. Erstens, im Kontext der frühen Philosophie, wo „das bessere Bewusstsein“ eine Schlüsselrolle spielte. Der Höhepunkt dieser Zeit waren das Werk Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung und radikal formulierte philosophische Exklusivität. Zweitens, im Kontext von Essays-Sammlung Parerga und Paralipomena, und besonders einem der Essays Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit, wo sich Schopenhauer vom Metaphysiker und Buddhisten in den Moralisten und den Lehrer vervandelte, der die Verfahrensregeln in der irrationalen Welt des Willens zeigte, so dass das Leid die geringste Teilnahme an der realen Existenz des Menschen hatte. Diese Akzentverschiebung erfolgte vor allem dank der gründlichen und tiefen Lektüre von Baltasar Gracians Das Hand-Orakel und Kunst der Weltklugheit. Gracian lehrte aber an keiner Stelle, wie man sich von der Welt befreien kann, sondern eher wie man in einer Welt des Bösen, voll von Gegensätzen, Intrigen und Niederträchtigkeiten leben kann.
EN
In 1870, Wilhelm Richard Wagner (1813-1883) wrote an essay to celebrate the centennial of Beethoven’s birth. In this essay Wagner made the case that music is, unlike any other object we create or are attentive to in experience, in an immediate analogical relationship with the activity of the Schopenhauerian “will” and is always enlivened. By drawing on this idea, we can not only conceive of music as in an immediate analogical relationship with our personal experience, but as perhaps the only object of cognition that is in a constant state of personal vitality. It is by that very continuous vitality that it can return us to our own personhood with deeper insight and perspective. The essay concludes by exploring how attending to the musical object as a spiritual (existential) exercise might reconnect us to our roots in sensus communis, educate us on our common personhood, and play an ethical role in our lives.
EN
This paper provides an overview of selected philosophical implications connected with the topic of a virtual world as a simulacrum of anthropocentrism. The paper discusses also the impact of the implications on the considerations of the dilemma to what extent the users of a virtual world remain obedient to their moral values and how the virtual world influences being a human in the real world. The concept of a virtual world was initiated by a human because the human being`s intentions are to fulfill his own needs, to cross his individual barriers and, while attempting to his own development, to reach for what is for him instinctively attainable. Human aspirations of creating a virtual world, a look-alike world, emerge finalized but the only residuary conundrum is to assuage one`s desires for finding the good and for defending one`s moral values. A human being is in the centre of existence and is the issue of valence inasmuch as he is ‘the master’ of the world, and, according to the paradigm of anthropocentrism, he is able to achieve what he yearns for. Therefore, it is advisable to contemplate the issue whether a human being desired the virtual world to arise or whether he just wanted to desire the world in his omnipotence. Another alternative for the discussion is to ponder over a human craving for creating a new, better version of a real world and for his subconscious attempts at its annihilation. Because human cognitive faculties – his thoughts and needs are biologically conditioned, the article analyses also a phantasm of a human domination over the real world through the virtual world and a human being`s negation of moral values as well as his control of the limitations of the real world.
PL
The text Symbolic and philosophical similarities between Jan Kasprowicz’s and Janis Rainis’ poetry presents the figure of Kasprowicz – a great Polish modernist, and Rainis – a Latvian poet and playwright, a man of the theater, author of numerous works for children and a recognized translator of the works of William Shakespeare, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, George Gordon Byron, and Aleksander Pushkin. The analysis is directed toward the lyrical work of the Latvian and the Polish poet, emphasizing its symptomatic symbolism and philosophical influences (Blaise Pascal, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson) present in the phenomena of nature and love.
EN
This paper is a dialogue that considers compassion as a grounding for ethics. Its ap-proach is thematic but it draws significantly from Arthur Schopenhauer’s account of compassion (Mitleid). In Schopenhauer’s thought, values (Werthe) are functions of a subject’s willing and therefore inevitably tied to an ego-centric viewpoint. Real ethics needs to find a good beyond subjective valuations. Schopenhauer finds an ethical phe-nomenon beyond values in Mitleid, “suffering-together,” compassion. Compassion is a pre-reflective benevolent feeling toward another’s suffering. Compassion can occur only if the ego-world duality is overcome at least to some extent. In this way compas-sion is a metaphysical sentiment.
EN
The text Symbolic and philosophical similarities between Jan Kasprowicz’s and Janis Rainis’ poetry presents the figure of Kasprowicz – a great Polish modernist, and Rainis – a Latvian poet and playwright, a man of the theater, author of numerous works for children and a recognized translator of the works of William Shakespeare, Friedrich Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, George Gordon Byron, and Aleksander Pushkin. The analysis is directed toward the lyrical work of the Latvian and the Polish poet, emphasizing its symptomatic symbolism and philosophical influences (Blaise Pascal, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson) present in the phenomena of nature and love.
EN
This article considers the principles of philosophical thinking in Søren Kierke- gaard’s nonclassical aesthetics. Special attention is given to his radical critique of “false” and “impersonal” rationalism. This does not only mean the rejection of the tradi- tional principles of classical metaphysics which claims “universality” and “universal meaning.” Kierkegaard also bases his philosophy on individual human life, or, in other words, personal existence with its unique inner world. His critique is more profound than that by Arthur Schopenhauer. Kierkegaard develops his own philosophy of “exi- stential crisis,” opposing subjective will and internal changes to abstract thinking and external influences. Kierkegaard’s works initiate the critical or nonclassical stage in Western aesthetics. The main place in it is occupied by the idea of the disharmony of the world: its subjective reflection is “split” consciousness that has lost contact with the traditional concepts of harmony, humanism, goodness, beauty and philosophy of art. His philosophy of art is that of the internal personal world and of free choice. He opposes the famous motto of Cartesian rationalism cogito ergo sum, his own statement “I am here and think because I do exist here.” So the notion of existence becomes fun- damental for his philosophical reflection which is focused on the topics of personal existence, destiny and perspectives of being. Since personal becoming never stops, the ability to exist is treated as a great art. The aim of genuine philosophy is not a knowled- ge of the external world but an inquiry into the deepest problems of personal being and creativity; its greatest enigma is existence. Hence Kierkegaard gives a new subject and new tasks to aesthetics and philosophy of art. When treating the problems of individual human existence, Kierkegaard and other followers of nonclassical aesthetics relied on an understanding of being as non- substantial (personality is not something given but a totality of constantly emerging potentials) and at the same time subjectivized their ontological problems. Thus the stre- ngthening of subjectivist tendencies in the post-Hegelian philosophy of art reaches here culmination. “Subjective ontology,” or “ontology” in the narrow sense of the word, is that which we can call the “pontaneous ego:” It determines the unconscious functioning of human “existence” in a specific individual consciousness. The whole individual exi- stence is enclosed, as it were, in a subjective environment, but we cannot affirm that existence is subjective.
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