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Content available Homicide with a single stab wound
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EN
Taking life due to dealing single stab wound is very characteristic kind of crime. In most cases the stabbing takes place during an argument, both victim and the killer are drunk, and the thing happens at home of either of them. The purpose of this article was to examine if the classification of a criminal act, which was initially classified as a “murder”, would maintain as such act within the court decision. In most cases of such type, the killer is accused of homicide, however in half of them, it gets changed to dealing damage or hitting with a deadly result later.
EN
The article presents the most important values criminally protected in the Catholic Church by CIC/1983 and CCEO/1990. They are: the religion, the unity, the church authorities and the freedom of the Church. About their prime position in the hierarchy of goods legally protected by the provisions of penal canon law testifies that the crimes against them are put in the first and in the second title of CIC/1983, also the threat of severe penal sanctions. These sanctions result from the exceptional social harmfulness of the crimes. In the degree of ailment they are analogical in the canon law of the Latin rite and in the common law of Eastern Catholic Churches.
EN
The article describes situations in which it is permissible to depart from the results of a linguistic interpretation. L. Morawski enumerated these situations. Then Supreme Court adapted it in penal law. However, it has been accused that acceptance of such proceedings leads to acceptance of the law-making interpretation. The analysis of the these cases leads to the conclusion that departure from the results of the linguistic interpretation in criminal law is generally acceptable, as long as it does not constitute an interpretation that is not favorable for the perpetrator and is based on system and functional interpretation.
PL
Artykuł opisuje sytuacje, w których dopuszczalne jest odstąpienie od wyników wykładni językowej. Te przypadki wyliczył L. Morawski, co następnie zostało zaadaptowane przez Sąd Najwyższy na gruncie prawa karnego. Spotkało się to jednak z zarzutem, iż akceptacja takiego postępowania prowadzi do zaakceptowania wykładni prawotwórczej. Analiza powyższych przypadków prowadzi do wniosku, że wyjście poza wykładnię językową w prawie karnym jest generalnie dopuszczalne, o ile nie stanowi wykładni rozszerzającej na niekorzyść sprawcy i ma oparcie w wykładni systemowej i funkcjonalnej.
EN
This study deals with the legal status of royal libertines in the period after the Battle of White Mountain and their embedment in the period legal system. On the example of investigation of a particular criminal case, the study demonstrates a broad range of differences in the legal status of members of this group, as well as different ways they were treated by manorial and land officials. The main source is a criminal investigation file from 1663 concerning adultery and a subsequent attempt to arrest libertine Pavel Sládek alias Cícha, in which a course of an investigation of the committed offences is recorded. In addition to this file, other relevant sources were used as well in order to see the case from a more complex perspective, including its extralegal aspects. It followed from an analysis that were the libertine to end up in front of a court, it was necessary to proceed through the Royal Prosecution. Also, a hypothesis is presented that in some criminal cases, land captains conducted their own proceedings in which they acted as judges. The study builds on a microhistorical approach which allows to capture, describe, and evaluate details of the studied case and embed it into the relevant legal-historical context.
EN
The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and  punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular  shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape.             During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime  was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy,  it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more  sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is  unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started:  sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly.  Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively).  Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years  1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991.  The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison  term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines  (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court  in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of  persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts  of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures,  the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact,  the trends of that  period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual  mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).
EN
The present policy of all countries of the world  towards narcotic  and psychotropic drugs is in fact prohibitionIST. This means that all circulation of such drugs  ‒ their manufacture, transport, import, export, introduction into trade, giving,  and sometimes also possession – is illegal and carries most severe penal sanctions in some cases. It should be borne in mind, though, that this prohibition is ONLY about eighty years old now. Before, despite a large numer of addicts (not at all smaller than today according to some estimations), purely medical approach to such persons prevailed, and the drugs were subject only (if at all) to some administrative control and rationing at most. The drug prohibition emerged immediately after World War I, chiefly in United Stetes. As can be judged today, the criminalization of drugs and addicts introduced in those days was highly emotional. For this reason, by no means the harmfulness of narcotic and psychotropic drugs on both the individual and the social scale, one should consider the use and reasons of prohibitive policy from the viewpoint of today’s standards of rational criminalization. It is unquestionable that any social policy with respect to drugs should aim first and foremost at reduction of their consumption. The question remains, though, about the extent to which prohibition and penal law can actually serve towards this aim. Universal in the world of today as it is, the prohibitive approach to drugs assumes a variety of forms. There are different models of prohibition which base on different penal law regulations. They can be classified in two dimensions: restrictiveness vs. permissiveness, and repressiveness vs. treatment. Te first of the above dimensions pertains to the extent of criminalization; the other one – to treatment by the law of addicted offenders. Restrictive systems are those which provide for absolute prohibition with no exceptions whatever and ban all circulation of drugs, possession included. Instead, permissive systems provide for  an extent of decriminalization of that circulation, chiefly with respect to possession of drugs. Involved here is usually decriminalization, or even total depenalization of possession of specific amounts of drugs or drugs possessed for a specific purpose as e.g. own consumption. This depenalization can be introduced not only by substantive law but also by procedural provisions law. In this latter case, elements of expediency are introduced, offering the prosecutor or court the possibility to discontinue proceedings or to drop the charge. Repressive systems treat addicted offenders like all the other offenders, applying to them regular penal sanctions both for traditional criminal offenses (as e.g.. theft), and for the “prohibitive” ones (such as possession of drugs). Treatment-oriented systems, instead, reflect a belief as to futility of punishing addicts: within tchem, attempts are made at implementing a principle “tratment instead of punishment”. In most cases, this means that an addict can avoid penal sanction if he submits to withdrawal treatment. The actual application of such provisions on conditional stay of proceedings usually depends on the seriousness of the offense committed. It can be stated that most of today’s European legislations try more or less consistently to combine elements of permissiveness with the treatment orientation. Particularly useful in the analysis of the reason and sense of prohibition are specific economic notions and categories used successfully within so-called economic approach in criminology: demand and supply. Therefore, to what extent are prohibition and penal law capable of reducing the demand for narcotic and psychotropic drugs? First, the demand for those substances is created by a great variety of categories of individuals. The first such category are the consumers. This group, however, is by no means uniform as it consists of both addicted persons, occasional users, and experimenters. Another group which is of great importance in terms of the aims of prohibition are potential consumers, that is practically the whole of socjety if we take the extreme approach. Penal law can influence those groups through its instruments of special and general prevention. The possibilities of applying individual prevention to addicts or occasional users are minimal, though, which results from the very essence of addiction. It is a general opinion today that punishment cannot force an addict to give up his addiction. Only therapy can potentially be successful here; but – an extremely important issue – therapy to which a person submits voluntarily. Today’s spread of this opinion is expressed in the above-mentioned principle of “treatment instead of punishment”. It means that, the very principle of prohibition preserved, penal repression with respect to addicts is avoided. In this interpretation, the individual preventive action of punishment is reserved for the group of persons who experiment with drugs (as it would be simply impossible to criminalize a mere wish to take drugs). The question still remains, though, whether punishment as a form of shock therapy makes any sense here. The general preventive effect of penal law assumes the forms of either deterrence or so-called positive prevention. Deterrence is entirely out of the question in the case of addicted drug consumers due to the considerable rigidity of their demand. Yet deterrence is just as inefficient with respect to potential consumers. This is caused by a huge dark number of “prohibition”, resulting from their specific nature of offenses without no victims: the police encounter immense difficulties trying to disclose such acts. Most legislators try to make up for these weak points introducing severe statutory penalties. This is ineffective in the light of the long-discovered truth that it is rather inevitability than severity of punishment that determines the effectiveness of deterrence. A similar problem arises with respect to potential integrative function of penal law. The question is whether this kind of function – consisting in reinforcement of specific values with the aim to integrate a group – can really be performed by relatively seldom euforced provisions such as no doubt the penal law provisions designed to safeguard prohibition. What remains, therefore, is just the argument, classically used when discussing the problem of decriminalization, that this step might be interpreted as a consent to a specific behavior (here, the taking of drugs) which, in turn, might have disastrous consequences. In this interpretation, prohibition is the last outpost to curb completely unrestrained spread of drug addiction. Penal law's inability to exert any crucial influence on demand considered, it is assumed more and more often today that prohibition aims basically at reducing the supply of drugs. The application of penal law to this area  is justified to the extent that its addressees are not addicts but manufacturers, smugglers, dealers and other such persons most of whom are not drugs consumers themselves but only derive profit from the addiction of others. No doubt, penal law sometimes succeeds to eliminate such persons by means of incapacitation or deterrence.  Generally, though, there is a specific and important internal contradiction involved in prohibition: delegalization of drugs in a situation of continued demand makes the  provision of supply a most attractive activity since it yields immense profits. As a result, not even the most severe penalties can either deter those involved in this activity or prevent the recruitment of their successors, the less so as the risks they run are actually rather small for reasons that have been mentioned above. It might perhaps prove possible to eliminate all supply of drugs, but not without the use of universal terror. This option, however, is out of the question in a democratic state governed by the ruled by law. Therefore, are there any alternatives to prohibition? The answer seems to be yes. First and foremost, one should realize the crucial problem of today’s drug addiction is demand. Admittedly, the demand for drugs can be seen as a apecific cultural constant, something we have to put up with. One should bear in mind, however, the  attempts at influencing that phenomenon with constructive and creative rather than destructive methods. Quite obviously, this is an extremely difficult and entangled  task – as difficult and  entangled as any struggle against the couses and not just the synptoms of a social problem. It seems, however, that work on developing constructive strategies to fight the demand  for drugs is the basic challenge of modern civilization. Namely, if we manage to gain any influence over the couses that make so many young people of today reach for drugs – if we manage to cause a reduction of that demand – departure from prohibition and resumption of the purely medical  approach to drugs might perhaps become possible. For this reason, decriminalization or legalization of drugs should be seen today as a long-term strategic aim; before it can actually be achieved, prolonged preparations, experiments, small steps strategies, and chiefly efforts towards reduction of demand by methods other than  repression are necessary. I believe it would be too risky if we tried to run this operation straight away and to leave the matter to be regulated by nothing but the forces of the free market. Finally, the fact has to be borne in mind that decriminalization can only be sensible if it is done globally; this means that such decision require close international co-operation and co-ordination.
EN
The author presents some practical aspects of the functioning of the immunity witness institution following the seven years of its existence in the Polish legal system. The paper contains an analysis of doctrinal as well as practical problems deriving directly from the utilisation of testimonies made by immunity witnesses. It is based on the results of research conducted using materials regarding the process of choosing candidates for immunity witnesses, as well as documents from criminal investigations and cases in courts where that institution was used. The author presents an analysis of police operational work during the process of choosing immunity witness candidates whose testimonies then shape the investigation as well as other evidence acquired during court hearings. It is compared with opinions expressed by judges, public prosecutors and police officers involved in the work with immunity witnesses at diffrrent stages of criminal procedure (e.g. receiving testimonies) and the immunity witness protection programme (e.g. physical protection of a witness). A consideration of these two aspects ensures a comprehensive diagnosis of that institution. There are two fundamental questions related to the subject matter: is the evidence effective in the Polish penal law? And is the evidence really necessary and useful in every respect?
EN
The article concerns the issue of admissibility of assisted suicide in Poland and Germany. The main research question is the possibility of accepting the right of an individual to commit suicide and to apply for help of the third party in this matter. The analysis of this issue has been made by comparing Polish and German regulations, with particular attention paid to the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court issued in February 2020. The existence of the right to suicide would have to influence the perception of not only the suicide itself and the possible provision of medical assistance to persons committing a suicide attack, but also assisted suicide in form of providing resources or assistance to persons intending to commit suicide. Before the judgment was delivered, the legal assessment of such behaviour under German law depended on the relationship between the person who provided the assistance and the suicide - the institutions which provide assistance for suicide in an organised manner (for example the Swiss association „Dignitas”) were prohibited. In Poland, on the other hand, there is a dispute concerning the assessment of assisted suicide – part of the doctrine considers this to be an activity prohibited by Article 151 of the Polish Penal Code, while others considers that this provision does not apply to aid granted at the initiative of a future suicide. Therefore, the German experience is helpful in assessing the issue of admissibility of assisted suicide, especially discussion about the former regulation. The article presents criminal law regulations in both countries and an analysis of the adoption of the right to commit suicide in the Polish legal system. 
PL
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy kwestii dopuszczalności samobójstwa wspomaganego w Polsce i w Niemczech. Głównym pytaniem badawczym jest możliwość przyjęcia prawa jednostki do popełnienia samobójstwa oraz do ubiegania się o pomoc w dokonaniu tego zamiaru. Analiza tej kwestii została dokonana poprzez porównanie regulacji polskiej i niemieckiej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wyroku Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego wydanego w lutym 2020 roku. Przyjęcie istnienia prawa do samobójstwa musiałoby wpłynąć na postrzeganie nie tylko samego samobójstwa i ewentualnego udzielania pomocy medycznej osobom dokonującym zamachu samobójczego, lecz również samobójstwa wspomaganego, czyli dostarczania środków lub pomocy intelektualnej osobom zamierzającym popełnić samobójstwo. Przed wydaniem wspomnianego wyroku ocena prawna takiego zachowania według prawa niemieckiego zależała od relacji osoby udzielającej pomocy oraz samobójcy została zabroniona działalność instytucji zajmujących się udzielaniem pomocy do samobójstwa w sposób zorganizowany (np. znanego szwajcarskiego stowarzyszenia „Dignitas”). W Polsce natomiast istnieje spór dotyczący oceny samobójstwa wspomaganego – część doktryny uznaje to za działanie zabronione przez art. 151 k.k., część natomiast uznaje, że przepis ten nie dotyczy pomocy udzielanej z inicjatywy przyszłego samobójcy. W związku z tym do oceny zagadnienia dopuszczalności samobójstwa wspomaganego pomocne są doświadczenia niemieckie, zwłaszcza związane  z uchylonym zakazem działalności wyspecjalizowanych organizacji. Artykuł prezentuje regulacje prawnokarne w obu państwach oraz analizę przyjęcia prawa do popełnienia samobójstwa w polskim systemie prawnym. 
EN
Technological development implies a lot of new ways to commit crimes in cyberspace. Stealing virtual objects (such as magical swords or shoes) is one of them. It is unique because virtual theft combines one of the oldest types of criminal activity with the achievements of modern technology. This article deals with those situations when the actions taken by players stop being protected by the ‘magic circle’ and become criminal. It will also explore how the Polish Penal Law deals with these matters. It shall also discuss a comparable U.S. based case, involving fraud committed by the player called Cally in "Eve Online", three cases from Poland and finally, It will deal with stipulated solutions.
PL
Glosowane orzeczenie powiązane jest (między innymi) z problematyką tzw. przestępstw wieloodmianowych. Zdaniem Sądu Apelacyjnego: 1) zawartość normatywna art. 11 § 1 k.k. sprowadza się do nakazu uznawania za jedno przestępstwo jednego (tożsamego), relewantnego prawnokarnie czynu; o tym zaś, czy i kiedy mamy do czynienia z jednym czynem w rozumieniu art. 11 § 1 k.k., rozstrzyga przede wszystkim znamię czasownikowe, którego użyto do opisania zachowania zabronionego pod groźbą kary; 2) przestępstwo z art. 296 k.k. należy do kategorii przestępstw wieloodmianowych, a co za tym idzie – pomimo wielości podjętych przez sprawcę działań (zaniechań), jest ono niepodzielne, w związku z czym niedopuszczalne jest skazanie sprawcy za fragment takiego przestępstwa, obejmujący kilka czynów, i jednoczesne uniewinnienie (umorzenie) w części obejmującej pozostałe czyny (zachowania sprawcze) wchodzące w jego skład; 3) błędne umorzenie przez prokuratora (nawet powtórne) postępowania jedynie o fragment przestępstwa (i część szkody) nie statuuje prawa pokrzywdzonego do wywiedzenia subsydiarnego aktu oskarżenia. Autor glosy niektóre z tych założeń krytykuje, poddając jednocześnie pod rozwagę inne rozwiązania.
EN
The issue of (among others) multi-variant offence has been taken upon in the glossed judgement. According to the Court of Appeal: 1) legislative content of art. 11 § 1 k.k. comes down to warrant consideration of one (identical) penally relevant action as one crime; while primarily the verb feature that has been used to describe the criminal offence decides if and when we deal with a single offence according to art. 11 § 1 k.k.; 2) the offence described in art. 296 k.k. belongs to the category of multi-variant offences, which means – despite multiple deeds (omissions) taken by the perpetrator, it is indivisible, which means that sentencing them for a fragment of such offence that contains some of the deeds and acquitting (discontinuing) them of the part containing other deeds of the offence is unacceptable; 3) erroneous discontinuation (even repeated) of the procedure only by a fragment of the offence (and part of the damage) by the prosecutor does not enact the victim's right to draw a subsidiary indictment. Author of this gloss critiques some of these assumptions and takes other into consideration.
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EN
After the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918 there were several post-partition criminal acts in force. Established in 1919, the Codifi cation Commission was to develop a uniform civil and criminal law. One of the tasks accomplished by the Commission was the substantive criminal law. The modern Code of 1932, developed among others by Julian Makarewicz, was one of the outstanding projects prepared by leading criminal law scholars of the interwar period. It comprehensively introduced the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. It included innovative solutions, including elements of the sociological school of criminal law, as well as a concisely regulated individual responsibility of the instigator and accomplice.
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Content available remote Je gender důležitou proměnnou pro pochopení kriminality?
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EN
The anthology edited by Libora Oates-Indruchová Tvrdošíjnost myšlenky. Od feministické kriminologie k teorii genderu (Doggedness of Idea. From Feminist Criminology to Theory of Gender) – published on the occasion of the 70th birthday of Gerlinda Šmausová –, which has as its subject-matter the importance of gender for criminality, focuses on the issue of whether the criminality of women has an ontic nature or whether it is rather the result of labelling, initiated by organs of penal control. The criminality documented by police is seen more as an “artefact” of police investigation, extended into the lifeworld and very often explained by labelling approaches. The anthology points to the contradiction between sociology as an discipline that casts doubt on the naturalness and fixity of social phenomena on the one hand and the simple-minded adoption of a conception of stable homogenous gender identity corresponding to biological gender-difference on the other. For the sake of analysis and advancement of knowledge in the theory of gender, Gerlinda Šmausová aims to abandon dualism and to research into social heterogenity by exploring the theoretical approaches of Sandry Harding, Élisabeth Badinter a Judith Butler
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji przepisów o przestępstwach przeciwko środowisku, którego podstawowe etapy wyznaczają: - zalążki w latach 60. ubiegłego wieku, - ustawa z 31 stycznia 1980 r. o ochronie i kształtowaniu środowiska, - ustawa z 16 października 1991 r. o ochronie przyrody, - kodeks karny z 6 czerwca 1997 r. - wielka reforma prawa ochrony środowiska z roku 2001. Przegląd uregulowań prowadzi do wniosku, że ukształtował się stosunkowo obszerny zbiór przepisów o przestępstwach, który może być nazwany prawem karnym środowiska.
EN
The article presents the evolution of laws addressing crimes against the environment, the milestones of which are determinedby thefollowing: - beginnings during the 60s ofthe last century, - environmentalProtectionActof31 January 1980, - nature ConservationActofl6 October 1991, - penal Code of 6 June1997. - reform ofthe environmental protection law in 2001. An overview ofthe laws leads to a conclusion, that a relatively vast portfolio of legał regulations addressing crimes have been established which may be considered as an environmentalpenal law.
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The phenomenon of multiculturalism has its reflection in the growing importance of the concept of ‘cultural defence’ which is present in criminal jurisdiction. It means that a court will take into account the defendant’s cultural roots that might have influenced his behaviour. The debate in a courtroom regarding such cultural arguments touches upon the dogmatic as well as practical issues. While deliberating matters in which the ‘cultural defence’ appears, courts should first and foremost rule if the defendant can refer to such motivation of his actions at all. Next, the court must decide how to account for the cultural factor: whether as the cause for insanity, error facti, or error concerning the ignorance of law, etc. Agreeing upon both the facts of the case and fair assessment of the action may be a difficult task under the present legal system. It is also important not to allow to use ‘cultural defence’ against women’s rights. Codifying crimes with cultural basis may turn out impossible to achieve. Therefore, when carrying out proceedings, organs of the administration of justice should remember about the cultural background of certain crimes.
PL
W związku ze zjawiskiem wielokulturowości coraz większe znaczenie zyskuje koncepcja cultural defence, czyli uwzględniania przez sąd kulturowych korzeni oskarżonego, które miały wpływ na popełnione przestępstwo. Debata, która toczy się nad takimi „kulturowymi argumentami” na sali sądowej, dotyka problemów zarówno dogmatycznych, jak i praktycznych. Sądy, rozpatrując sprawy, w których pojawia się cultural defence, muszą przede wszystkim rozstrzygnąć, czy oskarżony może w ogóle powołać się na taką motywację swoich czynów. W dalszej kolejności sąd powinien zdecydować, jak uwzględnić czynnik kulturowy: czy jako przyczynę niepoczytalności, błędu w zakresie nieświadomości czynu, błędu co do faktów i tak dalej. Pogodzenie stanu faktycznego sprawy i sprawiedliwej oceny czynu może w świetle obowiązującego prawa okazać się bardzo trudne. Ważne jest też, żeby nie pozwolić na korzystanie z cultural defence wbrew prawom kobiet. Skodyfikowanie przestępstw o podłożu kulturowym może okazać się niemożliwe do zrealizowania, dlatego to organy wymiaru sprawiedliwości powinny w toku stosowania prawa pamiętać o kulturowym tle przestępstw.
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