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EN
Alasdair MacIntyre, often classified as a communitarian, is one of the most radical critics of modernity, modern liberalism and the Enlightenment project. A crucial concept and leitmotiv of his critique is the concept of compartmentalization. In After Virtue and other works MacIntyre develops an idea that a malaise of modern civilization (its practices, presuppositions, institutions, and especially its public moral discourse) is the lack of one hypergood (which liberals approvingly call ‘pluralism’). In consequence, the modern individual has no moral identity and his/her life is only a series of episodes with no unifying element. An essential part of MacIntyrean critique of modernity is his historical narration in which he contrasts the modern and contemporary situation with the heroic and classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. In this comparison we may see, as MacIntyre says, that history of modern morality is the history of drama which culminates in contemporary new barbarism and its heroes (characters): Manager, Rich Aesthete and Therapist. MacIntyre is not only a critic of modern societies; he also proposes some remedies to maladies of modern civilisation. His proposition, deeply rooted in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, is the return to Tradition as a kind of moral inquiry and a kind of life. In times of technocratic barbarism we must turn back to cultivating practices with their own goods and virtues and to the concept of the unity of human life.
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The author looks at the dichotomy between shame and honor through references to traditional societies of the Mediterranean culture. Anthropological studies in the 1950-1980s define both concepts as morally determined social regulators. Emotions related to shame are etymologically feminine, those related to honor are masculine. Consequently, gender seems to determine what is moral. Therefore, one can venture that social expectations with regard to women evolve around notions related to shame: modesty (particularly sexual), passivity and submission. For men they evolve around notions related to honor: activism, courage and usefulness. In contemporary discourse this division translates into attaching women to the household related private sphere and placing men in the public politico-economic sphere. Such a distinction solidifies traditional social order whose role is to assist in proper functioning of the family.
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Content available remote Psychologia moralnosci odpowiedzi, jakich nie znajdzie filozofia
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The article is concerned with psychology of morality which is a relatively new area of psychology and is interested in the morality of man. the article shows description of the understanding of psychology of morality, its historical background and divisions, as well as its object of study. in addition, the article enumerates differences between psychological and philosophical approaches to morality and the possibility of cooperation between these two sciences.
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The authoress presents the philosophical and methodological assumptions underlying the work of Zygmunt Bauman - one of the most interesting and best-known (if not the single most interesting and best known) Polish sociologists. He has devoted himself to engaged sociology, ie, one that is subject to moral values, though his understanding of morality differs from that in classical Durkeimian sociology. While for Durkheim morality is a social fact, created by society and based in society, for Bauman the source of morality is to be found in the modality of human existence. Morality is the ability to distinguish between good and evil. Bauman calls that which society treats as morality 'ethics'. He believes that behaving in accordance with social norms, established in institutions and human consciousness, very often interferes with the upholding of morality. For Bauman, morality also means responsibility for others, who should be treated the same as oneself. He is a maximalist and would like to transfer moral responsibility to the entire network of social relations, institutions and the whole of society, and even humanity. This possibility depends on the condition of society and the dominant social relations. Bauman presents two types of society: modern and postmodern, which he sometimes also calls a society of 'liquid modernity'. His analyses of each kind of society have nevertheless an autotelic value and demonstrate the values of Bauman's reflections.
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The paper deals with several aspects of Patocka's reflections on the role and mission of intellectuals in times, when science becomes 'the central productive power' and when the self-identifications of philosophy and philosophers become necessary. These requirements are due to various past and present 'shakes' (e.g. the extraordinary experience of participating in the WW I, which make the sense of human life problematic. According to the author, there is no unambiguous answer to the question: How the intellectual as a 'possessor of reason' is related to the intellectual as a 'spiritual being'? In the first term he finds Kantian motifs working (especially differentiating between 'Vernunft' and 'Verstand'); as for the second term, which is a more emphatic expression of distancing oneself from the obviousness of the facticity, the motifs are Platonic. In the author's view by his engagement in the Charta 77 movement Patocka has overcome 'Heraclitean-Platonic' distance between a philosopher and his townsmen, and incorporated his general principles into the postulates with strong moral accent.
EN
Ethics has been one of the main fields of Zygmunt Bauman's in­terests for the last two decades. His papers considering this topic have a considerable impact on contemporary humanities. The idea of 'the moral party of two', developed by the Polish sociologist, contributed to the development of ethical thought and, for example, influenced the new trends in the debate on post-modernity. On the othe hand, this concept has been widely criticized, which is one of the issues discussed in this paper. The author demonstrates that if Bauman's ethical concepts are considered in the context of the foundations of his sociology, and account being taken of the way of writing distinctive for this sociologist, certain controversial aspects of post­modern ethics could be evaluated as functional. Another aim of this paper is to present the evolution of Bauman's ethical thought, which can be seen as twofold. On the one hand, it is the considerable enlargement of the part the individual responsibility is given in Bauman's thought, on the other - his including in the ethical thought the reflection on the role of the political structures in the settings of the collective rules. The author emphasizes that by making such changes Bauman does not deny the constitutive features of his idea of morality, but supplements it and tries to adjust it to the current socio­cultural changes.
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Content available remote Rozwój moralności w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego
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The paper presents views of Polish philosopher of history Feliks Koneczny, (1862–1949) on morality. The author of On the Plurality of Civilisations claims that, the ethics of Latin civilization is a Catholic one. The ethics should be defended against, ethics of other communities because civilizational mixtures lead to moral chaos and non-civilized state. According to the Polish scholar Europe witnesses the progress of, morality but the process is slow. Besides, downfall and retraction of morality are possi-, ble in every community. That is why ethical education is so important both in private, and public life. According to Koneczny, also Christian countries should be distinctly, founded on Christian religion. Polish philosopher’s views – according to the author of, the paper – are significant and up-to-date, though in some points they require a slight, correction
EN
Wolf proposes supererogation as a solution for curbing the exaggerated demands of morality. Adopting supererogation is supposed to prevent us from considering that all morally good deeds are obligatory. Supererogation, indeed, makes some morally good deeds merely optional, saving the agent from the requirement of behaving as much as possible like a Moral Saint. But I argue that Wolf cannot use supererogation in service of her overall project, for two reasons. First, because implied in the concept of supererogation is that going beyond duty adds to our humanity rather than detract from it (as Wolf argues). Secondly, after analysing attempts to acclimatize supererogation in other theoretical frameworks, I conclude that supererogation can limit morality’s claims only if Wolf’s reasons of “individual perfection” can defeat moral reasons. I argue that a common scale of evaluation between moral and non-moral reasons is needed for their comparison, but Wolf explicitly rejects this way out.
EN
A series of research on three beliefs on social world is summarized: a system legitimacy belief, the belief in injustice of social world and the belief that life is a zero-sum game. A Polish national sample was studied as well a number of smaller student samples. A great majority of Poles was found to believe that social world is generally unjust, and a sizeable majority was found not to believe in legitimacy of the current socio-political system. Experimental research suggests that Poles do not develop myths justifying the existing social order. Rather, they tend to produce myths delegitimizing this order: Persons who attain social status or material wealth are perceived as less moral (though more competent) than persons of low status or relatively poor. The belief in life as a zero-sum game (that successes are won at the expense of other people's failures) is discussed as a factor underlying delegitimization of the social world.
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In this paper, I defend the view that the requested euthanasia of adults is morally permissible and should be legalised; I use an argument from analogy which compares physician-assisted euthanasia with morally less ambiguous and, in my opinion, an acceptable instance of mercy killing. I also respond to several objections that either tries to prove that the instance of mercy killing is not acceptable, or that there is a fundamental difference between these two cases of killing. Furthermore, in the remainder of the paper I defend the moral permissibility and legalisation of euthanasia against several objections that appeared in local disputes on this issue, based on the concepts of the limits of freedom, the slippery slope, and the needlessness of euthanasia.
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In this article the author would like to touch a problem of the religion as an element of the adult religious people's life, specifically the element participating in the formation of an individual set of the moral attitudes. The group he is interested in is constituted by the Judaic, Catholic and Protestant worshippers. The main reason which inclined him to undertake the signalled problem is its practical dimension. Personally, he has an irresistible impression that morality is losing more and more of its importance in today's, especially highly developed, societies. Superseding such values as Good and Truth, pleasure, utility and profit increasingly become the leading values. He is certain that we live in the days of something what he would call the crisis of morality; morality in general. Therefore, a clear need both of reflection and action that tends to find the foundation which this fading morality could be rebuilt on and the sources which the principles and the instruments essential for this rebuilding could be derived from. The author's project is a part of the search of these sources and the area he explores is religion. He tries to investigate moral attitudes of the Judaic, Catholic and Protestant worshippers and also to verify whether the religion has an influence on these attitudes, and if it has, is this attitude a possitive one.
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The main target of the article is an attempt to draw a reflection on the theoretical contexts of moral upbringing. What was discussed in particular is the question of relations between morality, psychological concepts of moral development and possibilities of pedagogic influence. The priority was given to Kohlberg’s philosophical basis of a cognitive and developmental concept and other psychological concepts. Thanks to it, in the further part of the text, it was possible to reflect on problems connected with the normativity of moral upbringing.
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Content available remote Bioetyka a moralność o nieetyczności medycznych kodeksów etycznych
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The author of the article analyzes contents of the so-called medical codes of ethics which are currently in common usage. He proves the contents are unnecessary repetitio of legal acts, but they do not include instructions how the physician should act in situations which by nature are not regulated by law, but require moral solutions on the part of the physician. The author postulates for the creation of medical codes of ethics on the basis of Adam Smith’s distinction between personal virtues and social virtues. Only the latter can be included in legislation, i.e. they can be codified in form of legal norms. Thus, in medical codes of ethics one should codify only orders and prohibitions based on personal virtues such as kindness, altruism, or love for fellow man.
EN
The paper deals with the ethical-moral dimension of Popper's critical rationalism, which is the less analyzed aspect of his philosophy. Critical rationalism is not without assumptions. As a life attitude, it is actualized on the basis of one's moral preferences based rather on assumptions than on critical reasonableness. Critical rationalism does not exclude logical argumentation and reasoning, but the adoption of them is predominantly the result of an individual moral decision and choice, based, paradoxically enough, on an irrational belief in reason. The author considers this attitude to be productive, as it emphasizes individual moral responsibility. Nobody is able to persuade us about the relevance of what we don't want to adopt and apply. Thus we find ourselves in the sphere of personal morality.
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Content available remote MORAL BORDERS IN A STATE INSTITUTION
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The border between what is human - man's inalienable and inherent rights and needs - and what is public - institutionalization of human life in the state, reaches down to the very basis of the axiological and normative system underlying the legal order of the institution of the state. This border consists in the almost 'barring' character of normative acts of state institutions which often lack public transparency, and in extreme cases are even contradictory to the endeavors of democratic countries (e.g. clarity, accessibility and openness of the principles and rules, norms and values that underlie the governing of the state). The value of democracy lies in its normative acts, so-called metaregulations or universal principles from which all other acts of state law and order originate. The bond between morality and state institution - disrupted and underestimated in history - actually does exist. The question is: Is the dependence and bond between morality and the state reflected and present in the process of creating democratic, legal acts of the state and institutions of state administration?
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Wojciszke and Baryla argue that the evaluation of one's own morality has a minimal impact on his or her global self-esteem. I suggest t’shat the empirical evidence presented by the authors may be interpreted in a different way. In my opinion, a positive evaluation of one's own morality is necessary for a human being to obtain a high level of global self-esteem.
EN
A person and morality are inseparable because all human activity has its axiological aspect. Similarly, all human activity, both verbal and non-verbal is the way to communicate with other people or with the external world. It applies to direct person to person communication and also to mass media communication. Besides the above, each activity has its aim and means to attain the aim. The article analyses the question of what relations bind a person, morality and mass media, as indicated in the title. To what extent they are in line with Immanuel Kant's personal norm: 'may a human never be the means of your actions, but the aim' or with Karol Wojtyla's personal norm, which is a specific postulate of human affirmation for the sake of humans themselves: a person can never be the means to attain the aim, because this would violate the person's dignity. The idea of the personal norm and Wojtyla's personal anthropology with the perspective of 'a person and person's deed' allow us to present these relations in the article.
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Content available remote Syntetyzm socjologiczny Luigiego Sturzo
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The article presents the conception worked out by Luigi Sturzo, the Italian priest, community worker, politician and sociologist. His theory, having both anti-collectivist and anti-nominalistic features, is defined as sociological synthetism. Sturzo’s synthetism, however, should not be mistaken for eclecticism: man and society are not two separate realities doomed to mutual coexistence, but it is one reality manifesting itself in two different ways. Hence a sociologist has to be aware that although there is the necessity to distinguish between individual and social life, which is often repeated in his studies, in his research discipline there is really no difference between what is individual and social, between what is objective and subjective. Sociological synthetism undermines the raison d’être of many widely-held, but according to Sturzo groundless divisions into individual and social: those of morality, sins, religiousness, faith, etc. On the other hand Sturzo stresses that “there is one morality, at the same time individual and social, personal and collective, just like a man is individual and social at the same time”.
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The problem of freedom considered in the broad context of self-fulfilment is in my view not merely an intellectual challenge, but also one of the most difficult existential experiences. Dealing with issues concerning the reality of human freedom and self-fulfilment directs us to the anthropological concept of the subjectivity of the individual and the questions it prompts. That is so because if we assume freedom to be a fundamental property of man’s subjectivity, embedded in its extremely complex structure, it then turns out to be among the fundamental conditions for the realisation of his humanity. By capturing more and more closely the specifics of individual subjectivity, we will achieve a deeper insight into what man really is. Karol Wojtyła’s concept of freedom is another voice in the philosophical discourse on man, his nature and the sense of his worldly pilgrimage. As we follow the successive stages and elements of Wojtyła’s phenomenological analyses, we may observe how freedom is constituted in the individual and how it can become the foundation of man’s self-fulfilment; how creative and dynamic was Wojtyła’s personal activity may perhaps also come to light.
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Content available remote Právní a pastorační aspekty formálního odpadu od katolické církve
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This article deals with the statement of Pontifical council for legislative texts in the case of the essentials for leaving the Church by a formal act. Not all such acts of defections should be interpreted as a true and willful separation from the Church (e.g .just to escape the obligation to pay the church tax most likely is not an act of reneging of the doctrinal teaching). Therefore the reason of defection from the Church has always to be examined. The point has close connection with marriage law by reason that a fallen away Catholic does not need to observe the canonical form of marriage. In the cases of the declaration of the nullity of marriage, it is necessary to examine, whether or not there is a true separation from the Church. The attitude of German bishops, according to which all the fallen away Catholics incur ipso facto an excommunication, contradicts the statement of the Pontifical council. Excommunication cannot be imposed validly for refusal to pay the church tax. The author is suggesting necessary changes of the relevant prescripts of the Codex and issuing new corrected proceeding how to treat Catholics who had fallen away from the Church.
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