Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Adaptacje i ewolucyjna inercja ludzkiego umysłu

100%

Pawłowski B.

Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae

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2010

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tom 3

109-121

EN

Human brain and its functions evolved under selection pressures. There are at least a few evolutionary approaches to human mind, behaviour and/or preferences. Apart of sociobiology, human behavioural ecology (HBE), it is evolutionary psychology (EP) that have been developed in the last 25 years. EP differs with other approaches to human mind in methodology and in the attitude to human behaviour adaptability. EP methodology, the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and mind modularity concepts, as well as examples of psychological mechanisms related to adaptations acquired in our evolutionary past that do not need to increase biological fitness in modern societies are discussed. These adaptations are: 1.) mechanism of child attachment; 2.) Westermarck effect that explains the emergence sexual aversion to close relatives in childhood and 3.) relationship between man's socio-economic status and his reproductive success in the societies with socially enforced monogamy and effective contraconception. In a few last thousands years man's environment changed dramatically, but due to lack of parallel strong selection pressure, human brain and mind almost did not change. This is why humans have still some psychological mechanisms that might not be perfect adaptations nowadays. EP does not excuse any human behaviour (as EP opponents claim), it only explains the evolutionary roots of psychological mechanisms and preferences. EP provides scientists with the new insight to human mind.

2

THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN ABHIDHARMA BUDDHISM (Podstawy abhidharmicznej koncepcji umyslu. Pojecie swiadomosci)

100%

Szymanski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2009

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nr 9

143-161

EN

According to Abhidharma thinkers mind is a set of many mental elements (dharmas). All these elements were regarded as impermanent. The basic dimension of the diachronically considered mind was believed to be a continuous succession of consciousness (citta) elements. They were believed to lie at the foundation of any psychical activity. They were to be accompanied by other mental elements (called caitasika) to determine the nature of cognitive, emotional and volitional activity of the mind at any given moment. Among them they recognised dharmas unavoidably accompanying citta elements (feelings, elements of attention, conceptual identifications, volitions etc.). The mind was apparently treated as an integral whole which is signified by the conviction that every mental dharma is adjusted to the character of the other simultaneous mental elements. Such a combination of mental dharmas was believed to determine the content of the mind in the succeeding moment (i.e. to bring about the new set of mental elements before it ceases), which is effected with such participating factors as karmic compensation and the influence of the environment.

3

METAFORA V KOGNITÍVNOVEDNOM MODELOVANÍ

100%

Gáliková S.

World Literature Studies

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2011

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tom 3 (20)

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nr 3

28 – 40

EN

There has been an ongoing intensive research of the nature of human mind in contemporary cognitive science. The author ś aim is to point out the role of metaphorical language in the experimental and theoretical mind studies. The analysis subject is to emphasize heuristic and argumentative function of metaphor in models of cognitive science representatives. Viability of this strategy appears by solving problems reaching beyond the imaginary boundaries of disciplines, f.e. reality-fiction, literal-metaphorical, text understanding, the nature of truth etc. putting significance on the function of metaphorical language in art, philosophy and science has become a great challenge for reconsidering traditional approaches to the study of human mind, body and reality.

4

Tělo a mysl, nebo ité a popisované tělo?

100%

Klikova A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2007

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tom 55

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nr 6

857-878

EN

In this article we ask the question of whether it is possible to connect phenomenology with neuroscience so as to develop the concept of the unified human being, which could be the subject of both objective information and lived experience. This question we answer with the help of the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and the phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur. Our finding is that while both authors express the need to bridge the gap between science and phenomenology, in fact they remain locked in their respective methodological frameworks. Although neuroscience says that it needs to exploit the findings of phenomenology in order to adequately grasp experience, instead it actually replaces experience with mental states. On the other hand although phenomenological hermeneutics would like to include objectivity in its operations, in fact it only simulates it by the process of the sedimentation of experience. This finding leads us to further reflections about the character of thinking and about reflection on the person. We are interested in the question of what gives rise to the thought that neuroscience and phenomenology should indeed be concerned with the same thing. What gives rise to the supposition that there should be two perspectival viewpoints on one and the same reality? We suppose, as the preceding study shows, thinking does not grasp reality but rather divides it in a certain way, always differently to another way of thinking. It is not, therefore, the case that we understand better and better what a person is, or that from a different perspective we may regard that same person, but rather that we mean by the concept of person various forms of selfoverlapping. It does not therefore make sense to attempt to create coherent closed systems for dealing with the identical human being, but rather that on the basis of one thinking to divide reality and begin to think differently.

5

Philosophy as Reverse Engineering: The Case of Daniel C. Dennett

100%

Milkowski M.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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tom 13

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nr 2(50)

75-89

EN

Daniel C. Dennett approaches philosophy of mind in a manner typical for reverse engineering. He studies the construction and behaviour of a mechanism in order to discover what are the functions of various units in the system. He applies this method to explain some biological facts and then to interpret specifically mental operations. The author tries to establish why Dennett uses this approach and proposes that his main reason may have been to sustain a naturalistic conception of mind.

6

Spinoza i Kant o naturze ludzkiego umysłu

100%

Tomaszewska A.

Filo-Sofija

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2012

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tom 12

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nr 2(17)

101-110

EN

In the paper I try to compare the Spinozian and the Kantian accounts of the mind, underlining their relevance to contemporary debates in the area. I also discuss the problem of the nature of consciousness, in particular whether, on the basis of both Spinoza’s and Kant’s theories, one can claim that consciousness, or mentality, can be regarded as specifically distinctive of human beings. My suggestion is that one cannot.

7

Relacja między Kantowską filozofią teoretyczną i praktyczną w świetle dwóch pierwszych Krytyk

88%

Jabłoński P.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2010

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tom 38

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nr 3

133-154

EN

The analysis of the problem designated in the title consists of two parts. The first, which is preparatory, presents Kant’s essential notions in theoretical and practical philosophy. The second part is an attempt to disclose the subtlety of his construction. The considerations concentrate on the following issues: 1. The key distinction for practical and theoretical cognition is the contradiction between two types of mindset rather than between two objective domains. 2. Theoretical and practical reason strictly cooperate with each other. Theoretical philosophy not only prepares the field for practical considerations, but also enriches its own activity by incorporating the latter’s achievements. 3. Since practical reason represents its own object, which turns out to be the subject, practical cognition is an effort of being the best possible version of ourselves. 4) Kant does not require that theoretical reason disclaim its eligibility to speculate about God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, but he only notes that it is necessary to be aware of the inability of theoretical cognition in resolving these matter.

8

SÚČASNÉ PERSPEKTÍVY KONCEPTU MYSLE SUSANNE K. LANGEROVEJ

88%

Košičanová A.

ESPES

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2022

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tom 11

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nr 1

99 - 114

EN

The continual possibility of aesthetic experience throughout history has prompted philosophical reflections about its nature and meaning in human life. This article outlines some neuroscientific ways of understanding their functioning, focusing specifically on Susanne Langer’s contribution. Commonly subsumed under the heading ‘philosophy of mind’ – especially due to the trilogy Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling – Langer’s interests in the human mind developed already in the 1950s, as witnessed by the paper The Deepening Mind. A Half-Century of American Philosophy. Following these lines, the article discusses Langer’s philosophical approach from the perspective of a (neuro)aesthetic inquiry, emphasizing particularly the importance of the non-discursive realm of the mind. It also shows how Langer’s account might be seen as going beyond that of John Dewey, which is often referred to as an advancement in the historical development of neuro-aesthetics.

9

Breathing new life into cognitive science

88%

Froese T.

Avant

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2011

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tom 2

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nr 1

113–129 (pl: 95-111)

EN

Abstract In this article I take an unusual starting point from which to argue for a unified cognitive science, namely a position defined by what is sometimes called the ‘life-mind continuity thesis’. Accordingly, rather than taking a widely accepted starting point for granted and using it in order to propose answers to some well defined questions, I must first establish that the idea of life-mind continuity can amount to a proper starting point at all. To begin with, I therefore assess the conceptual tools which are available to construct a theory of mind on this basis. By drawing on insights from a variety of disciplines, especially from a combination of existential phenomenology and organism-centered biology, I argue that mind can indeed be conceived as rooted in life, but only if we accept at the same time that social interaction plays a constitutive role for our cognitive capacities.

10

IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

88%

Bugar J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2008

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tom 15

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nr 4

458-472

EN

The main purpose of the paper is to criticize materialism in the philosophy of mind and to search for alternative approaches to the problems of mind, consciousness and body. According to the author, materialism does not present a satisfactory explanation of the mental life of human beings, because it fails to explain phenomena such as conscious experience, sleep, unconsciousness, death. These phenomena point to the fact that consciousness is not identical with the body and can be detached from it. The author adopts the conclusion that the solution to the problem of consciousness is closely connected to the problem of identity of a human individual. A human being plays certain social roles, he or she possesses a body, he or she possesses a mind, but is not identical with them. In its essence, the human being is identical with consciousness.

11

AN EPISTEMIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND A SELF-IDENTITY (Swiadomosc poznawcza i tozsamosc podmiotowa czlowieka wspólczesnego a mass-media)

88%

Szmyd J.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2009

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nr 48

31-46

EN

The paper considers the influence of the media picture on the mind and subjectivity of a man. It is the influence which is of considerable importance for the moulding of the cognitive process, attitudes towards life, spirituality of the individuals living in the present times. The ongoing philosophical and scientific explorations of this influence put the fundamental enquiries into the foundations of the classical theory of cognition and epistemology including the classical transcendentalism of Kant and Husserl in question. At the same time they present the possibility and necessity of their thorough revision and verification without absolute rejection. This thesis is supported in the paper by an initial analysis of the mechanism of creation of reality and cognitive functioning of electronic media, mainly television and internet, and the consideration of theory and cognitive assumptions of the philosophy of life and human existence of A. T. Tymieniecka and other contemporary concepts of a man and the cognitive process. The paper also determines the key tasks of the newly formed philosophy/epistemology of the media.

12

MIND AND EMOTIONS. A CONTRIBUTION TO MIND-BODY PROBLEM (Umysl a emocje. Glos w debacie mind-body)

88%

Jastrzebski A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2010

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tom 46

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nr 2

333-347

EN

Are emotions capable of influencing our thinking? Where is their source? Those are the questions that are subject of a scientific research in the present paper, which has, as its aim, an interdisciplinary analysis of emotional states related to cognitive processes. The newest neuroscientific discoveries supply a lot of interesting information with regard to the human brain and central nervous system and their relationship with the higher mental functions like planning or knowledge. This research points out to a reciprocal influence between emotional states and cognitive processes, which is a step forward in the mind-body problem discussion.

13

ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOW INFORMATION IS EMBODIED AND EMBEDDED WITHIN THE MIND (Ontologiczne aspekty ucielesnienia i realizacji informacji w umysle)

88%

Hetmanski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2010

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nr 11

105-131

EN

The main aim of this paper is to explain how one can talk about information as functioning ontologically within the mind. From the cybernetic point of view, coding is essential to such functioning-transforming information from one system of symbols of signs into another. Information coding takes place within the body (brain), in human use of instruments and tools, as well as in the manifold relations between humans and the environment. Using the work of Arbib, Gibson, Bateson and Dennett, this paper present a model of the manifold functioning of information within the human mind, with particular stress placed upon its significance for practical-cognitive behavior.

14

Berkeley o naturze umysłu

88%

Spryszak P.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2011

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tom 39

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nr 4

25 - 41

EN

The present essay is concerned with George Berkeley's theory of mind. An outline of his (sketchy) immaterialist theory of mind is presented and some of the principal (and well-known) difficulties are pointed out. The main problem seems to be that his attack on materialism can be easily converted into an attack on his concept of (immaterial) soul. Moreover, Berkeley offers no principle of the identity of minds; hence it is possible to argue that a troublesome consequence of his theory of mind is the possibility of an agnostic conclusion (the paper outlines an analogy between Berkeley's concept of mind and Kant's theory of the transcendental unity of apperception). In the present paper I show that it is possible to overcome these difficulties by formulating Berkeley's philosophy in pragmatic terms.

15

Uwagi o języku w filozofii Kartezjusza, Locke`a, Hume`a, Leibniza, Kanta i Milla

88%

Maciejczak M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2011

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tom 39

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nr 3

7-92

EN

The main problems of modern philosophy concern sources, limits and character of knowledge. Objectivity and validity of knowledge are justified by critique and analysis of structure and function of the mind. Investigations focus primarily on the epistemological issues. Philosophers see the roots of meaning of language in mind or experience. Pure intuition of Descartes, experience of British Empiricists, universal language of Leibniz, Kant’s notions of the pure reason and Mill’s criteria of the correct reasoning are not connected to language. In their opinion language is not a suitable means of representing the world. A very fast development of empirical linguistic studies - works of Herder, Hamann and Humboldt etc. evoke much interest in language. The situation begins to change: critique of language is gradually taking place of critique of reason. Instead of ideas in the mind philosophers discuss linguistic expressions and question of how they refer to the world.

16

Spontaniczność świadomości: Analiza neurofenomenologiczna

88%

Hanna R. , Thompson E.

Avant

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2010

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tom 1

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nr 1

EN

It is now conventional wisdom that conscious experience — or in Nagel’s canonical characterization, “what it is like to be” for an organism — is what makes the mind-body problem so intractable. By the same token, our current conceptions of the mind-body relation are inadequate and some conceptual development is urgently needed. Our overall aim in this paper is to make some progress towards that conceptual development. We first examine a currently neglected, yet fundamental aspect of consciousness. This aspect is the spontaneity of consciousness, by which we mean its inner plasticity and inner purposiveness. We then sketch a “neurophenomenological” framework for thinking about the relationship between the spontaneity of consciousness and dynamic patterns of brain activity as studied in cognitive neuroscience. We conclude by proposing that the conscious mentality of sentient organisms or animals is active and dynamic, and that this “enactive” conception of consciousness can help us to move beyond the classical dichotomy between materialism and dualism.

17

SOME (PHILOSOPHICAL) PROBLEMS FOR CONSCIOUSNESS AS A NEURAL CAPACITY FOR OBJECTIVITY

88%

Boongaling J. I. K.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2015

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tom 22

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nr 3

325 - 339

EN

This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objectivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has the first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have the third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the “hard problem” of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness.

18

DOES THE FUNDAMENTALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS ENTAIL ITS UBIQUITY?

88%

Blamauer M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2012

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tom 67

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nr 3

243 – 254

EN

Property dualists commonly consider consciousness to be a further fundamental feature of reality in addition to its physical properties. Fundamental physical properties are ubiquitous: every physical object and its intrinsic properties ontologically depend on fundamental particles and their fundamental intrinsic features. However, property dualists mostly restrict the range of mental properties to a set of systems that satisfy a particular physical description. This paper challenges the approach of restriction and argues that if mental properties are ontologically fundamental then they must be widespread as well.

19

ĽUDSKÁ PRIRODZENOSŤ, ROZUM A EMÓCIE: POHĽAD T. AKVINSKÉHO A D. HUMA

75%

Chabada M. , Szapuová M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2017

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tom 72

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nr 9

698 – 710

EN

The paper deals with the understanding of human nature in the philosophy of T. Aquinas and D. Hume. Its aim is to highlight some of the naturalistic tendencies in the writings of both authors. Naturalism is conceived as a position which in the explanation of human nature underlines the role of natural dispositions, inclinations and capacities operating in human mind, which are out of the control of reason. Aquinas and Hume are presented as philosophers of human nature. This view is supported by their understanding of the role of natural propensities of human beings as well as the relationship between reason and emotions (passions) and also their respective explanations of moral actions.

20

Steroids and ion channels in evolution: from bacteria to synapses and mind. Evolutionary role of steroid regulation of GABA(A) receptors

75%

Majewska M. D.

Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis

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2007

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tom 67

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nr 3

219-233

EN

Ion channels are vital components of plasma membranes. This article presents an evolutionary view of the biochemical mechanism of controlling activity of ion channels by rigid lipids, such as steroids or biophysically similar molecules, which were instrumental in formation and control of ion channels in cell membranes at the very origin of life. Such regulatory mechanisms exist in all cellular forms of life from ancient bacteria to humans and participate in a diversity of biological functions, from the most basic, such as maintenance of cell shape, homeostasis, feeding, cell fusion, and reproduction to the most intricate, such as the mind. Learning about the regulation of membrane ion channels by steroids and like molecules is important for understanding the evolution of life and various aspects of cell and organism physiology, for unraveling the mysteries of mind, and for practical purposes such as developing new pharmacotherapies.