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Content available remote Sceptycyzm Pascala
Some of Pascal’s statements, like le „pyrronisme est le vrai”, suggest that he should be counted among sceptics, even though this claim seems to contradict the general appeal of his thought. Indeed, Pascal is known as a philosopher who desperately sought truth to finally find certainty in mystical experience. He did not deny that the human reason may have a chance to attain wisdom knowledge, provided that reason would not try to reach beyond its natural limits. Nevertheless, a kind of skepticism is certainly present in his philosophy. Its nature needs clarification, which is the aim of this paper. Drawing on a distinction made by I. Dąmbska between theoretical and normative scepticism, the author introduces the notion of existential skepticism, which most adequately renders Pascal’s view on the inability of reason to grasp by its own power the very nature of human condition.
The paper defends the thesis that the only possible answer to the global skepticism is the so called ontological proof: only God's truthfulness and His bonitas can guarantee the rejection of such skeptical hypothesis as the one of R. Decscartes' stating that we are deceived by some evil demon or H. Putnam's claim that we are brains in vats. The author proposes an interpretation of the ontological proof in the spirit of I. Kant's considerations from his 'Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes' (1762) where Kant uses the concepts of necessity and possibility in order to proof God's existence. Existence is a perfection and hence it must be one of the attributes that form the idea of God. Also truthfulness and bonitas must be treated as belonging to the idea of a perfect being. The truth condition for the sentence 'Perfect necessary being exists' is the real existence of a perfect necessary being but at same the time the truth condition for this sentence is its condition of possibility. This sentence could not be possible, if the object it refers to had not existed, e.g. if the perfect necessary being had not existed. Because this sentence is something real it must be also possible and from this follows that the perfect necessary being exists. Analogically, every attempt to suppose that it is possible that perfect necessary being does not exist presupposes real existence of perfect necessary being because nothing could be possible, if something were not necessary. 'Perfect necessary being exists' is the only sentence where the truth condition and condition of possibility coincide in this way. God's truthfulness and His bonitas guarantee that we are not deceived by some evil demon or that we are not brains in vat.
G. E. Moore replies to scepticism by using propositions which are trivially true from the common sense perspective. However, it seems that his replies are not effective, because the sceptic's doubts concern precisely the common sense truths. This problem became the subject of various interpretations. N. Malcolm and B. Stroud suggest that Moore is not trying to refute scepticism directly (he would not have been successful and it is not probable that he would have overlooked such a 'fatal' error). Therefore, they look for an alternative interpretation of Moore's replies. They find the ground of their effectiveness in his pointing to the use of words, as well as in the illegitimacy of the sceptic's position. The author offers an interpretation in the terms of reliabilism, which avoids the defects of the previous ones and does not require an alternative understanding of Moore's propositions: Moore insists on the reliability of perception what enables him to yield effective replies to scepticism in agreement with common sense.
Similarly to Husserl's gradually developing view of the fundamental phenomenological questions also his relationship to the philosophy of R. Descartes and to the history of philosophy as a whole underwent several changes. There is for example his shift from stressing (Descartes') 'universal attempt at doubt' to 'misunderstanding of Descartes' own discovery of ego'. Husserl sees Descartes' methodical skepticism as a crucial historical impulse for articulating his own conception of 'epoché'. Descartes' methodical skepticism and Husserl's putting in brackets the general thesis about the existence of the world show the closest parallel between their philosophical doctrines. Further, similarly to Descartes Husserl also aims at reforming the philosophy of his time; in Descartes' 'Meditations on first philosophy' he finds the way leading to transcendental phenomenology. However, there are also differences in their projects of universal philosophy. While for Descartes the model of his 'mathesis universalis' is mathematical science, Husserl aims - with far reaching consequences - at creating transcendental phenomenology as a strictly scientific philosophy which must offer a fundamental organon to all other sciences and thus enable them to undergo fundamental reforms.
W.V.O. Quine declared more than once that he was a naturalist. This claim must not be limited to one or another field of philosophy but should be understood as pertaining to every possible aspect philosophy. In ontology Quine wrote about 'ontological commitments of theories', in philosophy of logic he spoke of 'existence being a value of a variable', in semantics he opted for 'semantic behaviorism', and in epistemology he urged to 'make do with psychology'. The author concentrates on Quine's epistemology and shows how his views were different from other positions held in that field. The common key is naturalization. This view is supported by showing how Quine responded to his critics. To fend off skeptical doubts he argues that sceptical doubts are to be placed within science and not used as an external criterion of its results. When defending himself against the acusation that he eliminated all normative claims from science, Quine argued that axiological investigation have ultimately a scientific character. Finally when he proposed to naturalize epistemology his justification was based on the concept of holism, which was to be construed as one more plank in the naturalisatic boat that must be repaired at open sea, in his favorite metaphore invented by Neurath.
This is an attempt to investigate two opposite positions in the controversy about justification of knowledge - foundationalism and coherentism. The author refers to the views of Edmund Gettier, Ernst Sosa and Keith Lehrer. The main findings can be summarized as follows. The author argues that the two opposite positions are not dramatically contrary. Moreover, taking a clue from Sosa, he distinguishes an ideal of knowledge based on formal criteria from substantive knowledge that bears the stamp of revocable theory. Finally, going in the footsteps of Lehrer, he identifies genuine knowledge with a search for truth and indicates that a new form of justification of knowledge is to be looked-for in the hope that the new approach will redefine such concepts as relativism, skepticism and epistemological realism.
The aim of the article is to systematize fundamental concepts involved in the philosophical debate on realism and idealism. In the first (historical) part distinction between appearance and reality (which has its roots in ancient philosophy) is presented as one of the sources of the modern debate on realism and idealism. In this part different interpretations of realism and idealism (Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Heidegger, Moore, Carnap) are also analyzed. The second part is concerned with definitions of four fundamental oppositions: metaphysical idealism and epistemological idealism, metaphysical realism and epistemological realism. The third part discusses different forms of realism (naive realism, critical realism, scientific realism, transcendental realism and conceptual realism) and introduces the concept of antirealism. Fourth part deals with connections between realism and idealism debate and such philosophical standpoints as skepticism, agnosticism and solipsism.
The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.
The first part of the paper focuses on the long conflict between East and West, which reached its peak with the movement of the Kollyvades in the 17th and 18th century. What is of great interest here is the fact that we do not deal with a single event in the ecclesiastical history, but with an issue of Orthodox theology, which extends to our modern times. In the second part, we probe into the basic Hesychastic principles of the three Kolyvades Saints – Macarius Notaras, Athanasius Parios and Nicodemus the Athonite; in particular we explore their Filocalistic approach, their idea of the Invisible War, and their Anti-papalism. Finally, the prominence of the Church Fathers in their work is examined along with their contribution to the liturgical life and their views about education.
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The analysis in the text presented concerns the phenomenon of self-cre- ation and self-perception, referring Paul de Man’s contemplations in the Autobiography as De-facement study, as well as early monography by Em- manuel Levinas, From Existence to Existents. Self-creational and autobi- ographical statement or action reveal moments in which a certain mul- tithreading is exposed, a tear, which becomes a basis for the analysis of works by Chuck Close, Yves Klein, Cy Twombly and Marina Abramović. Self- perception and self-introspection lay at grassroots of thinking and artistic creativity, and in a way also self-mythology of solipsistic ego. By creating a self-portrait the artist duels oneself in a most difficult self-creative clash. Impersonal “I” as another form of revealing “I”, it exposes through, among others, vigil and insomnia as a particular state of mind, similar to de Man’s “blurring” of the mind described by me.
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